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 1 
Introduction 
 
On January 7, 2011, I interviewed former Egyptian State Security Court Judge 
Said Ashmawy at his apartment in Cairo’s posh Zamalek district.  I had just started 
another round of fieldwork for my dissertation on Egypt’s “durable authoritarianism,” 
and given State Security’s central role in manipulating the Mubarak regime’s political 
opponents, Ashmawy promised to be a fascinating interviewee.  But he was also 
astoundingly odd. 
The oddness began from the moment I approached his building.  A police officer 
was expecting me, and he escorted me to an elevator, locked us inside, unlocked us when 
we reached Ashmawy’s floor, and accompanied me to Ashmawy’s door, leaving only 
after he saw that I had safely entered Ashmawy’s apartment.  The septuagenarian 
Ashmawy welcomed me tersely, guiding me along a narrow path through a bric-a-brac-
crammed reception room, and into a living room that contained even more bric-a-brac: 
glass animals, antique furniture, porcelain figurines, brass lamps, wood carvings – the 
works.  The room was dark, and Ashmawy sat at a distance from me, with an antique 
couch separating us, while an antique lampshade further obscuring his face.  As we 
chatted, elevator muzak hummed in the background, with the occasionally recognizable 
show tune piping through. 
Despite the odd setup, the interview went well enough.  For about an hour, 
Ashmawy mostly confirmed much of what dozens of opposition party leaders had already 
told me: that Egypt’s opposition parties were tightly controlled by State Security; that 
State Security’s primary task was enforcing certain generally understood “red lines,” such 
as bans on criticizing the military and the Mubarak family; and that opposition parties 
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often received various benefits, including financial rewards, for agreeing to this 
arrangement.  When we moved on to other topics, he explained that he had been granted 
24-hour police protection after receiving threats from the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
objected to his criticisms of the group’s Islamist ideology.  He also discussed his career, 
which included authorship of over thirty books and an honorary degree from Harvard 
University – too little time for a wife, he said. 
 Suddenly, our conversation halted.  “When are you going to see Rob Satloff 
next?” Ashmawy asked me, referring to the executive director of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, who had given me Ashmawy’s phone number  
 “I don’t know,” I replied.  I was set to be in Egypt for the next three months, and 
had no plans to visit Washington thereafter.  “Maybe in six months.” 
 “Well, take down a message for me,” said Ashmawy.  “And don’t e-mail it to 
him.” 
 According to my notes, the message went as follows (emphasis mine): 
Stability is not with the regime.  The regime here is fragile, so it's better to work on 
both sides: with the regime and with the people.  And in 2-3 years, we can [discredit] 
the slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood is now gaining an 
advantage because people hate the regime, and find nothing in the Wafd party.  And 
[opposition party] Tagammu, [opposition leader] Ayman Nour, [and Ghad party 
leader] Moussa Mustafa Moussa are not popular, and are not working for principles.  
They just want [to achieve personal, i.e., corrupt] benefits. … 
 
There should be a state president and a government with a real parliament that can 
make real decisions.  There should be some people in charge of the legislature, and you 
need technocrats in agriculture, transportation, and education to lift the country.  And 
the first thing that we must do is work against corruption, and we need to restore the 
rule of law to regain public trust.  Currently there is no rule of law.  It's the role of the 
president or the [ruling National Democratic] Party, so people are not convinced by 
anyone, and they view law as a tool for ruling them.  And as you see in Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Egypt, rulers are looking for money, and some of them are surrounded by 
corrupt people while the people [i.e., general public] cannot eat.  There were 
revolutions in Algeria and Tunisia, and it's coming to Egypt because the people 
see others [e.g., officials] making money and they cannot find food. 
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The date, again, was January 7, 2011.  The “revolutions” that he was observing in 
Algeria and Tunisia had not crossed my radar.  And they were not, in any event, 
revolutions just yet.   
Moreover, my research on Egyptian opposition parties up until that point, which 
included over 100 interviews with opposition party leaders since the summer of 2010, 
had led me to believe that Hosni Mubarak was a remarkably efficient authoritarian ruler.  
Only two months earlier, Egypt’s opposition parties had been demoralized in the most 
rigged elections in Egyptian history – without any perceptible response from either these 
parties or the Egyptian public more broadly.  Indeed, Mubarak had seemingly frustrated 
his opponents to the point of exhaustion, and therefore his regime appeared remarkably 
stable.  Even despite his reported health problems, it was widely expected that he would 
“run” for his sixth six-year term in September 2011 – and, of course, win. 
So as I surveyed the bric-a-brac-crammed room, arched my neck to look past the 
antique lampshade that otherwise obscured Ashmawy’s face, and heard him predict an 
anti-Mubarak revolution while a lyrics-less version of “Don’t Cry for Me Argentina” 
played in the background, only one thought crossed my mind: this guy is nuts. 
“Don’t e-mail it to Rob,” he repeated.  “You have to tell him in person.”  
After a brief tour of his figurines, which I had requested, Ashmawy dialed his 24-
hour police guardian, who arrived and escorted me out of the building.  As with most of 
my interviewees, I did not expect to hear from him again. 
 Yet the following day, Ashmawy gave me a call.   “Did you tell Rob what I told 
you?”  he asked. 
 “No, you told me to tell him in person.” 
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 “I really think you need to e-mail it now,” he said.  “E-mail it now.” 
 So later that evening, I e-mailed Satloff, transcribing Ashmawy’s message 
verbatim.  I strongly considered including my own view that Ashmawy was crazy, but 
thought better of it.  Ashmawy, after all, was a former State Security Court judge and, for 
all I knew, that meant he could monitor my e-mail.  I thus kept my message to Satloff 
neutral.  “I look forward to sharing my own views on this in the future,” I signed off. 
 Exactly one week later, mass demonstrations in Tunisia, to which I had barely 
paid attention, forced longtime dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s ouster.  Ashmawy 
suddenly seemed like a sage, and he called me to gloat. 
 “See?”  he said.   
 “Yeah,” I replied.  “Nice job predicting that one.  I’m impressed.” 
 It was the last time we spoke.  But just over two weeks later, as I stood on a long 
line outside of Cairo International Airport waiting to be evacuated from Egypt amidst the 
revolt that would ultimately end Mubarak’s dictatorship, my meeting with Ashmawy was 
all I could think of.  The notion of a popular uprising against Egypt’s notoriously stable 
regime had seemed so ridiculous, and the figurine-filled setting in which Ashmawy made 
his prediction had only affirmed for me its ridiculousness.  But as it turned out, Ashmawy 
was extremely prescient, and it was my dissertation on “durable authoritarianism” that 
looked ridiculous.  It had all happened so fast.   
The intellectual whiplash that I was feeling at that moment, and which I still 
occasionally feel today, motivates the central puzzle of this dissertation.  How was a 
seemingly stable ruler’s thirty-year dictatorship toppled after only eighteen days?  Or, 
more broadly, how can authoritarian regimes that last so long fall so quickly?  
 5 
The Argument 
 In this dissertation, I argue that formally democratic institutions can bolster 
autocratic regimes’ longevity.  While previous studies of “durable authoritarianism” have 
examined the role of strong ruling parties in preventing intra-regime fissures1 and the use 
of tightly controlled parliamentary elections to distribute political patronage and 
accommodate pro-regime elites,2 this dissertation examines opposition parties under 
Mubarak to show how regimes can coopt legalized opposition parties, thereby “trapping” 
potential opponents within them and preventing insurrection.   
By looking granularly at the ways in which Egypt’s regime dealt with three 
opposition parties – the Tagammu, Wafd, and Ghad parties – I argue that opposition 
parties are willing to accept profound limitations on their activities under autocratic 
conditions for a number of reasons, some of which echo the findings of previous works 
on opposition parties under authoritarianism.  For example, some opposition party 
members receive political patronage in exchange for participating in the regime’s pseudo-
democratic structures,3 and the parties are often “motivated by higher principles” – such 
as promoting their ideological programs – than merely attaining power.4  In addition to 
these explanations, however, I argue that opposition parties under autocratic regimes 
often serve as social clubs for like-minded people from similar personal backgrounds, 
which is why members stay attached to parties that have no shot of winning.  Moreover, 
the members of these parties often take a long view of history, and believe that they can 
                                                           
1 See Smith (2005), Brownlee (2007), and Reuter and Remington (2009). 
2 See Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), Koehler (2008), and Blaydes (2011). 
3 See Kassem (1999). 
4 Yemile Mizrahi, From Martyrdom to Power: The Partido Acción Nacional in Mexico (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003) 6. 
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preserve their party so that it will compete in a post-authoritarian future by playing 
according to the regime’s rules for the time being. 
Yet, as I further argue, regimes that rely on electoral authoritarian institutions to 
enhance their longevity are more vulnerable than the literature commonly assumes.  The 
fact that autocratic regimes’ formally democratic institutions are not, in fact, democratic 
at all damages their credibility over time, and may deter newly emerging oppositionists 
from participating in them.  When this happens, the newly emerging oppositionists may 
refuse to participate in autocratic elections and/or heavily manipulated opposition parties, 
and may seek other – potentially more threatening – means for protesting their regimes, 
which could undermine these regimes’ durability. 
To illustrate these dynamics, I examine the emergence of pro-democratic activists 
in Egypt during in the first decade of the twenty-first century, analyzing these activists’ 
refusal to participate in the Mubarak regime’s parliamentary elections or legalized 
opposition parties, which they viewed as fraudulent.  Because the regime’s electoral 
authoritarian institutions lacked credibility, I argue, these activists sought other means of 
challenging the regime and, through trial and error, developed a set of protest strategies 
that ultimately sparked Egypt’s 2011 uprising and Mubarak’s ouster.  This argument 
carries an implicit counterfactual: had the Mubarak regime made its formally democratic 
institutions appear more credible, it might have been able to trap these activists and 
thereby prevent the uprising from happening when it did.  Still, this is easier said than 
done, since an autocratic regime’s elections cannot, by definition, be credible. 
Outline for the Rest of This Dissertation 
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 The political science literature on authoritarianism offers compelling explanations 
for how regimes can manipulate formally democratic institutions – such as ruling parties, 
parliamentary elections, and opposition parties – to bolster their longevity.  My first 
chapter examines this literature, and argues that electoral authoritarian institutions can 
enhance regimes’ durability: ruling parties can manage intra-elite conflicts; parliamentary 
elections can be used to distribute spoils; and opposition parties can be coopted through 
political patronage or policy concessions.  I further argue that oppositionists will stay 
committed to opposition parties that cannot win for reasons that the literature does not 
appreciate: these opposition parties serve as social clubs for like-minded individuals with 
similar backgrounds, and they can also protect their members from the regime’s more 
extreme forms of repression.  By allowing oppositionists to join supine parties to which 
they feel personal attachment, regimes can prevent these individuals from pursuing other 
– potentially more threatening – means of opposing them. 
 Yet, as I also argue in Chapter 1, the literature on electoral authoritarianism looks 
too narrowly at elites for sources of potential regime breakdown, thereby overlooking the 
many other societal forces that can undermine regimes’ durability.  Specifically, the 
literature ignores the extent to which electoral authoritarian institutions are inherently 
weak: the unwinnability of autocrats’ elections and subservience of the opposition parties 
that participate in them undermines these institutions’ credibility, and may lead newly 
emerging regime opponents to seek other outlets for protesting the regime.  For this 
reason, I argue, the literature on durable authoritarianism must look beyond the elites 
who have been coopted by formally democratic institutions in assessing potential threats 
to durability. 
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 To illustrate how autocratic regimes manipulate opposition parties to keep them 
“trapped” and thereby prevent their members from challenging the regime, Chapters 2 
and 3 feature case studies of the Tagammu and Wafd parties, respectively.  As I show, 
when these parties were founded, they contained prominent opposition leaders whom the 
regime feared: the founders of the Tagammu Party were major figures during the 1977 
Bread Riots, during which President Anwar Sadat had to call in the military to restore 
order; and the founders of the New Wafd party were elite leaders from the original Wafd, 
which was Egypt’s ruling party before the 1952 Free Officers Revolution.  But by the eve 
of the January 2011 uprising, the regime had subdued both parties through a variety of 
tactics, such as the use of political patronage to buy the parties’ leaders’ quiescence.  
Moreover, though many Wafd and Tagammu leaders recognized that their parties were 
not truly opposing the regime, they stayed committed to the parties anyway because these 
parties were effectively social clubs consisting of like-minded and similarly situated 
people.  As a result, these parties offered only modest criticism of the regime and 
abstained from street demonstrations. 
 Still, opposition groups occasionally refuse to accept the implicit exchange of 
legalization and patronage for abiding by the regime’s “red lines.”  In these cases, I 
argue, regimes abandon their efforts at coopting opposition parties and instead resort to 
outright repression, which aims to contain or, when possible, destroy these parties.  To 
examine these dynamics, Chapters 4 and 5 provide case studies of the liberal Ghad party 
and Muslim Brotherhood, respectively.  As I will show, the Mubarak regime responded 
to the Ghad party’s strong criticisms by jailing its leader and placing the party under a 
puppet leadership, and it prevented the Brotherhood from mobilizing its nationwide 
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support networks against the regime through a series of harsh crackdowns.  While these 
tactics never “trapped” either the Brotherhood or the original leaders of the Ghad party – 
both remained strong critics of the regime – they rendered the Ghad party ineffective and 
successfully deterred the Brotherhood from participating in anti-regime protest activities. 
 While regimes’ use of formally democratic institutions to coopt some opposition 
parties can enhance their durability, these institutions contain an inherent weakness: they 
lack credibility, and may thereby deter newly emerging oppositionists from participating 
in them.  I use a case study of Egypt’s revolutionary activists in Chapter 6 to illustrate 
these dynamics, observing these activists’ emergence during the final decade of 
Mubarak’s rule and their refusal to join either the “trapped” opposition parties, which the 
activists viewed as frauds because of the parties’ avoidance of anti-regime protest 
activities.  
 Finally, in Chapter 7, I argue that regimes’ use of electoral authoritarian 
institutions to trap opposition parties might be insufficient to enhancing their durability.  
Taking a granular look at Egypt’s opposition movements and parties on the eve of the 
2011 anti-Mubarak revolt, I show that the “trapped” opposition parties’ refusal to 
participate in the January 25 protests could not ultimately prevent the uprising that 
followed.  This is because the “untrapped” activists, who studiously avoided the regime’s 
electoral authoritarian institutions, developed a series of protest strategies through trial-
and-error that succeeded in mobilizing the masses into the streets – precisely the outcome 
that Mubarak’s democratic façade intended to preempt. 
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Chapter 1 
Durable Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Vulnerability 
 
Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade rule and eighteen-day demise presents an 
interesting puzzle for political science: how can regimes last so long yet fall so rapidly?  
As I argue in this chapter, the academic literature on “durable authoritarianism” offers 
many valuable insights into the types of institutions that autocrats can use to bolster the 
longevity of their regimes.  One subset of this literature, which focuses on electoral 
authoritarian regimes, examines the extent to which non-democratic regimes can use 
formally democratic institutions – such as ruling parties, parliamentary elections, and 
legalized opposition parties – to manage potential conflicts within the regimes, coopt 
potential opponents, and thereby prevent the regime from breaking down.  Indeed, the 
Mubarak regime’s use of these tools explains, at least partially, its thirty-year durability. 
Yet as I further argue, the literature on electoral authoritarianism focuses too 
narrowly on elites, and therefore misses the multitude of sources from which severe 
threats to regimes’ durability may emerge.  This literature also fails to acknowledge a 
weakness inherent in electoral authoritarian regimes: namely, that their heavily 
manipulated elections and severely coopted opposition parties ultimately lack credibility 
with the public, and may thereby deter newly emerging activists from participating in 
them.  These shortcomings in the electoral authoritarianism literature explain why few 
political scientists anticipated Egypt’s 2011 uprising: they were too focused on elites as 
the possible source for regime breakdown, and failed to appreciate how the lack of 
credibility regarding the Mubarak regime’s formally democratic structures might drive 
oppositionists to find new – and ultimately more potent – tools for protesting the regime. 
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I. Electoral Authoritarianism and Its Shortcomings 
 The literature on electoral authoritarianism provides some useful explanations for 
understanding how autocratic regimes can manipulate formally democratic institutions to 
bolster their durability.  But its emphasis on ruling parties as key regime stabilizers 
overlooks threats to the regime that might emerge from the opposition.  Meanwhile, even 
those studies that examine regimes’ manipulation of opposition parties to enhance their 
stability overstate the extent to which this strategy can keep regime opponents “trapped.”  
In this section, I trace the emergence of the electoral authoritarian literature; analyze its 
shortcomings; and explain the motivation for this dissertation. 
a. The Theoretical Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism  
 The realization that formally democratic institutions could be manipulated to 
enhance the durability of non-democratic regimes emerged following the Cold War.  The 
disparate political trajectories of post-Soviet states led scholars of political transitions to 
question the “third wave” transitions literature of the 1970s and 1980s, which viewed 
intra-regime fissures as catalyzing democratization,5 and examine whether different types 
of regimes yielded different transitional outcomes.6  The realization that some transitions 
from autocratic rule yielded outcomes that appeared to be somewhere between 
democracy and authoritarianism led scholars to question the very dichotomy between 
these two forms of government.  Analysts were particularly confused by the emergence 
                                                           
5 See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1991). 
6 For example, Linz and Stepan (1996) argued that prior regime type affects prospects for democratization, 
especially in “sultanistic” and “post-totalitarian” countries.  Geddes (1999) demonstrated this link between 
prior regime-type and prospects for democratization empirically, noting that single-party regimes are the 
least likely to break down, while military regimes are the most likely to do so. McFaul (2002) similarly 
acknowledged that political transitions might yield non-democratic regimes, arguing that the ideology of 
the most powerful party often determined the emerging regime type. 
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of regimes in which autocratic rule persisted despite the adoption of formally democratic 
institutions, such as elections and independent courts.7    
 Initially, political scientists responded to this puzzle by specifying an intermediate 
regime-type between democracy and authoritarianism, since, “every step toward political 
liberalization matters both for the prospect of a transition to democracy and for the 
quality of political life as it is daily experience by abused and aggrieved citizens.”8  Yet 
scholars struggled in naming this new regime-type, and initially questioned whether 
regimes were deliberately subverting formally democratic institutions,9 or whether the 
institutions were, themselves, simply too weak to promote political liberalization.10  
Scholars also disagreed on whether this “gray zone,” in which formally democratic 
institutions coincided with autocratic tendencies, constituted a point on the path towards 
democracy,11 or whether it represented the entrenchment of autocratic rule through more 
sophisticated means.12   
                                                           
7 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transitions Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13.1 (Jan. 2002) 6, 10. 
8 Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of 
Democracy (Apr. 2002) 33. 
9 Diamond (2002) argued that the formally democratic institutions of “hybrid regimes” mask “the reality of 
authoritarian domination” (33).  Levitsky and Way (2002) agreed: the formally democratic institutions of 
“competitive authoritarian regimes” are violated “so often and to such an extent … that the regime fails to 
meet conventional minimum standards for democracy” (52). 
10 O’Donnell (1999) blamed the institutions, arguing that “delegative democracy” features elections that 
only hold incumbents “vertically accountable”; though incumbents can be voted out of office, they may 
otherwise govern as they wish without much pushback from other governmental figures.  See 160, 164-
166. 
11 Brumberg (2002) argued that the partial openness of “liberalized autocracies” gives “oppositionists a 
voice in the parliament or even the cabinet” and might encourage autocratic rulers to liberalize when they 
can accommodate the opposition at a relatively low cost (57-58).   Posusney (2005) also viewed “electoral 
authoritarian” regimes as a mere step behind democracy, arguing that even manipulated elections can 
provide a forum for diverse segments of society to debate their collective future, as well as new 
opportunities for political mobilization (92).   Hadenius and Teorell (2007) backed this view statistically: 
examining a variety of regime-types, they found that “limited multiparty regimes” have short life spans 
(9.97 years) and democratize most frequently (143, 152). 
12 Schedler (2002) argued that formally democratic institutions under otherwise autocratic regimes 
comprised “authoritarian window-dressing” to appease foreign and domestic critics (36-37). Ottaway 
(2003) agreed: in her study of “semi-authoritarian” regimes, she noted that formally democratic institutions 
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 Increasingly, the “electoral authoritarianism” literature has accepted this latter 
view: elections under autocracy reinforce non-democratic rulers’ power.  In this vein, 
autocratic elections are viewed as “competitive clientelism,” in which candidates vie to 
act as intermediaries in patron-client relationships,13 or partake in the system for their 
own enrichment.  Autocratic elections also “institutionalize dominance through formal 
channels, provide important information for the regime regarding the performance of 
party leaders and rank-and-file cadre, offer focal point for the redistribution of wealth to 
state employees and the citizenry, provide a façade for high-level corruption, and enhance 
the international reputation of the autocrat while strengthening his political hold.”14 
b. The Ruling Party Bolsters Durability – But Cannot Prevent Breakdown 
 Much of the scholarly literature on electoral authoritarianism focuses on one 
formally democratic institution in particular: the ruling party.  To some extent, this is a 
consequence of the literature’s emergence from studies of third-wave transitions, which 
emphasize intra-regime splits as the cause of regime breakdowns15 and which 
consequently led many scholars to view ruling parties as vital for preventing intra-regime 
splits that might catalyze political transitions.16 
                                                                                                                                                                             
are deliberately weak, since permitting a broader allocation of power would cause “the democratic façade 
to crumble” (16). 
13 Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 12 (2009) 404, 411. 
14 Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 2. 
15 See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Przeworski (1991), and Geddes (1999). 
16 See Smith (2005), Brownlee (2007), and Reuter and Remington (2009). 
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 Specifically, scholars view ruling parties as “the aggregator and regulator of 
competing interests,”17 as well as vital to maintaining the regime’s internal solidarity by 
permitting “the play of factions and for recurrent reconciliation.”18  Ruling parties are 
especially conducive to a regime’s durability when its members have “predictable access 
to policy-making and political power and stood more to gain than to lose by standing by” 
the regime.19   Finally, strong ruling parties ensure the regime’s domination of the 
political sphere: they support grassroots party organizations that “maintain authoritarian 
stability ‘on the ground’”; “deter defectors by ensuring that defectors will fail”; “facilitate 
executive succession”; organize electoral victories; and “facilitate legislative control” by 
keeping the regime’s allies in line.20 
 Studies of Egypt’s post-1952 regime echo many of these findings.21  While 
accounts of the Nasser years (1954-1970) view the ruling party as vital to channeling 
mass support during moments of crisis, the ruling party’s purpose later shifted towards 
managing conflicts within the regime once the regime stabilized.  The National 
Democratic Party (NDP), which President Anwar Sadat founded in 1978, thus served as 
“a tool for controlling the legislature,” through which the party could more easily “obtain 
                                                           
17 Samuel Huntington, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems,” Authoritarian Politics in 
Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement 
H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers 1970) 39-40. 
18 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 231. 
19 Benjamin Smith, “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single-
Party Rule,” World Politics 57.3 (Apr. 2005) 449. 
20 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 62-64. 
21 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000) 120-121; Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic 
Argument,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Sept. 
1999) 33. 
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legal sanction for the regime’s policies.”22  This party’s “inextricable ties to the state and 
the latter’s control of vast resources”23 encouraged NDP members to solve their disputes 
within the party rather than defecting, since defection would entail sacrificing access to 
these resources.  The NDP further “curbed elites’ incentives to exit the regime or push for 
change from the outside” by “providing opportunities for long-term personal 
advancement and political influence.”24 
 While the strength of Mubarak’s ruling party likely contributed to the longevity of 
his regime, it could not ultimately prevent the 2011 uprising.  Oppositionists, after all, 
catalyzed the uprising, and it took the NDP nine days to respond to the revolt, by which 
point it responded weakly and was unable to save the regime.25  In turn, this dissertation 
emphasizes a second type of formally democratic institution under authoritarianism as a 
possible enhancer of regime durability: opposition parties. 
c. Opposition Parties: Regime Enhancers, Political Sideshows, Or Both? 
 Political scientists also viewed regimes’ legalization of opposition parties as 
explaining autocratic durability.  According to the scholarly literature on electoral 
authoritarianism, regimes permit opposition parties for a number of reasons.  Opposition 
parties provide key information to the regime on the strength of the opposition26; signal 
political competitiveness and thereby promote economic investment27; and serve as a 
“safety valve” that renders “much opposition activity harmless while satisfying at least 
                                                           
22 Ami Ayalon, “Egypt’s Political Order: Continuity and Challenges,” The Politics of Change in the Middle 
East, Robert B. Satloff, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 206-207. 
23 Blaydes (2011) 9. 
24 Brownlee (2007) 156. 
25 Tarek Masoud, “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square,” Journal of Democracy 22.3 (Jul. 2011) 23. 
26 Magaloni (2006) 15. 
27 Joseph Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?  How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth 
and Investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52.2 (Apr. 2008) 322-323, 327. 
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some of the political expectations of the small but influential … intelligentsia and 
boosting the regime’s democratic credentials.”28  Moreover – and perhaps most 
importantly – regimes permit opposition parties because they have learned from history 
that excluding elites from political power often invites rebellion, and they therefore 
distribute political and economic spoils to buy off their would-be opponents.29   
 Multiparty elections and legislatures are vital to this distribution process, serving 
as forums in which rulers and outside groups negotiate over the distribution of 
patronage.30  To ensure that the opposition can never gain too much strength, regimes 
structure the rules of the electoral game to their benefit.31  Moreover, the fact that 
opposition parties must participate in these elections in order to receive any benefits 
“traps” them in a set of unwinnable electoral institutions and forces them to accept the 
quiescence-for-spoils bargain.32  Previous political studies of Egypt echoed these 
findings,33 and portrayed opposition parties under Mubarak as hollow, spoils-seeking 
entities that made no real attempts at challenging the regime.34   
 Yet as I began researching Egypt’s Mubarak-era opposition parties, these 
explanations seemed a bit too neat.  For starters, very few opposition party members 
actually received political or economic patronage from the regime, so clientelism could 
not explain why thousands of Egyptians joined these parties.  Moreover, there were 
                                                           
28 Ayalon 206. 
29 Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics 24.4 
(Jul. 1992) 383-384. 
30 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008) xvii-xviii, 80. 
31 Lust-Okar 6. 
32 Magaloni (2006) 15; Posusney (2005) 95-96. 
33 According to Kassem (1999), multiparty elections constituted a form of “clientelist control,” ensuring 
“that representatives from opposition parties are regarded by the majority of voters as intermediaries 
between themselves and the central government, rather than as representatives of a party ideology” (25). 
34 See Kassem (1999), Kassem (2004), Stacher (2004), and Arafat (2009). 
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noteworthy examples of Egyptian opposition parties defecting from the quiescence-for-
spoils bargain, meaning that the legalization of opposition parties to “trap” the opposition 
was an imperfect strategy for the regime at best.  Finally, the fact that these opposition 
parties were widely viewed as “fake” – i.e., as not really opposing the regime in any 
meaningful way – made their existence seem more like a political sideshow than a serious 
autocratic strategy for preserving control. 
 These theoretical objections to the literature on electoral authoritarianism 
motivated me to research Egyptian opposition parties for my dissertation, and I set off to 
Cairo in June 2010 with a number of questions.  Why did the Mubarak regime permit the 
existence of opposition parties that often included opposition-oriented “notables and 
activists”?35  How did it prevent these parties from defecting from the supposed 
quiescence-for-spoils bargain, and how did the regime respond in those instances when 
parties emerged unexpectedly as vocal opponents?  And why did people participate in 
parties that were widely viewed as frauds, won very few seats, and thus secured political 
patronage for only a few of their members?  
II. Research Methodology 
 Since answering these questions required taking a granular look at the workings 
of opposition parties and their relations with autocratic regimes, I opted for a single-
country study in which I interviewed dozens of members within each of four different 
parties.  I chose to study Egypt because it was a country with which I was intimately 
familiar, since I had lived in Egypt as a Fulbright grantee from 2006-2007 and speak 
decent Egyptian Arabic.   
                                                           
35 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Foreward,” In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, 
Maye Kassem (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999) xi. 
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 I used an interview-centric approach to collecting my data for two reasons.  First, 
interviews were the best means of learning about the ways in which Egyptian opposition 
parties interacted with the Mubarak regime.  As former State Security Judge Said 
Ashmawy told me when I asked about other forms of evidence for documenting the 
regime’s treatment of parties, “There are no papers.”36  Second, interviews were the most 
efficient way to gather the information necessary for understanding the question that 
initially piqued my interest: what kind of person would join a hopelessly “trapped” 
opposition party in an authoritarian regime?  I thus began my dissertation research by 
surveying opposition party members on their family backgrounds, personal backgrounds, 
educational backgrounds, professional backgrounds, social affiliations, and relationships 
with other political parties, including the ruling NDP.  It would have been nearly 
impossible to collect this kind of data through any other means. 
 To facilitate these research interviews and ensure their dependability, I hired two 
terrific translators: Mohamed Hemeda during the summer of 2010, and Ahmad Khader 
during the spring of 2011.37  The fact that neither of these individuals is an Egyptian Arab 
– Mohamed is an Egyptian Berber while Ahmad is a Palestinian-Jordanian – was, 
unexpectedly, to my benefit.  Some of my interviewees admitted that they would have 
been unwilling to divulge details on their parties’ internal workings or their own political 
histories if an Egyptian Arab was translating for me, because they would have been 
worried that my translator was an agent for Egypt’s repressive State Security service.   
 By the same token, my interviewees expressed no inhibitions about speaking at 
length with an American researcher.  If anything, they often seemed excited to speak with 
                                                           
36 Interview with Said Ashmawy, 7 Jan. 2011. 
37 A third translator, Sharaf al-Hourani, is Jordanian, and only assisted me with one interview. 
 19
me because of how rarely they were contacted by westerners for interviews.  This is why, 
I think, most of the parties that I researched readily gave me their leaderships’ full 
telephone directories: they were eager to be heard. 
 In choosing the opposition parties whose leaders I would interview, I focused on 
the four opposition parties that had won seats in the most recent parliamentary elections, 
which had been held in 2005.  Since I was trying to assess, in part, what role political 
patronage played in preventing opposition parties from defecting from their quiescence-
for-spoils bargain with the regime, it was important to examine those parties who had 
direct access to those spoils through the parliamentary immunity that parliamentarians 
enjoyed.  As a result, I focused on the Tagammu (2 seats), Wafd (6 seats), and Ghad (1 
seat) parties, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood (88 seats).  However, I also conducted 
interviews with leaders from other parties – including the Nasserist, Conservative, and 
Democratic Front parties – to check whether these parties’ motivations or relations with 
the regime were substantially different from those of the more successful opposition 
parties.  They weren’t, which is why I only interviewed handful of members in each of 
these parties. 
 I focused on interviewing top party leaders, as opposed to lower-level leaders or 
rank-and-file members, for a number of reasons.  First, leaders possessed the greatest 
amount of information of the workings of their parties, and how their parties dealt with 
the regime at the highest level.  Second, party leaders were typically older and had been 
involved in Egyptian opposition politics for many years; they could therefore offer deeper 
historical contexts for explaining changes in their parties’ relations with the regime.  
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Third, they were accessible: not only were they willing to talk, but they understood that 
part of their responsibility as party leaders meant answering questions for researchers.   
 Still, interview-based research is imperfect.  People misremember facts, 
exaggerate their significance, or flat-out lie.  So to ensure the reliability of my data, I 
interviewed at least two-dozen members from each of the parties that I researched, and 
ultimately conducted 231 interviews with 205 unique individuals.  This exhaustive 
process enabled me to check most of my data points multiple times for their veracity, and 
I further supplemented this data, when possible, with journalistic sources to confirm the 
information that I’d derived from interviews.  Finally, when interviews yielded 
conflicting accounts of certain events, I explained in the footnotes why I chose to accept 
one version of events over others. 
 It is also worth emphasizing that imperfect and/or misleading information is 
hardly unique to interview-based research.  Scholars who rely heavily on archives or 
journalistic accounts also must confront conflicting and competing accounts, and must 
therefore sort between truth and fiction.  This is why archival research similarly depends 
on casting a wide net, in which many different accounts are considered so that the 
researcher can determine the most accurate one.  My research methodology was based on 
an analogous process: by interviewing over 200 people, I was able to hear multiple 
accounts of the same series of events, and I double-checked my final rendering of the 
facts as frequently as possible. 
 Almost precisely halfway through my five months of fieldwork, however, Egypt’s 
2011 uprising jolted my research plan.  The fact that the Tagammu, Wafd, and Ghad 
parties, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, all sat on the sidelines as the uprising 
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commenced validated the notion that these parties were either thoroughly coopted or 
repressed into submission.  But it also became clear that coopting legal opposition parties 
didn’t bolster the regime’s durability, since the fact that they had not participated in 
organizing the uprising had no apparent effect on those activists who did.  So after a brief 
evacuation during the height of the uprising, I returned to Egypt following Mubarak’s 
ouster and added another chapter to my dissertation: the revolutionary activists.  And 
thanks to a helpful journalist friend, I secured the complete phone directory of the 
Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, which contained the top activists who had organized 
the January 25, 2011 demonstrations that catalyzed the uprising, and I interviewed them. 
 The uprising allowed me to refine my research question: how did the Mubarak 
regime succeed in “trapping” the other parties that I had studied, yet fail to “trap” the 
opposition activists that ultimately catalyzed its breakdown?  Does the legalization of 
opposition parties under autocratic conditions actually bolster regimes’ durability, as the 
literature on electoral authoritarianism suggests?  Or are autocratic opposition parties’ 
significance to regime durability overstated? 
III. Trapping Parties Can Enhance Regime Durability, But Not Indefinitely 
 The central argument of this dissertation is that autocratic regimes can use 
legalized opposition parties to trap potential opponents and thereby enhance their 
durability, but that this strategy cannot work indefinitely.  Over time, the fact that these 
opposition parties are not genuinely opposing the regime damages their credibility with 
the public, and may deter newly emerging oppositionists from joining them.  As a result, 
the multiparty system loses its ability to “trap” oppositionists, leading oppositionists to 
pursue new outlets that may undermine the regime’s durability. 
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 In this section I provide an overview of how the Mubarak regime specifically 
trapped its opponents; explain why opposition party members ultimately agreed to persist 
in trapped opposition parties despite the few rewards for doing so; and also explain why 
the regime’s manipulation of opposition parties couldn’t protect it from an uprising 
indefinitely. 
a. How Did the Mubarak Regime Trap Its Opposition Parties? 
As previous studies have observed,38 autocratic regimes “trap” opposition parties 
by forcing them to accept certain political and sometimes financial benefits in exchange 
for agreeing not to oppose the regime too aggressively.  Of course, the precise terms of 
this implicit agreement vary by regime and circumstances.  But for the Mubarak regime, 
this bargain typically meant that opposition parties were permitted to win a small number 
of parliamentary seats in exchange for abiding by the regime’s “red lines” – a term that 
comes from the literature on negotiations, but was commonly used to imply the upper 
limits of oppositional activity that the regime would tolerate.  
Mubarak’s “red lines” were neither explicit nor fixed: defining and enforcing the 
regime’s “red lines” was an ongoing process, in which opposition parties often learned 
what the “red lines” were only after they were punished for crossing them.39   Keeping 
the “red lines” vague was to the regime’s advantage, because it forced opposition parties 
                                                           
38 Magaloni (2006) 15; Posusney (2005) 95-96. 
39 Opposition party leaders typically inferred Mubarak’s “red lines” through trial and error, studying the 
regime’s patterns of repression against their own party and others.  Part of this learning process occurred 
through not-so-veiled threats that the regime would regularly transmit to opposition leaders, which often 
deterred these individuals from criticizing the regime too stridently.  At various times, opposition groups 
tested these limits – such as by printing negative reports about government ministers in their newspapers, 
holding seminars calling for constitutional changes, or demonstrating in the streets.  The regime typically 
responded repressively to these “red line” breaches, through actions such as jailing party activists, 
removing the party’s newspaper from the streets, targeting party leaders’ livelihoods, threatening retaliation 
for repeat offenses, or dispatching thugs to physically intimidate its opponents. 
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to err on the side of caution when it came to speaking or acting out against the regime.  
However, based on my interviews with opposition party leaders, three types of political 
speech constituted clear breaches of the “red lines.”  First, opposition parties could not 
criticize the military, whose officers staffed many of the state’s key political 
institutions,40 and also could not discuss the military’s budgets because of the military’s 
apparent fear that this would expose the vast economic resources that it controls.41  
Second, parties couldn’t criticize the presidential family – particularly First Lady 
Suzanne Mubarak, who was widely seen as pushing for her younger son, Gamal, to 
succeed his father as president of Egypt.42  Third, opposition leaders generally abstained 
from criticizing Mubarak himself directly, which included not discussing his corruption 
or rumors regarding his health.43 
Beyond these three areas of speech, opposition party leaders understood the “red 
lines” as including a list of proscribed activities. Legal opposition parties could not 
participate in demonstrations against the regime, though they were occasionally permitted 
to organize “walks,” which were tightly controlled events that emphasized narrow policy 
issues and avoided direct criticism of the regime.44  To further ensure that they did not 
participate in demonstrations, the regime forbade opposition parties from engaging anti-
regime protest movements, such as Kefaya and the April 6th movement (discussed in 
                                                           
40 Steven A. Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, 
and Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007) 26. 
41 Interview with Mohamed Ibrahim, 31 Jul. 2010; interview with Said Abdul Khaliq, 17 Jul. 2010; 
interview with Ibrahim Nasser el-Din, 17 Jul. 2010; interview with Camilia Shokry, 1 Aug. 2010; interview 
with Muhammad Said, 8 Aug. 2010; interview with Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour, 10 Aug. 2010; interview 
with Amina Niqash, 10 Jan. 2011. 
42 Interview with Ibrahim Nasser el-Din, 17 Jul. 2010; interview with Awatif Wali, 18 Jul. 2010; interview 
with Gameela Ismail, 22 Jul. 2010; interview with Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour, 10 Aug. 2010; interview 
with Amina Niqash, 10 Jan. 2011. 
43 Interview with Yasin Tag el-Din 19 Jul. 2010; interview with Hassan Abdel Gowad, 24 Jul. 2010; 
interview with Ahmed Ashour, 27 Jul. 2010. 
44 Interview with Camilia Shokry, 1 Aug. 2010; interview with Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour, 10 Aug. 2010. 
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Chapter 6).45  Perhaps most importantly, opposition parties could not associate with the 
Muslim Brotherhood (discussed in Chapter 5), which the regime viewed as its foremost 
threat, given the Brotherhood’s nationwide mobilizing networks and the mass appeal of 
its Islamist ideology.46  This was particularly the case during the final decade of 
Mubarak’s reign. 
In exchange for not crossing the regime’s “red lines,” legal opposition parties – 
that is, those parties that received licenses from the Shura Council’s Political Parties 
Committee (PPC) and could legally participate in elections – were permitted to do three 
things.  First, they were permitted to maintain headquarters, which served as the parties’ 
nerve centers and housed offices for party leaders as well as the editorial board of their 
newspapers.  The headquarters were also the sole space in which parties were permitted 
to organize large events with minimal risk of interference from the regime – a major 
benefit, since large events held outside the headquarters were frequently shut down by 
security services.47  Second, legal opposition parties were permitted to print a newspaper, 
which enabled the parties to maintain public profiles as well as send correspondents to 
various government ministries and institutions, thereby giving the parties firsthand access 
to insider information.48 
                                                           
45 Dina Basiony, “Voices of the Street,” Egypt Today Nov. 2008 
<http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=8234>; Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt Limits Challenges 
to Mubarak, His Foes Say,” The New York Times 11 May 2005. 
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on=&&scp=3&sq=kefaya&st=cse>; Samantha M. Shapiro, “Revolution, Facebook-Style,” The New York 
Times Magazine 22 Jan. 2009: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25bloggers-t.html>. 
46 Interview with Dina Shehata, 2 Aug. 2010; interview with Mustafa K. al-Sayyid, 5 Aug. 2010. 
47 Interview with Samir Fayyad, 3 Aug. 2010. 
48 Interview with Moussa Mustafa Moussa, 27 Jun. 2010; interview with Mustafa Abdel-Aziz, 4 Jul. 2010; 
interview with Farida Niqash, 11 Aug. 2010. 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the regime rewarded those parties that 
adhered to its “red lines” with parliamentary seats.  This dissertation tells this type of 
story repeatedly, but it bears emphasizing that the key payoff for quiescent parties was 
parliamentary seats, not policy concessions within parliament itself, as scholars have 
observed in other electoral authoritarian regimes.49  In Mubarak’s Egypt, parliament 
served as a rubber stamp for policies that came from the office of the presidency, and the 
regime used parliament to legitimate its power – not to share that power with other 
parties through policy concessions.  Yet winning parliamentary seats, even despite 
parliament’s practical powerlessness, was attractive to opposition parties for two reasons: 
parliamentary immunity allowed parliamentarians and their associates to pursue lucrative 
business deals extra-legally,50 and serving in parliament increased the parties’ public 
profiles.51 
 To ensure that it could use the allure of parliamentary seats as leverage over 
opposition parties, the Mubarak regime used a wide variety of vote-rigging tactics so that 
it could grant or deny seats to opposition parties.  These tactics included declining to 
approve potential candidates’ candidacy applications, arresting campaign activists, 
limiting access to polling places, stuffing ballot boxes, buying votes, and dispatching 
ruling party cadres to violently attack those whose votes it hoped to suppress.52   
                                                           
49 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” 
Comparative Political Studies 40.11 (Nov. 2007) 1280. 
50 Interview with Mahmoud Salem, 28 Jun. 2010; interview with Said Ashmawy, 7 Jan. 2011; interview 
with Essam Shiha, 23 Jan. 2011; Blaydes 10. 
51 Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Dynamics of Egypt’s Elections,” Merip (29 Sept. 2010): 
<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092910>. 
52 Human Rights Watch, Elections in Egypt: State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible With Free and 
Fair Vote (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010) 10-22; El-Ghobashy 2010. 
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Yet the regime rarely enjoyed total control in determining outcomes.  For 
example, prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the relatively independent Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that elections required judicial monitoring,53 which 
complicated the regime’s ballot-stuffing efforts that year.  Similarly, heighted 
international scrutiny during the 2005 elections forced the regime to allow a relatively 
clean voting process during the first round of voting, though the regime cracked down 
very aggressively during the second and third rounds following massive Muslim 
Brotherhood gains (see Chapter 5).54  Judicial action also compelled the regime to change 
its electoral formula in 1987 and 1990.55  Still, as Table 1 shows, the regime was always 
able to exert sufficient control over elections to retain a supermajority in parliament. 
                                                           
53 Atef Shahat Said, “The Role of the Judges’ Club in Enhancing the Independence of the Judiciary and 
Spurring Political Reform,” Judges and Political Reform in Egypt, ed. Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron (Cairo: 
The American University in Cairo Press, 2008) 122. 
54 In 2005, the Mubarak regime held voting in three rounds, with different provinces voting in each round, 
to ensure that it had sufficient judicial monitors, as required by the aforementioned 2000 Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruling. 
55 Mubarak called for new elections in 1987 to preempt a pending Supreme Constitutional Court case 
examining the legality of the 1984 elections, which used a party-list voting system and thereby excluded 
independents.  An initial report suggested that the SCC was prepared to rule the 1984 elections invalid, so 
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1990, the SCC ruled the 1987 elections unconstitutional for still not providing equal opportunities for 
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 27
Table 1. Egypt's Multiparty Elections, 1976-201056 
Year Size of 
Parliament57 
Electoral Formula % 
ruling 
party 
% non-MB 
independents58 
% 
opposition 
parties 
(incl. MB) 
1976 342 FPTP, 171 2-member 
districts 
81.9% 14% 4.1% 
1979 382 FPTP, 176 2-member 
districts + 30 seats 
reserved for women 
90.8% 3.4% 8.4% 
1984 448 PR, 48 districts of 
varying sizes with 
party-list voting and 
8% threshold 
87.3% - 12.7% 
1987 448 Mixed system 
consisting of 48 
districts: PR for 400 
seats through party-list 
voting within each 
district and 8% 
threshold; FPTP for 48 
seats (i.e., 1 per 
district) reserved for 
independents 
77.7% 1.1% 21.2% 
1990 438 FPTP, 222 2-member 
districts 
88.1% 13% 1.1% 
1995 444 FPTP, 222 2-member 
districts 
93.9% 2.7% 3.4% 
2000 442 FPTP, 222 2-member 
districts 
87.8% 4.5% 7.7% 
2005 432 FPTP, 222 2-member 
districts 
72% 5.6% 22.7% 
2010 504 FPTP, 222 2-member 
districts + 64 seats 
reserved for women 
83.3% 13.7% 3% 
  
Meanwhile, to ensure that opposition parties adhered to its “red lines,” the regime 
relied on Amn al-Dawla, or State Security, which was a subdivision of the vast – and 
                                                           
56 Source: “Representation in Egypt’s People’s Assembly: 1976-2000,” The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace: <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/wp-
content/themes/sandbox/swf/partyRep_en.htm>. 
57 This does not include the 10 MPs that the President appointed after the elections.  Discrepancies in “size 
of parliament” due to unfilled vacancies: there were 6 vacancies in the 1990 parliament, 2 vacancies in the 
2000 parliament, 12 vacancies in the 2005 parliament, and 4 races invalidated in the 2010 parliament. 
58 Non-Muslim Brotherhood independents  
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notoriously repressive – Interior Ministry.59  State Security monitored a wide variety of 
groups and individuals that the regime viewed as potential security risks, and worked to 
foil any attempt at challenging the regime too directly.60  In turn, State Security officials 
communicated regularly with opposition party leaders, offering carrots to ensure their 
compliance with the “red lines,” such as wider media exposure and assistance in winning 
local parliamentary races.61  Meanwhile, when parties approached the “red lines,” such as 
by arranging public events without permission, State Security would use an array of 
sticks, which could include harassment, detention, and interference with party leaders’ 
finances or businesses, to stifle the parties’ activities.62 
 Yet the most important way in which State Security prevented opposition parties 
from crossing the “red lines” was through its cultivation of agents within each party.63 
State Security recruited agents by promising individual party members certain privileges, 
such as special access to government services or help in facilitating business 
transactions.64  In many cases, individuals with close, pre-existing relationships with the 
regime members were the most obvious targets for recruitment as agents, because they 
feared that these relationships would be jeopardized if their party crossed the “red lines,” 
and were thus wiling to cooperate with State Security.  As I will show in my discussion 
                                                           
59 Since the January 2011 anti-Mubarak revolt, State Security has been officially disbanded, but it is widely 
believed that a new entity – National Security – essentially performs the same functions.  However, I speak 
of State Security in the past tense, because I am primarily concerned with how it operated under Mubarak. 
60 This information comes from an anonymous source who previously worked as a State Security officer.  
He requested that his name be withheld because of the sensitivity of his prior work.  
61 Interview with Ibrahim Muhammad el-Tobgui, 10 Jul. 2010; interview with Ayman al-Katib, 11 Jul. 
2010; interview with Shadi Talaat, 1 Aug. 2010. 
62 Interview with Abdel Raziq al-Kilani, 16 Jul. 2010; interview with Shadi Talaat, 1 Aug. 2010; interview 
with Abdel Fattah Ghalib, 1 Aug. 2010. 
63 Interview with Amin Taha Morsi, 13 Jan. 2011. 
64 Interview with Amin Taha Morsi, 13 Jan. 2011; interview with Abdel Aziz al-Nahhas, 19 Jan. 2011. 
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of the Ghad party (Chapter 4), State Security often used its party-based agents to foment 
internal divisions within parties – particularly when parties crossed the “red lines.” 
 The ultimate consequence of these carrots and sticks was to make Egyptian 
opposition parties entirely dependent on the regime for their survival.  By restricting 
opposition parties’ activities significantly, confining them to their headquarters, and 
forbidding them from tapping into popular criticisms of the regime or widespread Islamic 
sentiment, the Mubarak regime cut these opposition parties off from the public.  As a 
result, opposition parties needed to abide by the regime’s “red lines” in order to win 
parliamentary seats and maintain regularly published newspapers, because these were the 
only means through which the parties could maintain their public profiles in Mubarak’s 
Egypt.  This is the sense in which these parties were “trapped.” 
b. Why Did People Join – and Stay in – Trapped Opposition Parties? 
 One of the primary puzzles that motivated this dissertation is, why do people join 
and stay in parties that are “trapped”?  In other words, given the high risks and relatively 
low rewards that come with being a member of an opposition party under autocratic 
conditions, why do people bother?  This question has important analytical consequences: 
if opposition party members were not willing to remain in these “trapped” parties, they 
might attempt other – potentially more threatening – types of oppositional activity and 
thereby undermine the regime’s durability.   
While the academic literature on opposition parties under authoritarianism 
emphasizes the extent to which these parties are clientelist extensions of the regime and 
are thus seeking a share of the spoils,65 this can only explain the handful of opposition 
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party members who actually get elected to parliament.  Most, after all, do not.  Nor do I 
find convincing the argument that people join unwinnable parties to gain popular 
sympathy when they lose rigged elections, or because losing elections allows them to 
demonstrate that they are “motivated by higher principles, that power was not their 
ultimate concern.”66  This applies somewhat to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members 
demonstrated their willingness to suffer brutal repression in pursuit of their ideology and 
used this to rally support.  But it does not capture the motivations of the legalized 
opposition parties of the Mubarak era, which took no apparent pride in losing. 
 Based on the research that I present in this dissertation, I argue that there are two 
more compelling reasons why people join and remain members of “trapped” opposition 
parties.  First, opposition party leaders under autocratic regimes take a long-term view.  
Knowing that victory is not an option under the present regime, opposition party leaders 
focus instead on ensuring their party’s survival so that their party can play an influential 
role once the regime either reforms or falls.  And to ensure their party’s survival, 
opposition party leaders accept the present limitations on party activities.  “This is the 
best we can do in this environment,” Wafdist high committee member Sherif Taher told 
me during an August 2010 interview, six months before the revolt that would topple 
Mubarak.  “But I’m not worried, because when the time comes, people who believe in the 
principles will prevail.”67 
 Second, even if legalized opposition parties have relatively little political impact 
under authoritarian regimes, they serve important social purposes within the lives of their 
members.  These parties are ultimately organizations of like-minded individuals with 
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similar visions of what they’d like their country to be politically.  Moreover, they are 
often unified through their shared experiences facing the regime’s repression.  For 
example, the leaders of the Tagammu party, which I discuss in Chapter 2, had remarkably 
similar political backgrounds: most were members of secret communist organizations in 
the 1970s; were arrested at various points for their anti-regime activism; and joined 
Tagammu around its 1976 founding, and had therefore worked with each other for many 
decades.  Similarly, many leaders of the Wafd party, which I discuss in Chapter 3, are 
descendants of prominent Wafdists from the pre-1952 era, who lost much of their power 
under the Nasser regime. 
 The fact that the people stayed in opposition parties for reasons other than 
winning elections or pursuing political patronage ultimately rendered these parties more 
effective traps.  After all, would-be oppositionists effectively committed themselves to 
parties whose existence depended on their adherence to the regime’s “red lines.”  If 
opposition party leaders were only after electoral victories and political patronage, they 
would have likely abandoned these parties quickly – either by joining the ruling party or 
by partaking in more strident oppositional activities, the latter of which might have 
undermined the regime’s durability.  
c. Why Couldn’t It Work Forever? 
By manipulating legal opposition parties and, just as importantly, keeping 
oppositionists committed to those parties, autocratic regimes can deter “opposition efforts 
from being exerted towards revolution.”68  This is especially true when autocrats’ 
opposition parties manage to “trap” influential and politically capable individuals who 
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might otherwise be able to mobilize substantial opposition to the regime, as I will show in 
my examinations of the Tagammu and Wafd parties (Chapters 2 and 3 respectively).   
Yet the literature on opposition parties under authoritarianism fails to recognize 
that this strategy is not sustainable indefinitely.  Over time, newly emerging 
oppositionists will notice that that legal opposition parties under authoritarianism are not 
actually opposing the regime.  And given that many of these new oppositionists won’t 
have any personal attachments to these preexisting parties, they will be especially 
disinclined from being trapped in them.  In some cases, these new oppositionists may 
seek other – and perhaps more threatening – means of opposing the regime.  In this way, 
electoral authoritarian regimes may contain the seeds of their own destruction, because 
their durability depends, at least in part, on their opponents’ willingness to participate in 
opposition parties that cannot permanently retain their credibility as such. 
The literature on electoral authoritarianism doesn’t appreciate this possibility 
because it is analytically biased.  Given its emergence from the third-wave transitions 
literature, which views intra-regime fissures that the third-wave democratization literature 
views as the primary cause of transitions,69 the literature on durable authoritarianism 
focuses too centrally on elite actors – particularly ruling parties, which the literature 
views as essential to preventing intra-regime fissures,70 and opposition parties, which are 
seen as vital to trapping opposition-oriented “notables and activists.”71  The literature 
therefore asserts that formally democratic institutions can bolster regimes’ longevity 
without paying attention to the various societal factors that previous studies of 
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revolutions have highlighted.  These include economic or political grievances72; the 
perceived illegitimacy of the regime73; and the emergence of revolutionary movements, 
often as a result of the previous two factors.74   
This analytical bias explains, in part, why many political scientists failed to 
anticipate the 2011 Egyptian uprising: they accepted the premise that intra-regime 
fissures, particularly on the question of who would succeed the aging Mubarak, would be 
the most likely cause of regime breakdown, but concluded – correctly – that the regime 
was managing these tensions very effectively.  As Brownlee wrote, “The NDP 
leadership, divided to an extent between pro-Hosni and pro-Gamal factions, has come 
together in facilitating the regime’s continuity.  Such solidarity does not preclude the 
opening of a debate at the moment of a change in presidency, but as long as Hosni 
Mubarak remains at his post, even Gamal’s adversaries within the ruling party seem 
content to bide their time and sustain their loyalty.”75  Cook similarly wondered whether 
the rise of Gamal might create tension between the NDP and Egypt’s military, but 
concluded that, so long as Hosni Mubarak remained in power, the regime was “coup 
proof.”76  
That is not to say that political scientists were unaware of Egyptians’ widely held 
economic and political grievances – in many cases, they were.77  But this discontent 
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lingered for many years before the uprising without any popular response, which only 
affirmed for many analysts – myself included78 – that the Mubarak regime was quite 
stable.  Its opposition parties were trapped79; the primary protest movement, Kefaya 
(which I discuss in Chapter 6), had been repressed into submission80; and the Muslim 
Brotherhood indicated repeatedly that, despite its unparalleled mobilizing potential, it had 
little interest in leading a revolt because it feared a repressive crackdown.  As Tarek 
Osman noted shortly before the revolt, “The Egyptian regime, with its (so far) effective 
containment and confrontation modus operandi (and highly efficient security 
apparatuses), is controlling the street and the various manifestations of popular anger.”81 
So while economic and political grievances were a necessary precondition of the 
2011 Egyptian uprising, they were hardly sufficient.  These grievances, after all, were 
prevalent for many years before the revolution, but had little political impact because 
there seemingly existed no political force that could translate them into sustained action.  
That changed on January 25, 2011, when a loose coalition of mostly young activists who 
refused to be trapped in Egypt’s multiparty system successfully coordinated a day of 
protest that catalyzed Mubarak’s ouster.   
IV. Conclusion 
 Mubarak’s three-decade rule reinforces the extent to which autocrats can use 
formally democratic institutions to bolster their durability.  Regimes can use an 
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assortment of carrots and sticks to prevent the opposition parties they legalize from 
crossing their “red lines,” and opposition party members may accept these conditions 
because of their personal attachments to their parties’ ideas and fellow members.  But 
using formally democratic institutions to bolster a regime’s durability cannot work 
indefinitely.  These institutions are, after all, not truly democratic, and their inherent lack 
of credibility will deter oppositionists from participating in them over time, and possibly 
compel them to embrace more confrontational tactics vis-à-vis the regime.  This is 
precisely why the Mubarak regime fell so quickly: its strategy for trapping the opposition 
became untenable once new oppositionists emerged who refused to participate within its 
multiparty system.   
The remainder of this dissertation uses case studies of Egyptian opposition parties 
and movements to illustrate these dynamics. 
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Chapter 2 
Tagammu: Trapping Egypt’s Left Since 1976 
 The Mubarak regime’s multiparty system aimed to prevent opposition activists 
from crossing the regime’s red lines by trapping them in legalized opposition parties.  
These parties were often offered carrots, such as lucrative political patronage, when they 
complied with the regime’s red lines, and punished with sticks, such as arrests, when they 
crossed those red lines. 
In this chapter, I use a case study of the National Progressive Unionist Party, 
better known by its abbreviated Arabic name Tagammu, to show how this system 
worked.  I argue that the regime founded the Tagammu Party in 1976 to trap Egyptian 
communists and far leftists, many of whom were active opponents of the regime during 
the reigns of presidents Gamel Abdel Nasser (1954-1970) and Anwar Sadat (1970-1981).  
Although the Tagammu Party initially opposed the regime quite stridently, the regime’s 
use of carrots and sticks ultimately brought it to heel.  A series of regime crackdowns 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, including arrests and restrictions on the party’s 
newspaper, made the party’s anti-regime activism quite costly.  Then, when top 
Tagammu leaders decided to tone down their criticisms of the regime, the regime 
rewarded them by granting the party parliamentary seats.  As a result, from 1990 until the 
anti-Mubarak revolt of January 2011, the Tagammu Party was effectively trapped – it 
fastidiously abided by the regime’s red lines, accepted the limited political space that the 
regime afforded it, and, as a result, was mostly irrelevant. 
I. The Tagammu Party’s Pre-History 
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 Since the 1952 Free Officers Revolution, which toppled the Egyptian monarchy 
and replaced it with a military-backed dictatorship, leftists have comprised an important 
segment of Egypt’s political opposition.  Egypt’s left includes socialists, communists, and 
pan-Arab nationalists, often referred to as Nasserists.  Nasser and Sadat initially dealt 
with their leftist opponents by either repressing them or attempting to incorporate them 
into the ruling party.  As I show in this section, both of these strategies failed to tone 
down leftists’ opposition to the regime. 
a. Nasser’s Ruling Parties and the Egyptian Far Left 
 Communist parties have existed in Egypt since the early 20th century.  Although 
politically weak under Egypt’s monarchy, they were visible players nonetheless, and 
maintained close relations with the Free Officers who orchestrated the July 1952 military 
coup that successfully ousted King Farouk.  The Democratic Movement for National 
Liberation (DMNL), the foremost Marxist group of the era82, supported the coup, and key 
communist leaders held important positions within the new regime.  Two Free Officers 
had ties to the DMNL, and a third prominent Free Officer, Major Khalid Mohieddin, was 
a well-known Marxist who had previously been involved in underground communist 
politics as a member of the Iskra group.83   
Yet communists’ support for the Free Officers collapsed shortly after the coup, 
and major communist parties quickly emerged as vocal opponents of the new regime.  
Within weeks following King Farouk’s ouster, the Egyptian Communist Party declared 
the coup’s leaders fascists, and the DMNL turned against the new military junta when it 
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outlawed political parties on January 17, 1953.84  In response, the junta purged 
communist sympathizers from within its own ranks85 and imprisoned 2000 communists.86  
Meanwhile, the new regime sought to consolidate support for its agenda by establishing 
the Liberation Rally as its first ruling party in 1953, which required members to profess 
their loyalty to the new regime.   
Once Gamel Abdel Nasser became Egypt’s president in 1954, the regime initially 
softened its stance towards communists in an apparent bid to appease them.  It released 
many communists from prison and, in 1956, permitted the establishment of al-Masa, a 
communist newspaper edited by Marxist former Free Officer Khaled Mohieddin.87  
Nasser’s tolerance of communists, however, was short-lived.  In the late 1950s, Nasser 
pursued a pan-Arab nationalist policy, which included unifying with Syria and supporting 
an Iraqi revolt against President Karim Kassem in March 1959.  When Soviet support for 
Kassem contributed to failure of the Iraqi revolt, Nasser responded by launching a new 
crackdown on the pro-Soviet Egyptian Communist Party, which had regrouped the 
previous year.88  At least one thousand communists were arrested, and thirteen editors of 
al-Masa, including former Free Officer Mohieddin, were removed from their positions 
and imprisoned.89 
Two years later, the regime’s policy towards communists reversed once again.  
Following the breakdown of Egypt’s short-lived union with Syria in 1961, the Nasser 
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began embracing a more pro-Soviet posture, and increasingly viewed the incorporation of 
communists and far leftists into the regime as politically useful.  Thus, when Nasser 
founded the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 as his new ruling party, he encouraged 
previously banned communist organizations to join by promising them “key positions in 
the propaganda machinery and the vanguard apparatus” of the ruling party.  In April 
1965, the Egyptian Communist Party and DMNL accepted this offer and officially 
dissolved themselves.90 
For many leftists, however, Egypt’s six-day defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War, which resulted in Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, marked the turning 
point of their relationship with the Nasser regime.  While the broader Egyptian public 
rallied around Nasser and poured into the streets to protest his resignation, which Nasser 
ultimately withdrew, younger political activists began agitating for change.  In February 
1968, when the regime handed down light sentences to Egyptian Air Force officers 
deemed responsible for the 1967 defeat, workers in the southern Cairo district of Helwan 
began striking, and various leftist student groups soon joined in.91 Another round of 
leftist student demonstrations broke out in October 1968, and student movements 
continued demonstrating against the regime through the early 1970s.  Meanwhile, 
members of the defunct Egyptian Communist Party formed new communist 
organizations, which attacked the Nasser regime’s domestic and foreign policy failures.92 
These developments convinced the regime that the ASU, as well as its affiliated 
Socialist Youth Organization, had failed to create a reliably pro-Nasser “political force” 
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among Egypt’s youth.  By the end of 1968, the regime placed tight restrictions on student 
activists, and the Socialist Youth Organization was withdrawn from campuses.93  
b. The Far Left During the Sadat’s Early Years 
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Egypt’s political left was dominated by a 
variety of illegal communist parties, but two were particularly influential.  Kutab al-Ghad 
(“Tomorrow’s Authors”) emerged from the student movements of this era, and later 
constituted themselves as the Egyptian Communist Workers Party (ECWP).  Old guard 
communists with ties to the Soviet Union, by contrast, formed a tight, nameless circle 
until January 1975, when they officially declared themselves the Egyptian Communist 
Party (ECP).94   
These communist movements became especially active following Nasser’s death 
in September 1970, when his successor, Anwar Sadat, embraced an “open door” policy 
that emphasized closer relations with the West and economic privatization.  Communists 
feared that these policies “constituted the practical means of Egypt’s integration into the 
world capitalist order,” and that peace with Israel would isolate Egypt from the rest of the 
Arab world.95  The most noteworthy protest activity of the Sadat era occurred in January 
1972, when students demonstrated nationwide after Sadat’s declaration that he would not 
attack Israel that year to regain the territory that it had lost in 1967.  Although these 
protests were not led exclusively by communist organizations, Marxists and leftists were 
quite prominent and rallied support among university students.96 
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 Much of this campus activism ended following the October 1973 War, when 
Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula that the 
Sadat regime hailed as a tactical victory.  According to Abdalla: 
The October war was followed by a period of calm in the universities.  It 
also left the activists in a state of political perplexity.  It took them some 
time to evaluate its impact, but in spite of some initial skepticism, this 
was not enough to provoke a large-scale debate at the universities in the 
period immediately after the war.97 
 
While various communist organizations continued to demonstrate98, Sadat used his 
newfound popularity after the war to pursue a set of liberalization policies that he termed 
infitah, or the “open door policy,” which he combined with a new strategy for managing 
his opponents. 
II. Tagammu Emerges 
While the infitah focused primarily on economic liberalization, Sadat believed 
that “the introduction of a multiparty system [was] essential to attract foreign investment 
to Egypt’s ailing economy,” since it would give investors confidence that Egypt was 
becoming a more reliable “state of institutions.”99  Yet this multiparty system was never 
intended to allow for actual political competition.  Sadat feared that “open political 
struggle would threaten the regime’s stability”100, and he sought to ensure that new 
opposition parties remained firmly under the ruling party’s control.   
a. Controlled Political Liberalization 
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Sadat thus inaugurated limited multiparty competition by dividing the ruling ASU 
into three “manabir,” or “platforms,” which represented the “ideological orientations of 
the left, center, and right.”101  To enhance his credentials as a moderate, Sadat established 
the “center” platform – which later became the Misr Party – as his own.  Meanwhile, to 
ensure that the other two platforms wouldn’t attack his regime too harshly, Sadat 
appointed two former Free Officers as their chairmen.  Mustafa Kamel Murad thus 
headed the “right” platform, which later became the Ahrar Party, and Khaled Mohieddin 
chaired the “left” platform, which became the Tagammu Party.102 
Nearly all of the Tagammu Party’s leadership as of the January 2011 uprising 
joined at the time of the party’s founding in 1976.  For many of these leaders, 
Mohieddin’s stewardship of the party attracted them, given his reputation as an 
outspoken socialist within the ASU.103  Moreover, since many of the founding members 
had previously been involved with the secret communist organizations of the 1960s and 
early 1970s104, the opportunity to work openly in politics was appealing.105  To attract 
new members, the Tagammu published its mission statement and membership 
applications in the magazine Roz al-Yusuf.106  Within the first two years, Tagammu had 
approximately 150,000 members.107 
b. An Attempt to Trap the Left 
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 The regime established Tagammu with a clear aim in mind: to trap Egypt’s 
political left within a weak party that would abstain from challenging the regime too 
directly.  The regime had two reasons for believing that this might work.  First, 
Tagammu’s leadership was overwhelmingly comprised of leftist intellectuals “who had 
chosen during the Nasser era to work within the [ASU].”108  Moreover, Tagammu forced 
its members to resign from any illegal communist organizations in which they were 
members, thus bringing radicals under the auspices of a regime-sanctioned 
organization.109  This apparently led the regime to believe that Tagammu posed little risk 
of emerging as a major opponent. 
 Second, Sadat hoped that Mohieddin’s appointment to chair Tagammu would 
keep Egypt’s political left firmly divided between socialists and Nasserists.  During their 
time together as Free Officers, Sadat had nicknamed Mohieddin the “red major,”110 and 
Sadat portrayed Tagammu as Marxist, hoping that Nasserists “would not accept 
subordination to a Marxist leadership and would instead join his own center party.”111  To 
be sure, Sadat’s characterization of Tagammu’s first leaders was hardly misleading.  
Aside from Mohieddin, they included Fouad Morsi, a Sorbonne-educated Marxist figure 
who had founded the Communist Party of Egypt in the 1950s and his co-founder, Ismail 
Sabry Abdullah112; Lutfi al-Kholi, founder of the Nasser-era communist journal al-Tali’a; 
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and Rifaat al-Said, a longtime communist activist and journalist, whom Nasser had 
imprisoned from 1953-1964, with only a brief hiatus in 1959.113   
 Yet Tagammu’s leaders outmaneuvered the regime.  Determined to create a broad 
alliance of Egypt’s various left-wing political forces, they began negotiating with leading 
Nasserists to build a unified political party, and the two sides ultimately agreed on a 
leadership that included Nasserists.  In its founding statement, Tagammu – which means 
“union” – thus projected itself as an “ideologically pluralistic party”: 
The Tagammu Party is a republican organization in which there is enough room for the 
national, progressive, and unifying currents and forces (Nasserists, Marxists, 
nationalists, and informed religious currents) that struggle for realizing freedom, 
socialism, and unity, and accept working within the committed Tagammu framework 
with its basic agenda and political program, which is a unified program of cooperative 
struggle for all factions of the Egyptian left.114 
 
Tagammu also signaled that it would not take orders from the regime.  Within twenty-
four hours of its founding, the regime commanded Tagammu to denounce a recent Soviet 
statement that criticized Egyptian policy, which the party refused to do.  Tagammu also 
emerged as an early supporter of workers strikes, and criticized the regime’s stances on 
labor issues.115  
 In October 1976, Egypt held its first multi-party parliamentary elections.  During 
the campaign season, the state-run media harshly attacked the Tagammu Party, accusing 
it of being anti-religious and agents of a Marxist conspiracy.116  Tagammu won only 3 of 
342 contested seats, finishing behind its right-wing counterpart, the Ahrar Party, which 
won 10 seats.  Meanwhile, the regime’s Misr party won 295 seats, signaling the success 
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of Sadat’s bid to institute limited multiparty rule without threatening his hold on 
power.117 
c. A Failed Trap 
 In January 1977, however, the Sadat regime’s confidence was badly shaken.  On 
January 17, at the urging of the International Monetary Fund118, parliament announced 
that it would halve the subsidies on many basic commodities, including flour, rice, sugar, 
cigarettes, and butane gas.119  The following day, tens of thousands of Egyptians – mostly 
hailing from the working and middle classes – took to the streets in protest, “attacking 
symbols of state power, conspicuous consumption, and Western influence.”  For two 
days, security forces failed to contain the uprising: an estimated 160 people were killed 
and hundreds more wounded.  Finally, after rescinding the subsidy cuts, Sadat sent in the 
military to restore order.120 
 The “Bread Riots,” as they became known, put Tagammu squarely in the regime’s 
crosshairs.  Police reported that radical workers and students had been at the forefront of 
the demonstrations, and Sadat used this as a pretense for launching a sweeping 
crackdown against “leftist plotters,” whom he accused of inciting and organizing the 
protests.  On January 29, Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem explicitly blamed Tagammu, 
accusing it of harboring “communist elements” that had tried to use the party to 
“overthrow the government and install a communist regime.”121 
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 To justify a crackdown, the regime advanced an eleven-point response to the 
“Bread Riots,” which included measures that criminalized demonstrations and strikes, 
and further limited electoral competition to government-approved parties.  On February 
10, these measures were approved via referendum.122  Over the next few months, 
hundreds of Tagammu members were arrested123, including four members of the party’s 
secretariat.124  Tagammu responded by setting up the Committee for the Defense of Civil 
Rights to help their detained members125 and, by June, many had been released.126 
 Yet following Sadat’s November 1977 diplomatic visit to Jerusalem, which 
jumpstarted Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, Tagammu once again emerged as a 
vocal critic of the regime.  The party feared that a peace treaty with Israel would create “a 
psychological barrier between Egypt and her Arab sisters,” and viewed a separate peace 
with Israel that did not resolve the Palestinian issue as undermining Egypt’s “national 
prestige.” 127  Thus, in November and December, Tagammu members were arrested while 
publicizing meetings to protest of Sadat’s Jerusalem visit.128   
Shortly thereafter, Tagammu held an internal vote to determine its official stance 
towards the ensuing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.  When the party ultimately voted to 
oppose the peace process, the regime launched a new round of arrests.129  But Tagammu 
persisted.  In the inaugural issue of its official newspaper Al-Ahaly, which hit newsstands 
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in February 1978, the party emphasized its opposition to direct negotiations with Israel, 
and attacked the economic liberalization policies of the infitah as well.  These 
oppositional stances reached a wide audience: by mid-April, Al-Ahaly was selling over 
100,000 copies.130 
 Apparently realizing that its attempt to trap Egypt’s left in the Tagammu Party 
had failed, the regime intensified its crackdown.  On May 14, 1978, Sadat announced that 
the Tagammu Party “should dissolve itself because it has no place among us”131 and, one 
week later, another referendum that placed significant restrictions on parties’ activities 
passed with 98.29 percent of the vote.132  Then, on May 24, authorities raided Al-Ahaly 
and, though the paper was permitted to reopen two months later, security forces removed 
its new issues from newsstands.133  Under constant investigation and unable to find a 
press willing to print its publication, the Tagammu secretariat finally discontinued Al-
Ahaly in October.134   
Two months later, the regime made a second attempt at creating a loyal leftist 
party when it founded the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), which it hoped would draw 
supporters away from Tagammu.  Sadat appointed his former agriculture minister, 
Ibrahim Shukri, as the SLP’s first president, and ordered his brother-in-law to be one of 
the party’s first members.135  In turn, during the first year of its existence, the SLP 
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supported the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and kept it criticisms of the regime to a 
minimum136 
 Tagammu, however, continued agitating against Egyptian-Israeli peace.  On 
March 23, 1979, three days before the peace treaty was signed in a White House lawn 
ceremony, Tagammu’s general secretariat unanimously adopted a statement demanding a 
halt to the peace process, which it viewed as facilitating “imperialist projects aimed at the 
destruction of the unity, liberation and social and economic progress of the Arab 
world.”137  In response, the regime continued squeezing the party.  On the morning of 
April 7, after the Tagammu was caught printing anti-treaty material, State Security 
stormed its offices and seized its printing equipment.138  Then, when two Tagammu MPs 
– including chairman Mohieddin – joined with eleven other parliamentarians in voting 
against ratifying the treaty on April 11139, State Security launched another raid on the 
party’s offices.  During this period, forty-four Tagammu members were arrested, while 
hundreds more were imprisoned.140 
 Given the sensitivity of its peace treaty with Israel, the Sadat regime quickly 
moved to shut the treaty’s opponents out of parliament.  He thus called for early 
elections, which were held in June 1979.  The elections were heavily rigged and, 
unsurprisingly, Tagammu’s candidates were “effectively purged,” as all 31 lost.141  
                                                           
136 Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 241. 
137 “Progressive Assembly of National Unionists ‘Not to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty,’” MERIP Reports 80 
(Sept. 1979) 15. 
138 Baker 159. 
139 Marie-Christine Aulas, “A Very Strange Peace,” MERIP Reports 82 (Nov. 1979) 19. 
140 Merip Special Correspondent, “Sadat’s ‘New Democracy’: Fresh Rounds of Arrests and Detentions,” 
Merip Reports 80 (Sept. 1979) 14. 
141 Brownlee (2011-2012) 661. 
 49
Meanwhile, the SLP won 29 of 372 seats, which made it the second largest parliamentary 
bloc. Sadat’s new ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), won 320 seats.142 
d. Sadat’s Final Crackdown 
In the aftermath of the 1979 elections, Tagammu was effectively sidelined: 
without a single member in parliament or an active newspaper, it was “no longer an 
effective instrument of criticism of opposition.”143  Initially, its leaders attempted to work 
with more prominent organizations to continue their anti-regime activism.  Thus, when 
Israel and Egypt exchanged ambassadors on February 26, 1980, top Tagammu members 
attempted to create a national opposition front that included former Free Officers, 
professional syndicate representatives, Muslim Brothers, and renegade SLP members.  
The diversity of this coalition, however, ultimately made it ineffective.144  The following 
year, on the one-year anniversary of the establishment of Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic 
relations, the Tagammu held a joint press conference with only the SLP to condemn the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.145  While these efforts failed to gain traction, they ensured 
that Tagammu leaders remained on the Sadat regime’s ever-growing list of domestic 
opponents that it targeted for arrest.  Thus, on March 29, 1981, seventy people were 
arrested without any official accusation, including Tagammu central committee leaders 
Hussein Abdel Raziq and Farida al-Niqash, who are married to each other.146   
Sadat’s largest crackdown against his opponents came on September 3 and 4, 
1981, when the regime arrested approximately 1600 Egyptians, while detaining hundreds 
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more under house arrest.147  Although the crackdown primarily targeted Islamists, half of 
the Tagammu Party’s central committee was arrested148, including chairman 
Mohieddin149, and the party’s headquarters were shuttered.150 Sadat claimed that these 
arrests were in response to Muslim-Coptic violence that had erupted three months earlier, 
saying that the regime was targeting those who wanted to “settle old scores” by “kindling 
the flames of sectarian sedition.”151  The crackdown would prove costly: on October 6, 
during a parade commemorating the eighth anniversary of the 1973 War, Lieutenant 
Khalid al-Islambouli emerged from a military vehicle and assassinated Sadat. 
III. Mubarak Traps Tagammu 
Upon succeeding Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak sought to calm the tumultuous 
political atmosphere.  During his first speech before parliament on November 8, 1981, 
Mubarak remarked that, “Opposition has a role to play in the national march by 
presenting studied views and honest criticism away from slander and unfounded 
accusations.”152  In other words, political opposition parties would be permitted to resume 
their activities – but only if they limited their criticisms of the regime to questions of 
policy and refrained from attacking the president himself.   
Opposition parties seemingly accepted this arrangement two weeks later, when 
Mubarak brought 31 political prisoners, including Tagammu chairman Mohieddin, into 
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his office for discussions and promptly released them.153  As two observers wrote at the 
time, “In return for the release of some prisoners and the partial lifting of press 
restrictions, the legal opposition refrained from vigorous criticism of the government 
until after Israel had turned back the Sinai.”154  This would mark the first of many 
instances in which Tagammu would abide by the regime’s red lines to ensure its survival. 
a. Mubarak’s Enforcement of the Red Lines 
 During Mubarak’s first six months in office, which preceded Israel’s April 1982 
withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula, Tagammu kept its bargain with the regime and 
cooperated with it.  Thus, in February 1982, Mohieddin visited Algeria and Tunisia, 
where he encouraged both countries – which boycotted Egypt after signing its peace 
treaty with Israel  – to restore ties with Cairo.  He further defended Mubarak’s foreign 
policy as “balanced” and “positive,” and noted approvingly that Mubarak had clamped 
down on criticism of Arab governments in the state-run press.155  Meanwhile, the party 
focused internal matters, including electing a new editorial board for al-Ahaly.156 
 When Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai on April 25, however, 
Tagammu signaled its desire to resume its strident opposition to the regimes policies.  
Sensing this, the regime dispatched one of Mubarak’s top advisers, Osama el-Baz, to 
gently warn al-Ahaly editor Hussein Abdel Raziq to restrain the paper’s criticisms of the 
regime.  Abdel Raziq, however, rejected al-Baz’s warnings and, when al-Ahaly returned 
to newsstands on May 19, 1982, its top headline read: “The Tagammu Party Demands the 
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Freeing of Political Prisoners and Revoking Politicized Judgments.”157  It was an 
unmistakable attack on the regime and, during the next few months, al-Ahaly upped the 
ante by repeatedly criticizing the regime’s repressive emergency laws, reporting on 
instances of police torture, and demanding the revocation of restrictive laws on 
registering parties.  Given the party’s socialist roots, it further became an important voice 
for workers’ advocacy, and a critic of crony capitalism.158   
 The party also resumed its attacks on the regime’s foreign policy.  In this vein, 
Tagammu blasted the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, arguing the treaty’s limits on 
Egyptian troop deployments in the Sinai Peninsula undermined Egyptian sovereignty.159  
Then, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Tagammu set up stations for blood 
donations, money, and volunteers, and attempted to organize demonstrations.  This 
embarrassed the Mubarak regime, which desperately wanted to reassure the west of 
Egypt’s commitment to the peace treaty, and the regime responded by deploying police to 
end anti-Israel demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandra.160 
 As al-Ahaly’s circulation surpassed Sadat-era levels, breaking 160,000 by the end 
of 1982, the regime began its three-pronged counterattack.  First, the Interior Ministry, 
which controls State Security and the key domestic police forces, censored the al-Ahaly.  
It pressured the Tagammu Party’s leadership to end the newspaper’s campaign against 
police torture, and forced al-Ahaly to print its denial of previous reports regarding police 
torture.161 
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 Second, the regime began a concentrated media effort to undermine Tagammu.  In 
this vein, state-run newspapers declared the party unpatriotic and anti-religious, and 
accused it of incitement.  Meanwhile, to emphasize the party’s political isolation, 
Mubarak gave interviews to all other major opposition parties’ official papers while 
denying one to al-Ahaly, and the Interior Minister later did the same.162 
 Third, the regime used the emergency laws, which were enacted following 
Sadat’s assassination, to prevent Tagammu from holding large events away from its 
Cairo headquarters.  In this vein, Tagammu had to secure government approval for any 
public rally, and these rallies could only be held in expensive, enclosed tents at 
government-selected locations, which were often “inconspicuous side streets.”  When 
Tagammu bucked the regime by holding rallies without permission, the response was 
swift.  For example, when the party campaigned against lowering subsidies on basic food 
items in 1984 and joined textile workers’ mass demonstrations in Kafr Dawwar, the 
regime arrested 12 Tagammu members, including two top leaders.163 
 The regime’s assault against Tagammu worked.  By 1983, Tagammu increasingly 
resembled “little more than [a] small [group] of intellectuals and journalists centered 
round a single newspaper rather than [a] proper political [organization] with a capacity to 
mobilize supporters and run campaigns.”164 
b. The Mubarak Regime’s Elections: Carrot and Stick 
Ultimately, the regime’s best tool for managing opposition parties was its total 
control over the parliamentary election process.  For the regime, manipulating elections 
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served a dual purpose.  On one hand, the regime could use electoral outcomes as carrots, 
rewarding parties that abided by its red lines with parliamentary seats.  On the other hand, 
elections could be used as sticks, punishing those parties that crossed the regime’s red 
lines by shutting them out of parliament.   
Tagammu learned this lesson over the course of the next few elections.  Thus, 
after harshly criticizing Mubarak’s new elections law as a “conspiracy that threatens the 
entire nation,”165 Tagammu participated actively in the May 1984 elections.  It organized 
hundreds of meetings nationwide; distributed over one million pamphlets; and recruited 
nearly 900 candidates.166  Yet it fared poorly at the polls, winning only 4.2 percent of the 
vote and failing to secure a single seat.   
By comparison, the Wafd party – which reconstituted itself in 1983 and ran in a 
coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood – won 58 seats, while the NDP won 390 of 448 
contested seats.  The outcome reflected the regime’s manipulations, and constituted 
payback for Tagammu’s strident opposition to its policies.  Indeed, on Election Day, local 
NDP officials interfered with Tagammu’s activities, such as by throwing the party’s poll 
watchers out of voting stations, burning pro-Tagammu ballot boxes, and stuffing ballot 
boxes in favor of the NDP.167  At one polling location, an NDP member reportedly 
stabbed twelve Tagammu activists.168 
Tagammu’s electoral defeat was extremely damaging.  Its complete absence from 
the 1984-1987 parliament denied it one of the few outlets that opposition parties could 
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use for publicizing their ideas and, as its relevance plummeted, circulation of al-Ahaly 
dropped to 71,000.  Outwardly, however, the party showed little interest in softening its 
anti-regime posture.  Shortly after its defeat, it released a report highlighting the regime’s 
electoral manipulation.169  Then, when Mubarak appointed Tagammu member Milad 
Hanna to the parliament, the party responded by banishing him – a very defiant move.170 
 Yet within the party, top leaders started questioning whether Tagammu’s vocally 
anti-regime outlook had been self-defeating.  In this vein, party leader Lotfy Waked 
worried that al-Ahaly’s attacks on key political figures had damaged the party’s public 
image.  Chairman Mohieddin agreed, saying that the Tagammu newspaper should focus 
on “the positive aspects and problems of the masses” and not cross the “political line” – 
meaning that it would obey the regime’s red lines.  When some Tagammu leaders 
objected to watering down the party’s criticism of the regime, Mohieddin responded: 
“Supporters of the Wafd party are happy after the elections, [and] our supporters are not 
satisfied.”171 
These conversations catalyzed a slight strategic reorientation of the party, with 
Tagammu aiming to cultivate “a moderate and centrist outlook” so that it could better 
“convince and cooperate” with the regime.  To accomplish this, it narrowed its agenda to 
issues that were less sensitive to the regime, such as by abandoning its criticisms of 
police brutality and the emergency laws.  Thus, at the party’s second conference in June 
1985, Tagammu resolved to focus on four vague policy categories: Palestinian and Arab 
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issues, the national issue, national unity, and advocacy work.172  For the most part, this 
meant emphasizing an Arab nationalist approach to foreign policy issues while 
continuing to push a socialist economic agenda domestically. 
For the next three years, Tagammu operated within this narrower purview.  In this 
vein, despite its close ties with labor unions, the party declined to lead the large labor 
strikes that broke out in January and July of 1986.  Similarly, when a number of 
Tagammu activists were arrested while soliciting petition signatures against subsidy cuts, 
al-Ahaly declined to cover it.173  Moreover, even when al-Ahaly criticized the Mubarak 
regime, it avoided mentioning the president by name, as chairman Mohieddin insisted 
that this was a “red line.”174  Meanwhile, it turned its attention to foreign policy matters, 
criticizing the Camp David Accords and Cairo’s close ties with Washington.  It further 
agitated against foreign investment in Egypt, which it argued was exploitative. 
Even within this limited sphere, however, Tagammu butted heads with the 
regime.  One such incident came in October 1985, when Egyptian soldier Suleiman 
Khater shot and killed seven Israeli tourists in Sinai.  When the Egyptian government 
moved to try Khater before a military court, Tagammu organized a campaign to defend 
his actions and, when Khater reportedly hung himself in prison a few months later, al-
Ahaly insinuated a government conspiracy.  In response, the government press undertook 
a new smear campaign against the opposition, accusing it of trying to foment chaos and 
“threatening democracy.”175  In another incident, in March 1986, Tagammu criticized 
plans to build a General Motors (GM) factory in Egypt; the party claimed that GM had 
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cut a corrupt deal with the Egyptian military, and argued that GM would crush Egypt’s 
own Nasr car company.  This rankled the Egyptian military, and the regime seized issues 
of al-Ahaly and issued threatened party leaders via State Security.176 
Indeed, Tagammu’s attempt to act as a moderate opposition party failed to 
assuage the regime, which once again ensured the party’s defeat in the April 1987 
parliamentary elections.  Tagammu activists were arrested two days before the election 
for campaigning for communist candidates177, and violations were widely reported on 
election day.178 Meanwhile, state-run media used Tagammu’s electoral coordination with 
independent communists and Nasserists to cast it as a party of “extremists bent on 
disrupting national unity.”179  So for the second straight election, Tagammu won no seats, 
leaving it shut off from the public once again. 
 The Tagammu Party remained largely inconsequential for the next three years.  
During this time, circulation of al-Ahaly dipped considerably, from an average of 68,961 
in 1987 to 45,943 in 1990, and that party’s leadership underwent an administrative 
reorganization.180  Meanwhile, as the party searched for a way forward, it softened its 
approach vis-à-vis the regime, apparently hoping that the regime would respond by 
giving it more space for operating.  As longtime party leader Abdel Ghafar Shokr told 
me: 
In 1987, Tagammu stopped being oppositional and became just oppositional in words, 
because there was a lot of pressure on party leaders and no hope because the regime 
controlled everything in the streets and community.  Tagammu leaders are strugglers, 
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and they decided not to be too harsh with the regime, so that [the regime] would give 
[us] a chance to work.181 
 
As part of this process, the party began holding dialogues with the regime.182 
 These conversations between the Tagammu Party and the regime would prove 
mutually advantageous in the next parliamentary elections, which were held in November 
1990.  One month before these elections, parliament was dissolved via referendum, and a 
new electoral law was passed under which Egypt was divided into 222 two-
parliamentarian districts.  But three major opposition parties – the Wafd, SLP, and al-
Ahrar – objected to the new law, and jointly declared that they would boycott the 
election.183  This made Tagammu’s participation necessary for the regime, since an 
election without the participation of opposition parties would have lacked credibility. 
 Although there was strong support within the Tagammu Party for joining the 
other parties’ boycott, the party ultimately participated in the elections for three reasons.  
First, the campaigning period represented the rare opportunity for the party to engage the 
public with minimal regime interference, and Tagammu leaders were eager to return to 
the streets – even if only for a few weeks – after years of near invisibility.184  Second, 
chairman Mohieddin argued that the party could not follow a boycott that the Wafd party 
had initiated, because this would effectively make it a Wafdist branch.185   
Third – and most importantly – in exchange for not participating in the other 
parties’ electoral boycott, the Tagammu leadership had secured assurances from the 
regime that certain candidates would be permitted to win.  “It was known inside the party 
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who was against the regime,” Abu el-Ezz el-Hariri, a member of the Tagammu politburo 
at the time, told me.  “So when they faked the elections, they chose the weak people who 
would follow the regime.”186  On election day, this NDP-Tagammu partnership was quite 
visible: in five districts, Tagammu candidates participated in vote exchanges with the 
local NDP candidates, under which they acted as de facto tickets.187  Thus, for the first 
time since 1979, Tagammu returned to parliament, winning five of 444 contested seats.   
IV. Portrait of a Trapped Party   
Tagammu’s relative success during the 1990 elections marked a permanent shift 
in the party’s modus operandi.   For the next two decades of Mubarak’s rule, Tagammu 
toned down its opposition to the regime in exchange for constant parliamentary 
representation and other benefits – a trade that effectively made the party an appendage 
of the regime, rather than an opponent.188 
To protect this deal, the Tagammu leadership carefully abided by the regime’s red 
lines.  Although these red lines shifted occasionally, this typically meant that Tagammu 
declined to cooperate with Islamist parties and protest movements; participated in 
demonstrations only with the regime’s prior approval; and offered only soft criticisms of 
the regime’s policies, while avoiding direct criticism of Mubarak, Mubarak’s family, and 
the military.  In many instances, the party’s leadership ensured that Tagammu adhered to 
the regime’s red lines by obstructing party members who desired a more confrontational 
posture.   
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In turn, the party’s members – many of whom had cut their political teeth as 
radical communist activists in the 1960s and 1970s – were trapped.  They were unable to 
meaningfully oppose the regime within their co-opted party, and feared retribution if they 
tried to oppose the regime from outside of Tagammu’s framework.  As many of the 
Tagammu Party’s leaders admitted, by the eve of the January 2011 revolt that toppled 
Mubarak, the Tagammu Party had become practically irrelevant: it had little popularity, 
took few positions against the regime, and was still dominated by its aging founders. 
a. Keeping Tagammu Trapped 
 Yet the Mubarak regime never took Tagammu’s the eventual irrelevance for 
granted.  The regime’s top leaders and security services presumably knew that 
Tagammu’s leadership was comprised of former communist dissidents, almost all of 
whom had spent time in prison for their anti-regime activism.  It thus used an array of 
carrots and sticks to ensure that Tagammu abided by the regime’s red lines, which kept 
the party’s formerly strident opposition activists trapped. 
 Three carrots are worth emphasizing.  First, in exchange for abiding by its red 
lines, the regime permitted Tagammu’s survival.  This stood in stark contrast to the 
regime’s treatment of the two other parties that were during the late 1970s.  The Ahrar 
Party, which the regime established in 1976 as the “right” platform of the ASU, was 
frozen in 1998, when founding chairman Mustafa Kamel Murad’s death sparked a violent 
succession crisis.  Meanwhile, the SLP, which the regime established in 1978 as a leftist 
alternative to Tagammu, became an Islamist party and later renamed itself the Islamic 
Labor Party (ILP).  In 2000, the regime used a leadership dispute within the ILP as a 
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pretext for freezing it, and later deployed security forces to prevent the party from re-
opening when a court decision permitted the ILP to resume its activities.189 
Second, the Mubarak regime granted Tagammu’s top leaders substantial political 
patronage.  It thus permitted founding Tagammu chairman Khaled Mohieddin to win 
three straight parliamentary elections and serve in parliament until 2005.  The regime’s 
support for Tagammu’s second chairman, Rifaat al-Said, was more overt: in 1996, 
Mubarak appointed al-Said, who was then serving as Tagammu’s secretary-general, to 
the Shura Council, which is Egypt’s upper parliamentary body.190  This gave al-Said 
direct access to the regime’s top officials, and made him an attractive candidate to lead 
the party when Mohieddin retired in 2003.  “He was the secretary-general, and had 
connections in the government,” politburo member Magdy Sharabiyah told me.  “So 
nobody wanted to challenge him.”191  In this way, the regime’s early support for al-Said 
made him politically strong within the party, thus sparing Tagammu the messy 
succession fights that sunk the ILP and Ahrar Party, among others. 
 Once al-Said became Tagammu chairman, the regime continued feeding him 
carrots.  For example, it allowed him to write a weekly column in the state-run daily Al-
Ahram.192  The regime further gave business to a printing press that al-Said co-owns with 
other Tagammu founders, which printed educational, scientific, and political works for 
the government.193 
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 Most importantly, the regime strengthened al-Said by establishing him as the 
ultimate distributor of political patronage within the party.  For example, in 2004, al-Said 
used his influence to help secure a Shura Council seat for Tagammu leader Abdel 
Rahman Khayr194, and he did the same in 2007 for Ahmed Shaaban.195  During the 
heavily forged 2010 parliamentary elections, al-Said negotiated with top regime officials 
to ensure Rafit Saif’s victory196, and he additionally pushed the regime to permit Abdel 
Rashid Helal to run for a seat that Helal ultimately won.  “[State Security] was delaying 
my fingerprints and getting my criminal record so that I could run,”  Helal told me.  “So I 
called Rifaat al-Said, and he called [State Security] for me.  And sometimes if they don’t 
accept my papers, Rifaat al-Said calls them and it’s solved.”197  Al-Said’s distribution of 
political patronage to other party members also came in the form of lower level 
government jobs, which he secured for Tagammu leaders and their family members.198 
 The third carrot that the Mubarak regime used to ensure Tagammu’s compliance 
with its red lines was granting Tagammu open access to NDP leaders.  Indeed, a number 
of Tagammu leaders reported speaking to NDP officials “daily,”199 and these contacts 
helped Tagammu members secure government services that were politically useful to 
their local constituents.200  “We call the NDP about governance and people’s problems – 
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health services, roads, water, and electricity,” said Tagammu politburo member Atif al-
Maghrawi, who served on the local council of Zaqaziq.201  The regime also afforded 
Tagammu easy access to State Security officials, which was vital for freeing members 
who got arrested.202  “State Security was an institution, and there was someone 
responsible for political parties,” chairman al-Said told me shortly after Mubarak’s 
resignation in February 2011.  “When we needed anything, we called.”203 
 In addition to these three carrots, the regime had two major sticks at its disposal.  
First, State Security monitored the Tagammu Party very closely, frequently calling its 
leaders to check up on them.204  Given the broad powers that State Security enjoyed 
under the emergency laws, Tagammu leaders found these calls quite threatening.  
“Someone calls me and says that I’m rocking the boat,” Tagammu politburo member 
Gouda Abdel-Khalek told me.  “So I say I’m trying to [push for] reform in a [friendly] 
way.”205  At times, State Security would harass Tagammu leaders by turning their 
colleagues against them.  “They called me a lot,” said former Tagammu politburo 
member Sayyid Shaaban.  “The officer responsible for parties would tell me what 
[Tagammu leader and MP] Rafit Saif was saying about me, and then tell Rafit Saif when 
I was saying [about him].  So he played a dirty role.”206  
Beyond these types of calls to individual members, State Security regulated two 
types of party activities: party events and Al-Ahaly, the party’s official newspaper.  In this 
vein, State Security had to approve all Tagammu events, including conferences, rallies, 
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and even memorial services for deceased members.207  State Security was most 
concerned with events held outside the party’s headquarters, and it would call the party to 
warn its leaders against “doing activities in the street.”208  It also called Al-Ahaly’s editors 
frequently to make sure that criticism of the regime was kept to a minimum.  “Every 
week I receive a message from the military that says, ‘do not publish anything about the 
army,’” Al-Ahaly editor Farida Niqash told me.209 
 State Security harassed the Tagammu Party so regularly that many leaders 
believed that the party was infiltrated.210  “We’re a big party and accept anyone,” said 
Tagammu secretary-general Said Abdel-Ael.  “And surely some have connections with 
State Security.”211  Interestingly, after Mubarak’s fall, these suspicions were confirmed: 
raids of State Security offices yielded documentary evidence that at least three Tagammu 
members were reporting on the party to State Security.212   
 The regime’s second major stick that it wielded against the Tagammu Party was 
its thorough control of parliamentary elections.  In this vein, when the Tagammu Party 
boycotted the September 2005 presidential election, the regime punished it in the 
parliamentary elections, which were held two months later.  Tagammu’s parliamentary 
representation slipped from six seats to two, and the regime especially sought to punish 
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former Tagammu chairman Mohieddin, who refused to run for president despite the 
regime’s pleas and thus lost a seat that he had held for fifteen years.213   
 Taken together, these carrots and sticks offered Tagammu members clear rewards 
for abiding by the regime’s red lines, and threatened worrisome consequences if members 
crossed them.  So, if an opposition party isn’t allowed to oppose the regime, what exactly 
does it do? 
b. How a Trapped Party Acts 
 Given the severely limited space in which the Mubarak regime permitted it to 
operate, the Tagammu Party served three key functions.  First, because campaign seasons 
afforded Tagammu the rare opportunity to hold less-regulated public events, the party 
participated in every parliamentary election held under Mubarak’s rule.  “If you’re a real 
man of struggle, don’t miss the opportunity to go to the streets and explain your program 
in the cafes,” Tagammu spokesman Nabil Zaki told me shortly before the January 2011 
uprising.  “If you don’t [campaign], you will die.”214  Tagammu leaders also viewed the 
relative openness of campaign periods as useful for assessing the party’s popularity and 
recruiting new members.215   
In turn, Tagammu’s top leaders consistently fought internal efforts to boycott 
elections.  The closest that Tagammu came to boycotting a parliamentary election was in 
November 2010, when the first round of the elections was so severely rigged that all 
other opposition parties withdrew from the second round.  To prevent his party from 
joining the rest of the opposition, chairman al-Said stacked the Tagammu politburo with 
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ineligible voters who opposed a boycott, and the motion to boycott the second round of 
the elections was voted down by a single vote.216 
Tagammu’s second key function was serving as a gentle counterpoint to the 
regime, emphasizing that it merely disagreed with the regime on a handful of policy 
issues while avoiding personal attacks on regime figures.217  In this vein, Tagammu party 
leaders occasionally appeared on state-run television to debate their NDP counterparts on 
matters of economic and social policy.218  This enabled the regime to portray itself as 
somewhat open to alternate points of view, while Tagammu leaders enjoyed their 
moments in the spotlight. 
 Tagammu leaders believed that the party’s kid-gloved treatment of the regime 
gave it some influence in shaping the regime’s policies219, and the regime occasionally 
confirmed the party’s optimism.  For example, according to Abdel-Khalek, who chaired 
the party’s economic committee, Tagammu once pushed to get a 10-percent raise for 
public employees when the regime was only offering a 5-percent raise.  In another 
instance, it convinced the Minister of Investments to abandon legislation on managing 
public assets.220  While these meetings were rare221, they were sufficiently rewarding for 
an opposition party that was otherwise completely excluded from the policy process. 
 To preserve its limited access to the regime, the Tagammu Party kept a distance 
from the regime’s more outspoken opponents.  While its leaders dealt occasionally with 
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other legal opposition parties – particularly the Wafd and Nasserists222 -- it deliberately 
avoided anti-Mubarak protest movements such as the 2003-2006 Kefaya movement and 
the April 6th Youth Movement, which was founded in 2008.223  “We do not join 
demonstrations that are organized by others, because they are not political parties, but 
groups of young people who don’t coordinate with us, and they prepare everything and 
only then ask us to join,” said politburo member Muhammad Said.224  Indeed, when 
Tagammu members did participate in demonstrations, they did so as individuals, rather 
than under Tagammu’s official banner.225   
Tagammu’s third key function was serving as a consistent anti-Islamist voice 
within the opposition.  This anti-Islamist stance follows from Tagammu’s communist 
lineage, and chairman al-Said was particularly influential in steering the party in this 
direction.  Al-Said has written a number of books attacking political Islam and coined the 
pejorative term “muta'aslimin,” which is often interpreted as the cynical use of Islam to 
attain power.226  In turn, Tagammu has always opposed cooperation with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, even when the two groups shared common goals, such as opposing Israel 
and Mubarak’s autocratic practices.227  “We’re against political Islam and think that the 
Islamist view is more dangerous to the community than dictatorship,” said politburo 
leader Nabil Abdel-Ghani.228  This made Tagammu a useful ally for the Mubarak regime, 
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which viewed Islamists as its foremost political threat and, as I discuss in Chapter 5, 
repressed the Muslim Brotherhood very harshly. 
Taken together, the Tagammu Party’s three primary activities meant that the party 
was mostly inactive.  Other than its aggressive participation in elections for 
approximately three weeks out of every five years, it merely existed to offer light 
critiques of the regime while avoiding some of the key anti-regime activities that 
increasingly energized political activists during the latter years of Mubarak’s reign.  
Moreover, Tagammu’s parliamentary representation remained paltry and its newspaper 
Al-Ahaly was increasingly hard to find on newsstands.  On an ordinary weekday, its 
headquarters were mostly quiet, with smoking retirees sitting around and reflecting on 
their previous lives as communist dissidents.   
Indeed, by the eve of the January 2011 anti-Mubarak revolt, Tagammu’s leaders 
frequently admitted that their party was irrelevant.229  So why did they stay? 
c. Why Didn’t Tagammu Fold? 
 Tagammu leaders offered three explanations for their continued involvement in an 
increasingly meaningless party.  First, almost all Tagammu leaders joined the party when 
it was founded in 1976, and therefore felt tied to the institution and its cause.  Some party 
leaders believed that many of the policies for which Tagammu originally advocated had 
been implemented.  “We have changed many things since 1976,” Farida al-Niqash told 
me. “Now what we said thirty years ago, the government is applying.  We criticized 
privatization policies, and now they’re reversing them.”230  Others had faith that the 
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party’s ideas would be implemented in due time.  “We see socialism in Egypt,” said 
Farag Farag.  “Yes, we see that the government is broken.  But the idea is not.  It [will be 
achieved] in the long run.”231 
 Second, recognizing the limits that the Mubarak regime imposed on political 
groups, Tagammu leaders viewed their party’s toned-down approach as the only way to 
survive for the time being.  They had witnessed the regime’s closing of other parties that 
attacked it too harshly – such as the SLP and liberal Ghad party, which I discuss in 
Chapter 4 – and had no desire to follow in those parties’ footsteps.232  “Maybe 
[Tagammu] looks like decoration,” politburo member Ahmed Shaaban told me.  “But I’m 
dealing wisely to serve the party because we don’t have power to face the regime because 
we’re weak.  The regime reads me through State Security or by putting agents in the 
party, so I have to carry on until change comes.”233 
 Finally, Tagammu leaders believed that by cooperating with the regime during the 
Mubarak era, they were preserving Tagammu for the post-Mubarak future, when it would 
re-emerge in full force.234 “We believe that change is coming with the support of the 
Egyptian people otherwise we would have closed the party,” said politburo member 
Muhammad Said.  “In America, the Republicans sometimes lose, so the Democrats take 
over…. But I believe in this party and that change will come.  And I believe that every 
step we take will help us in the future.”235 
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 Five and a half months after Said predicted that “change will come,” change did, 
in fact, come, as ordinary Egyptians took to the streets and toppled Mubarak in dramatic 
fashion.  Yet when Egypt held its first post-Mubarak elections in late November 2011, 
Tagammu was still barely visible: far from emerging as the dominant leftist party, it 
joined a coalition of two newly formed – and better organized – secularist parties, 
winning just three of 498 seats.236  Indeed, after being trapped for the last twenty-one 
years of Mubarak’s reign, that party was in no condition to compete.  If anything, it had 
fossilized. 
V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I presented a case study of the Tagammu to show the various 
tactics that the Mubarak regime used to prevent its leftist opponents from challenging it 
too stridently.  In this vein, the regime threatened the party with an array of sticks, such 
as State Security penetration, and provided some carrots, such as political patronage, to 
win the party’s acquiescence for the final 21 years of Mubarak’s reign.  Tagammu’s 
ultimate irrelevance – a predicament that persists in the post-Mubarak era – suggests that 
the Mubarak regime neutered it quite effectively. 
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Chapter 3 
The New Wafd Party: Trapped By Regime Dependency  
 
 The Mubarak regime’s success in trapping the Tagammu party was partly owed to 
the continuity of Tagammu’s leadership throughout its 35-year history.  Indeed, only two 
men – Khalid Mohieddin and Rifaat al-Said – served as chairman, and neither faced 
serious challenges to their leadership.  This made them reliable partners for the regime 
and, in exchange for carrots, they frequently enforced discipline within their party by 
forcing their colleagues to abide by the regime’s red lines. 
 Other parties, however, were less cohesive, and competing leaders within these 
parties provided ample pressure points for the regime to press in keeping these parties 
trapped.  The New Wafd party, which is the subject of this chapter, is one such party. 
Following the death of its founding chairman, the regime exploited deep divisions within 
the Wafd, ensuring that the party was too focused on its own internal problems to emerge 
as a possible challenger to the regime.  In turn, the Wafd party presents another useful 
case study of how the Mubarak regime interfered with its legal opposition parties to trap 
its would-be opponents. 
I. The Wafd Party: An Overview 
 The Wafd was unique among Mubarak-era opposition parties: it was the only 
party that could trace its lineage to before the 1952 Free Officers Revolution.  In fact, 
some of modern Egypt’s most renowned politicians emerged from the Wafd, and its 
reputation as Egypt’s first nationalist party made its reemergence under Mubarak 
threatening to the regime.  To deal with this threat, the Mubarak regime initially treated 
the Wafd much as it treated Tagammu, using an array of carrots and sticks to force the 
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Wafd to abide by its red lines.  By the mid-1990s, the Wafd was a trapped party much 
like Tagammu. 
a. Origins 
 The Wafd was founded on November 13, 1918 – two days after the end of World 
War I – to represent Egyptian interests at the Paris Peace Conference.237  Led by 
legislative council member Saad Zaghloul and other prominent parliamentarians, the 
Wafd, which means “delegation,” ultimately emerged as the major Egyptian nationalist 
party of its era: it demanded the end of Britain’s protectorate in Egypt; led the struggle 
for Egyptian independence; and represented the foremost check on royal power during 
the 1920s and 1930s.238  But in the 1940s, its power began to wane: a 1937-1938 split 
drove local bourgeois Wafdist leaders towards the offshoot Saadist party, and the middle 
class increasingly supported other parties.239  Internal conflicts and corruption further 
eroded the Wafd’s credibility, and the final Wafdist government, which presided from 
1950 to 1952, was viewed as too appeasing of the palace.240  Moreover, as landlords 
increasingly dominated its leadership, the Wafd lost popularity.241 
When the Free Officers, led by Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, ousted King Farouk 
in July 1952, the Wafd became a primary target for the new regime.  Initially, the regime 
promised the Wafd that it could survive by shedding its corrupt leaders, but in January 
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1953, the new regime officially dissolved all political parties.  Many Wafdist leaders 
were tried for corruption and crimes against the state in public courts, typically receiving 
commuted sentences.  For the next twenty-four years, the party ceased to exist, as the 
Nasser regime instituted one-party rule.242 
When President Anwar Sadat divided his ruling party, the Arab Socialist Union 
into three “manabir” in 1976, thereby inaugurating limited multiparty competition, the 
Wafd’s former leaders considered resuscitating their party.  Fouad Serageddin, the 
Wafd’s last secretary-general, went public with these efforts on August 23, 1977, when 
he called for the formation of a new Wafd party during a speech at the Lawyers 
Syndicate.243  While the speech stopped short of criticizing Sadat directly, it received 
widespread attention for its harsh criticisms of the Nasser regime.  Immediately 
thereafter, Serageddin began holding meetings in his Cairo mansion to draw up a 
platform and recruit new members.  The reconstituted party, which was officially named 
New Wafd to satisfy a law that forbade naming new parties after pre-revolutionary ones, 
was formally legalized in February 1978.244 
Three months later, however, Sadat began rolling back his liberalizing policies.  
Viewing the Wafd and its increasing prominence as a political threat245, Sadat organized 
a referendum to ban individuals that had “corrupted political life” and belonged to parties 
before 1952, as well as those who had been convicted of “belonging to the ‘centers of 
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power’ after 1952 or of committing crimes against personal liberty.”  The referendum 
passed with 98.29 percent of the vote and, though it did not name the Wafd explicitly, it 
would have effectively banned Serageddin and the Wafd’s two other top leaders from 
political participation.  So on June 2, Serageddin convened the party’s leadership and 
announced that the Wafd would freeze itself.246  This prevented the party from being 
outlawed, and gave it the ability to reemerge at a later date, if conditions improved.247 
 Sure enough, conditions permitted the Wafd to reemerge five years later under 
President Hosni Mubarak.  An October 1983 court order permitted the resumption of 
political activities and, in February 1984, the political rights of former Wafdist leaders 
were restored.248 Under Serageddin’s leadership, the party quickly organized, recruiting 
governorate leaders and drafting candidates for elections.249  
b. The Trapping of the Wafd, 1984-1995 
During its early years following its reemergence, the Wafd opposed the regime 
vigorously.  Running in a coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood in the May 1984 
elections, the Wafd’s platform demanded legal reform, freedom of association for parties, 
canceling Camp David Accords, and economic and political liberalization250 -- thereby 
attacking key Mubarak policies.  In response, Mubarak enacted various changes to the 
elections laws, such as raising the electoral threshold to 8% and reducing the number of 
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electoral constituencies, aiming to hurt the Wafd’s electoral chances.  Ultimately, Wafd 
won 58 of 448 contested seats, thus emerging as Egypt’s top opposition party.251   
When early elections were called three years later because of a pending Supreme 
Court case that threatened to invalidate the 1984 parliamentary elections, the Wafd broke 
with the Brotherhood and ran on its own, winning 10.9 percent of the vote and 35 seats.  
The fact that it was able to cross the 8 percent threshold without aligning with another 
affirmed its strength, and its performance was especially impressive considering 
widespread reports of forgery perpetrated by the regime.252 
Increasingly, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) viewed the Wafd as a 
threat.  This was due, in part, to the connectedness of the Wafd’s leadership, which was 
largely comprised of “landed, professional and commercial bourgeoisie, especially those 
associated with the private sector.”  Moreover, the Wafd’s strong stance in support of 
economic liberalization constituted a challenge to Mubarak’s early tilt towards 
Nasserism, through which Mubarak aimed “to cover his exposed flank to the left.”  This 
led many business professionals to desert the NDP for the Wafd.253  Meanwhile, the 
Wafd opened its own weekly newspaper, al-Wafd, which became a daily in 1987.  Its first 
editor, Mustafa Sherdy, was viewed as a “virulent” critic of the regime, which frequently 
harassed its editors.254  
 The 1990 parliamentary elections, however, marked the pinnacle of the Wafd’s 
relatively confrontational approach towards the Mubarak regime.  Once again, elections 
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were called early, and the regime responded to litigation against the previous electoral 
law by inaugurating a district-based, first-past-the-post voting system.  But the Wafd was 
unsatisfied with these changes and, in a bid to extract further democratizing reforms, it 
joined with Muslim Brotherhood and Ahrar party in boycotting the elections.  
This represented a major breach of the regime’s red lines.  After all, one of the 
regime’s key aims in holding multiparty elections was creating the impression of political 
competition, and electoral boycotts were thus extremely humiliating for the regime.  
Initially, Mubarak personally appealed to Serageddin to request the Wafd’s electoral 
participation, but Serageddin refused.  Then, when the regime allowed fourteen Wafdists 
who had run as independents to win, Serageddin doubled down on the Wafd’s boycott by 
banishing these members for disobeying the party.255  Finally, when Mubarak appointed 
Mona Makram-Ebeid to the Shura Council, Serageddin tripled-down on the Wafd’s 
boycott by banishing her as well.256  (As Makram-Ebeid admits, Mubarak hoped to use 
her appointment to “punish the Wafd,” and she willingly played this role because she 
disagreed with Serageddin’s boycott decision.257) 
 Bold though it was, Serageddin’s commitment to boycotting the 1990 elections 
exacted a tremendous toll on the party.  As contemporary Wafdists emphasized in 
interviews, the Wafd’s absence from the parliament from 1990 to 1995 practically erased 
it from Egyptians’ political consciousness.258  “It created problems,” said High 
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Committee member Mohamed Sherdy, “because we disappeared from the scene.”259  
Meanwhile, over the next five years, the Wafd’s membership declined substantially. 
The Wafd’s sinking fortunes, it seems, forced Serageddin to negotiate more 
directly with the regime to ensure the party’s return to the parliament.  Before the 1995 
parliamentary elections, Serageddin made a deal with NDP leader Kamel el-Shezli, 
securing parliamentary for at least three predetermined Wafdist candidates, including his 
brother Yasin Serageddin; his grandson Fouad Badrawy; and youth leader Ayman 
Nour.260  Yet despite the Wafd’s more conciliatory approach, the regime rigged multiple 
elections against Wafd candidates, and offered parliamentary seats to Wafdists who 
defected to the NDP.261  Thus, only six out of the Wafd’s 184 candidates won.262 
II. The Tumultuous Chairmanship of Naaman Gomaa 
 The Wafd’s return to parliament in 1995 did little to inject life into the party.  
Fouad Serageddin, the iconic “pasha” who represented both the Wafd’s glorified past and 
contemporary resurrection263, grew very ill, ceasing his day-to-day involvement in the 
party even while retaining the title of chairman, which created a significant leadership 
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vacuum.  When Serageddin died at the age of 89 in August 2000, the regime sensed an 
opportunity, and threatened to freeze its activities.264  But the chairmanship elections, 
held sixty days later, inspired some optimism about the party’s future: in a remarkably 
transparent process265, vice-chair Naaman Gomaa trounced Serageddin’s grandson, MP 
Fouad Badrawy, thereby preventing a nepotistic succession.266 
a. Naaman Gomaa: A Co-opted – and Vindictive – Chairman 
 To understand why the regime backed off its threat to freeze the party and 
allowed the Wafd chairmanship to pass onto Gomaa, it is worth examining Gomaa’s 
background.  Born to an elite landowning family in the Nile Delta’s Sharkiya governorate 
in 1934, Gomaa earned his law degree from Cairo University in 1956 and, after a stint as 
a government prosecutor, moved to France, where he obtained his Ph.D. in law from the 
University of Paris in 1966.  In France, Gomaa became a wealthy lawyer, representing 
Shell Oil, billionaire Mohamed Al Fayed, and the prince of Qatar, among others.  Upon 
returning to Egypt in 1971, he continued to practice law and taught at Cairo University’s 
Faculty of Law, and becoming dean of the law faculty in 1988.267  Since all university 
appointments need to be approved by State Security268, Gomaa’s academic job and 
administrative position suggested that the regime knew him well – and therefore 
maintained important pressure points that it could use against Gomaa if he crossed its red 
lines. 
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 But these positions were just the tip of the iceberg.  Gomaa’s daughter is married 
to Sami Abdul-Aziz, an advertising executive who served on the NDP Policy Committee, 
which was headed by Gamel Mubarak.269  Perhaps more importantly, Gomaa was also 
the personal lawyer for Agriculture Minister and former NDP Secretary-General Yusuf 
Wali270, a position that was as politically beneficial under the Mubarak regime as it was 
personally lucrative, since Gomaa received large tracts of land from Wali at below-
market rates.271  In exchange for these corrupt land purchases, Gomaa used his position 
within the Wafd to quash the party’s criticism of the regime: during Serageddin’s 
chairmanship, Gomaa ordered al-Wafd journalists not to criticize certain regime figures, 
particularly Wali, and not to attack certain regime policies, such as Egypt’s support for 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.272  The regime thus 
considered Gomaa a perfectly palatable Wafd chairman, since he had demonstrated an 
acceptance of the red lines and could be easily reined in if he emerged, unexpectedly, as a 
strong critic of the regime.  As Gomaa admitted to me in an interview, “I had a good 
relationship with everyone.  There was mutual respect and I had freedom to criticize and 
kept my freedom in the opposition.”273  
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 Gomaa’s close relationship with the regime became apparent during the 2000 
parliamentary elections.  Gomaa refused to allow Mohamed Kamel, a former Shura 
Council member and the Wafd’s secretary-general in Menoufiya, to run against NDP 
leader Kamel el-Shezli, thereby forcing Kamel to compete as an independent.274  In 
return, the Wafd won seven seats, a one-seat improvement over the previous election.275   
 The next sign of Gomaa’s cooptation occurred in March 2001, when the regime 
pressured him to expelled two Wafdist MPs, Ayman Nour and Farid Hassanein, both of 
whom had crossed the red lines.  Nour’s emergence as an anti-Mubarak figure occurred 
shortly after the 2000 parliamentary elections, when he ran for deputy speaker and won a 
shocking 161 votes.  This vote-total suggested that Nour had received support from many 
NDP parliamentarians and, in response, an alarmed Mubarak threatened to dissolve 
parliament if NDP parliamentarians permitted this to happen again.276  Three months 
later, Hassanein stoked the regime’s ire when he staged a sit-in outside of parliament, 
which Gomaa claimed harmed “the credibility and well being of the party.”277 
 More banishments soon followed.  In 2002, Gomaa fired a third Wafdist MP, Seif 
Mahmoud, accusing him of using his position for pursuing personal interests.278  Another 
incident occurred in December 2002, when Wafdist MP Mahmoud El-Shazli opposed an 
NDP-led effort to strip Muslim Brotherhood MP Gamal Heshmat’s parliamentary 
membership on the dubious grounds that Heshmat had won his seat because of a vote-
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counting error.279  By bucking the NDP and, more egregiously, supporting a Muslim 
Brother, El-Shazli had crossed a major red line, and Gomaa responded by firing him from 
both the party and al-Wafd newspaper, where El-Shazli had worked for fifteen years.280  
Gomaa’s stance in support of the NDP against the Brotherhood was soon rewarded: when 
a new election for Heshmat’s seat was held in January 2003, Wafdist Khairi Kilig won by 
a landslide.281 
The firing of four of the Wafd’s seven parliamentarians raised suspicions that 
Gomaa was deliberately “weakening the position of the Wafd in the parliament in order 
to please the government.”282  But Gomaa’s personal insecurity might have also played a 
role in these firings.  Indeed, Gomaa reportedly resented Ayman Nour’s popularity, and 
was particularly unnerved by a demonstration that Nour staged outside of the Wafd’s 
headquarters, in which Nour’s supporters called for him to become deputy editor of al-
Wafd.283  Meanwhile, Gomaa ordered al-Wafd not to cover the activities of the Wafd’s 
remaining parliamentarians.  This was another move borne of Gomaa’s insecurity, since 
it appeared to target MP Fouad Badrawy – Gomaa’s opponent in the Wafd’s 2000 
chairmanship election, who commanded meaningful support within the party.284 
Yet of all the threats that Gomaa perceived within his own party, none seems to 
have frightened him more than Mahmoud Abaza.  A descendant of one of Egypt’s largest 
political families, Abaza was remarkably well-connected within the regime: his uncle, 
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Maher Abaza, served as Minister of Electricity; his brother, Amin Abaza, served as 
Agriculture Minister; and his wife worked as an assistant to Osama el-Baz, one of 
Mubarak’s most influential advisers, before being appointed ambassador to the 
Vatican.285  But Abaza also possessed a stellar Wafdist lineage: his father, Ahmed Abaza, 
served two stints as a Wafdist MP and, having known Fouad Serageddin since his 
childhood, Mahmoud Abaza had been involved in the Wafd’s 1983 resurrection.286  And 
perhaps most threatening to the short and pasty Gomaa, Abaza was tall, charming, and 
fifteen years younger. 
Like most Wafdists, Abaza had supported Gomaa during the 2000 chairmanship 
elections.  But shortly after his election, Gomaa encouraged Mohamed Sherdy to replace 
Abaza as chairman of the Wafd Youth Committee, which Sherdy – who, like Abaza, 
came from an established Wafdist family – flatly refused to do.287  As displeasure with 
Gomaa’s management style rose within the party, Gomaa increasingly feared that Abaza 
would emerge as his replacement.  But Abaza, a deputy chairman, simply had too many 
supporters in the party, particularly among the leadership, to be ousted.  Gomaa may have 
also feared that an ill-timed move against Abaza would invite retribution from the 
regime, given Abaza’s connections.288  This brewing rivalry would prove pivotal. 
b. The 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 
 Under intense foreign and domestic pressure to institute democratizing reforms, 
the Mubarak regime announced in February 2005 that it would hold its first ever multi-
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candidate presidential elections, and it held a national referendum in May approving a 
constitutional change to this effect.  In a bold move against the regime, the Wafd joined 
with other opposition parties in boycotting the referendum, and al-Wafd even ran a front-
page spread highlighting incidents of electoral fraud.289  But when the referendum passed, 
the Wafd was left with a stark choice: would it boycott the election, thereby undermining 
Mubarak’s attempt to make Egyptian politics appear more democratic?  Or would it run a 
candidate, participating in an election that it knew would be a complete sham? 
 Immediately after the referendum, the regime began pressuring the Wafd to 
participate in the election, with NDP strongman Kemal al-Shezli calling Gomaa and 
encouraging him to run for president.290  Initially, Gomaa resisted, and even voted against 
the Wafd’s participation in the presidential election when the party’s high committee met 
to decide on the issue.  Gomaa, however, was in the minority: recalling the fallout from 
the party’s 1990 parliamentary boycott, most Wafdist leaders feared that boycotting the 
presidential elections would diminish the party’s image.291  Then, when Abaza threatened 
to run, Gomaa tossed his misgivings aside and threw his hat in the ring.  “I would never 
give Mahmoud Abaza the honor of running for president,” he told his colleagues.292 
 From the very beginning, Gomaa’s presidential campaign was an epic failure.  
Faced with hecklers during his first rally in Port Said, Gomaa abruptly walked off the 
stage and, still miked, ordered a campaign assistant to tell the crowd to “shut the fuck 
up.” His subsequent press conferences were similarly disastrous: ignoring the talking 
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points that his staff had prepared for him, Gomaa would speak for forty-five minutes 
without taking any questions.   Before long, Gomaa’s campaign completely slipped from 
the news, while the presidential campaign of Ayman Nour – the charismatic young 
politician whom Gomaa had fired in 2001 – overtook the headlines.  To those around 
Gomaa, it seemed as though finishing ahead of Nour was the only thing that kept him 
going, and Gomaa even begged the regime on Election Day to give him more votes than 
Nour.293  But Nour’s popularity apparently made it hard for the regime to justify this sort 
of outcome, and Gomaa thus finished a distant third, winning only 2.7% to Nour’s 7.6%, 
while Mubarak was handily reelected with 88% of the vote.  Despite having spent 10 
million Egyptian pounds (approximately $1.75 million), Gomaa’s campaign had hurt the 
Wafd’s image, and internal calls for Gomaa’s ouster started mounting.294 
 But first the Wafd had to plan for the parliamentary elections, which began two 
months later.  Working with ten other political parties, the Wafd formed the United 
National Front for Change (UNFC), an electoral alliance that aimed to coordinate 
candidacies so as to limit competition among the opposition parties, and the Wafd ran 
114 candidates.  Importantly, the UNFC excluded the two groups most worrisome to the 
regime: Ayman Nour’s Ghad party, which – as I discuss in Chapter 4 – had crossed the 
regime’s red lines by declaring the presidential elections rigged; and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which – as I discuss in Chapter 5 – the regime viewed as it’s greatest 
political threat.295 
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 Once again, however, Gomaa’s personal jealousies undermined the party’s 
chances.  In this vein, Gomaa ordered al-Wafd not to cover MP Mounir Fakhry 
Abdelnour’s re-election race.296  As a member of one of the Wafd’s founding families, 
Abdelnour was a popular figure within the Wafd’s leadership, and Gomaa’s action 
contributed to his surprising loss. 
Gomaa similarly tried to sink Abaza’s parliamentary campaign by telling 
Wafdists not to support it.  But Abaza was able to overcome Gomaa’s efforts thanks to 
his strong regime connections, which be used to beat Yehya Azmi, the brother of NDP 
leader Zakaria Azmi.  Security forces initially shut down the polling places to ensure 
Azmi’s victory, but after complaining to a Mubarak deputy297, Abaza secured a “no-
forgery” pledge.298  Abaza’s supporters were ultimately permitted into the polls and, as a 
result, Abaza was one of only six Wafdists elected to parliament.299  Despite having 
participated actively in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the Wafd’s 
parliamentary representation had decreased by one. 
 By this point, an intra-party crisis became unavoidable.  The spark would come 
shortly after the elections, when Abdelnour accused Gomaa of undermining his campaign 
in a national television interview.300  Gomaa responded by banishing Abdelnour from the 
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party and, shortly thereafter, Abaza called his allies within the party to seek Gomaa’s 
ouster.301   
c. The Wafd War of 2006 
 The Wafd’s by-laws had been drafted with its iconic leader, Fouad Serageddin, in 
mind, and the position of the chairman was therefore a lifetime appointment and endowed 
with substantial authority.  Some Wafdists viewed this as anti-democratic and, when 
Gomaa ran for the Wafd chairmanship following Serageddin’s death in 2000, he 
promised to amend the by-laws and institute a two-term limit.  But after being elected, 
Gomaa reneged on this promise, viewing subsequent calls for amending the by-laws as an 
effort to steal the party from him.302  Yet the Wafd’s embarrassing performance in the 
2005 elections made calls for reforming the chairmanship unavoidable.  Over Gomaa’s 
objections, a majority of high committee, led by Abaza, decided to meet on January 18, 
2006 to draft new by-laws.  
 When the Wafd high committee arrived to the party headquarters on that day, 
however, they found Gomaa sitting at the head of their conference table with unknown 
individuals occupying their seats.303  When these unknown individuals refused to leave, 
fights broke out, and thirty-three high committee members withdrew to an adjacent room, 
where they drafted a statement calling on Gomaa to be investigated and fired.304  In 
response, Gomaa froze the Wafd memberships of Abaza, Abdelnour, and wealthy 
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businessman Mohamed Sarhan.305  Gomaa then staged a 24-hour sit-in, refusing to leave 
the party headquarters until Abaza’s supporters cut his water, electricity, and telephone 
line.  Once Gomaa exited, the high committee’s insurgents called for new elections to be 
held on March 2, and named Abaza interim chairman.306  Meanwhile, in a bid for greater 
legitimacy, both Gomaa and the Abaza-led high committee informed the regime-run 
Political Parties Committee (PPC) of its decision, apparently hoping that the PPC would 
intervene to resolve the standoff.307 
  The regime, however, had no interest in ending the in-fighting.  The Wafd’s self-
destruction would bolster Mubarak’s argument that his regime was on the path towards 
democracy, and that the weakness of the opposition wasn’t his fault.  Moreover, the 
regime apparently feared that if it froze the party’s activities, as it had done to other 
parties during leadership disputes, it would face accusations of undemocratic behavior.308   
So when both Gomaa and the pro-Abaza faction appealed to the PPC, it declined 
to take a side, declaring the dispute an “internal matter.”309  Two days later, Gomaa filed 
a complaint with the public prosecutor, who authorized Gomaa to enter the party by 
“force” and resume his role as chairman.  When Abaza appealed, the prosecutor noted 
that, under the Wafd’s by-laws, only the party’s 2000-person general assembly could 
remove a chairman – and not merely a majority of the Wafd high committee.310 
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And so the standoff continued.  In February, Gomaa shut down al-Wafd 
newspaper for the first time in its 21-year history, accusing editors Abbas al-Tarabily and 
Magdy Sarhan of colluding with the regime.  It was another instance of Gomaa 
misreading the situation: Tarabily, the editor-in-chief, had actually supported Gomaa, but 
after a tense confrontation with an Abaza supporter that nearly ended in a shoot-out, he 
had agreed to keep al-Wafd neutral.311  In response to the shutdown, al-Wafd journalists 
organized an anti-Gomaa sit-in in front of the Press Syndicate Building and general 
prosecutor’s office in downtown Cairo, and the regime fanned these flames when the 
state-affiliated Higher Press Council declared that al-Wafd should return to newsstands as 
soon as possible.312  When the paper reappeared a week later under the condition that it 
would remain neutral, Gomaa announced that he would start another newspaper – called, 
simply, Wafd – and invited the staff of al-Wafd to join.  They refused.313 
On March 2nd, the 2000-person Wafd general assembly finally convened to 
resolve the crisis.  It elected elderly Mustafa al-Tawil, a member of the pro-Abaza camp, 
president until a new round of election would be held in June.314  By a 98-to-2-percent 
margin, it also approved amendments that empowered the high committee to question the 
party chairman, limited chairmanship terms to four years, and established a two-
consecutive-term limit for party chairmen.  But Gomaa still rejected the legitimacy of 
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these amendments, arguing that any changes made in his absence were null and void.315  
Meanwhile, ongoing court cases kept the status of the party’s leadership ambiguous: in 
one case, the prosecutor-general ruled that Gomaa must be permitted to re-enter the party 
headquarters and continue his job as chairman, while another court ruled on March 29th 
that Mustafa al-Tawil had been legitimately elected by the Wafd’s general assembly.316  
Meanwhile, the regime-run PPC remained neutral. 
Then, on the morning of April 1, Interior Minister Habib al-Adly and Shura 
Council Speaker Safwat Sherif, a powerful NDP leader who chaired the PPC, called 
Gomaa and told him to go to the party.317  At approximately 8 am, Gomaa arrived at the 
Wafd headquarters accompanied by 30-40 armed men, and microbuses filled with pro-
Gomaa reinforcements arrived shortly thereafter.318  Initially, the few Wafd employees 
and al-Wafd journalists who had shown up for work attempted to resist, but Gomaa’s 
forces overpowered them, stormed the complex, and welded its gates shut.  By midday, 
pro-Abaza activists managed to enter the complex through the back, and a violent 
standoff ensued, with the pro-Abaza forces reportedly throwing Molotov cocktails and 
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setting fire to the main building.319  Gomaa’s supporters opened fire, and at least 28 
people – most of them al-Wafd journalists – were injured, including two critically.320 
For approximately eight hours, the Mubarak regime did nothing.  Gomaa 
apparently believed that the police would assist him in reclaiming the party, viewing the 
calls from top regime officials as a promise to execute the court decisions that had gone 
in his favor.321  But this did not happen, and the police just stood to the side, apparently 
content to let the Wafd burn.  Meanwhile, Egyptian television broadcast live images of 
the violence, which bolstered the regime’s bid to destroy the party’s image.322  Finally, at 
around 5:00 PM, truckloads of security forces arrived and arrested Gomaa, carting him 
away in an armored vehicle.323  Two days later, the PPC recognized Mustafa al-Tawil as 
the new party head.324 
In theory, Gomaa’s violent defeat at the Wafd headquarters should have been the 
final nail in the coffin of his political career.  After all, Gomaa had lost virtually all of his 
supporters within the party, and the regime had also abandoned him.  Yet apparently 
believing that “the post of chairman was like that of the pope,” meaning that he “could be 
removed from office only by death or resigning,”325 Gomaa would never concede defeat. 
III. A Severely Trapped Party 
                                                           
319 Tim Seah, “April 1 at the Wafd Headquarters” The Arabist 3 Apr. 2006: 
<http://www.arabist.net/blog/2006/4/3/april-1-at-the-wafd-headquarters.html>. 
320 Pakinam Amer, “Al-Wafd Party Infighting Turns Violent,” Egypt Daily Star 3 Apr. 2006: 
<http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1075>; Shaden Shehab, “A New Beginning?” Al-
Ahram Weekly On-line 798 (8-14 Jun. 2006): <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/798/eg7.htm>. 
321 Interview with Hossam el-Kholy, 20 Mar. 2011. 
322 Interview with Abdul Aziz al-Nahhas, 19 Jan. 2011. 
323 Amer (2006). 
324 “Committee Recognizes New Al-Wafd Party Head,” Egypt Daily Star 4 Apr. 2006: 
<http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/archive/committee-recognizes-new-al-wafd-party-head.html>. 
325 Shehab, “A New Beginning?” 
 91
In early June 2006, the Wafd’s General Assembly reconvened and elected a new 
high committee. Abaza ran unopposed for party chairman, while Abdelnour was elected 
secretary-general.  But only days before the election, in response to a case brought by 
Gomaa, an administrative court had ruled that the party’s March 2 election of al-Tawil as 
interim president had been illegitimate.326  Although the PPC declined to enforce the 
court decision, Gomaa pressed on.  Over the next four years, Gomaa would win – by his 
count – thirteen cases against al-Tawil and Abaza327, though Abaza’s lawyers would also 
score some victories.328 
a. Mahmoud Abaza and the Sword of Damocles 
 The ongoing litigation was more than just an annoyance.  It represented an never-
ending challenge to both Abaza’s chairmanship and the party’s viability, since it left the 
regime’s PPC with the option of declaring the chairmanship contested and freezing the 
party’s activities entirely.  The regime further strengthened its hand against the Wafd by 
keeping two sets of criminal cases open: one involving Gomaa’s violent assault on the 
Wafd headquarters, and another involving three pro-Abaza activists who torched the 
Wafd headquarters with Molotov cocktails during the April 1 standoff.329   
Thus, Abaza was completely trapped, and the possibility that the regime might 
either take away his chairmanship or indict his associates prevented him from building 
the Wafd into a meaningful opposition force.  “Because of Naaman Gomaa’s claim to get 
back the leadership of the Wafd, Mahmoud Abaza had to be very understanding and 
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obedient to the regime,” acknowledged high committee member Salah Diab.  “He kept a 
very low key opposition, a very friendly attitude always.”330 
Practically speaking, this meant that chairman Abaza’s most confrontational acts 
towards the regime were, at best, half-measures.  For example, the Wafd boycotted the 
2007 Shura Council elections, and Abaza boldly declared that, “Egypt's political life had 
become a toy in the hands of the children of NDP leaders.”331  But when Mubarak later 
appointed Wafdist leader Mohamed Sarhan to the Shura Council332, Abaza accepted it – 
he did not banish Sarhan from the party for breaking the boycott. 
Abaza’s effort to build a coalition of opposition parties was similarly flaccid.  The 
coalition was comprised entirely of regime-sanctioned parties with minimal public 
presence, including the liberal Democratic Front Party, leftist Tagammu party, and pan-
Arab Nasserist party.  Most importantly, the coalition stayed within the regime’s red lines 
by excluding the two forces that were most confrontational towards the regime during 
this period – the Muslim Brotherhood and popular left-wing Kefaya protest movement333 
– and the coalition repeatedly acted in self-defeating ways.334  For example, the coalition 
participated in the severely rigged 2008 local council elections, fielding only 1,221 
candidates combined versus 53,000 NDP candidates.335  The NDP won approximately 97 
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percent of the seats, and the coalition’s tremendous losses fueled speculation that it had 
agreed to participate as part of a deal with the regime.336  The coalition also pursued 
purely symbolic exercises like attempting to draft a new constitution.337  But given the 
deep ideological divide between its liberal and leftist members, even this ended in failure, 
and the coalition could only agree on a watered down “document for political reform.”338 
Meanwhile, on virtually every issue that was politically sensitive for the regime, 
Abaza echoed the NDP’s positions.  Thus, when the Mubarak regime proposed 
constitutional amendments in 2007 banning religious parties and restricting judicial 
monitoring of elections339, Abaza broke with other opposition MPs – including some of 
his fellow Wafdists – and declared the amendments “generally positive.”340  Similarly, 
during the December 2008 Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, the Wafd backed the regime’s 
quiet support for Israel.341  And when various opposition figures, led by Ayman Nour, 
began a public campaign in October 2009 to prevent Gamal Mubarak from succeeding 
his father as president of Egypt, the Wafd kept its distance.342 
 Indeed, the matter of Mubarak’s succession was, by this time, the most sensitive 
issue confronting the regime.  Although various constitutional amendments had been 
passed to facilitate Gamal’s rise to the presidency, there was strong resistance to Gamal 
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among the NDP’s old guard and within the military.343  The regime thus feared that 
external resistance to Gamal’s succession could catalyze an internal rift. 
For this reason, Mohamed ElBaradei’s emergence as a possible presidential 
challenger to Mubarak in late 2009 shook the regime’s confidence.344  As the former 
secretary-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, ElBaradei possessed tremendous domestic and international credibility, making it 
hard for the regime to quash him.345  His arrival in Egypt in February 2010 energized 
youth activists, hundreds of whom flocked to greet him at Cairo International Airport346, 
and ElBaradei quickly engaged a broad array of opposition organizations, including the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya, and various liberal political parties.347   
Within the Wafd, ElBaradei attracted significant attention – particularly from 
younger activists, but from some high committee members as well.348  They shared 
ElBaradei’s pro-democratic outlook and, perhaps just as importantly, appreciated 
ElBaradei’s strong Wafdist lineage: his father had been a Wafdist until the 1952 
revolution and, as chairman of the Lawyers Syndicate in the 1970s, had invited 
Serageddin to deliver the 1977 speech that resuscitated the Wafd after 25 years of 
dormancy.349  Almost immediately after it became clear that ElBaradei would return to 
Egypt, the Wafd’s secretary-general in Tanta called on ElBaradei to be the party’s 
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candidate in the 2011 presidential elections.350  But Abaza dashed these hopes 
immediately. “The Wafd is not interested in importing presidential candidates,” he 
said.351  Abaza further refused to invite ElBaradei to meetings of the opposition party 
coalition352, and he refused calls within his own high committee for an informal meeting 
with ElBaradei.353   
It is fair to wonder whether Abaza’s stance on ElBaradei was motivated, in part, 
by his personal resentment of ElBaradei, whom Abaza seemingly viewed as a Johnny-
come-lately who had captured liberals’ political imagination without ever working a day 
in Egyptian politics.354  “The credit for revitalizing political life and constitutional reform 
should not go to ElBaradei, who has lived outside Egypt for more than 30 years,” Abaza 
said at the time.  “It is opposition parties, and the Wafd foremost among them, that have 
been the driving force behind the movement for reform.”355   
But even if Abaza had wanted to work with ElBaradei, the risk that the regime 
would finally enforce one of the cases in Gomaa’s favor and shut down the party would 
have made this cooperation unlikely.  And that threat never dissipated.  Indeed, as 
support for engaging ElBaradei rose within the party, Wafdist MP Ahmed Nasser – one 
of Gomaa’s few remaining allies – began calling for the implementation of a 2008 court 
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ruling that had restored Gomaa’s chairmanship356, and Wafdist members in Alexandria 
inaugurated a new party branch that would be run by Gomaa.357 
 Ultimately, though, the Mubarak regime stuck with Abaza.  He was a mostly 
obedient opposition leader, as well as politically well connected to the government 
through his extensive family ties.  So in addition to allowing him to remain chairman, the 
regime occasionally threw him some bones.  In this vein, during the 2008 local council 
races, Abaza called State Security to ensure that at least five of his supporters won 
municipal seats.358  But in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections, Abaza may 
have landed an even bigger deal. 
b. Abaza’s 2010 Electoral Deal With the Regime? 
  On March 14, 2010, al-Masry al-Youm reported that the Wafd had reached a deal 
with the NDP in which it would win at least 23 seats in the upcoming elections in 
exchange for agreeing not to support ElBaradei and his calls for changing the 
constitution.  The Wafd had also agreed, according to the report, to participate in the 
2011 presidential elections by nominating a member of its high committee, presumably to 
run as a show-candidate against either Hosni or Gamal Mubarak.  The report named the 
23 Wafdists who were going to be given parliamentary seats, and stated that these 
individuals would replace parliamentarians from the Muslim Brotherhood, which had 
won 88 seats in the 2005 elections and had been an “annoyance” to the ruling party.  The 
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report further speculated that other officially recognized opposition parties might have 
reached similar deals with the regime.359   
Abaza immediately denied that such a deal existed, and the Wafd sued al-Masry 
for libel.360  The NDP similarly denied the report.361  Meanwhile, the Wafd summoned 
Salah Diab, al-Masry’s billionaire owner who also happened to be a member of the 
party’s high committee, and Diab apologized for the story, saying that he merely owned 
the newspaper and had no control over its editorial content.362  Four months later, the 
public prosecutor dismissed the case against al-Masry, ruling that its report constituted 
“permitted criticism.”363 
 There are five reasons to doubt the veracity of al-Masry’s earth-shattering report.  
First, it was based on a single, unnamed source, who apparently called the author out-of-
the-blue and, during a subsequent meeting, slipped him a document containing the 
details.364  Second, the author, Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan, was the head of research at the 
state-run Middle East News Agency, and therefore hardly an independent journalist.365  
Third, it seems implausible that such a specific deal – in which both the number and 
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names of the Wafd’s victors were known – would already be in place more than eight 
months before the parliamentary elections.366  Fourth, at least one of the Wafdists 
mentioned as benefiting from the deal, MP Taher Hazeen367, had already announced in 
late 2009 that he would not run for re-election.368  Fifth, the al-Masry report broke just as 
the coalition of opposition parties, which had been reconstituted in late 2009 to 
coordinate activities for the 2010 parliamentary election369, issued a joint call for far-
reaching constitutional reform, which included a provision for organizing protest marches 
and vigils370 – a major violation of the regime’s red lines. 
 Yet there is ample circumstantial evidence that such a deal was, in fact, in the 
works.  For starters, the kind of negotiations that the al-Masry report described – in 
which the Wafd’s leadership had agreed to abide by certain red lines in exchange for 
being guaranteed to win a certain number of seats – was very common in Egyptian 
politics under Mubarak.  Abaza was hardly above this kind of deal making.  After all, 
he’d negotiated with the regime to ensure that certain Wafdists won their local council 
elections in 2008.371   
Moreover, before the al-Masry story broke, there had been murmurings within the 
party regarding a deal.  One Wafd leader reported that, at one high committee meeting, 
members later mentioned in the al-Masry article started congratulating each other – a 
                                                           
366 Interview with Sherif Taher, 2 Aug. 2010. 
367 “The Detection of a ‘Wafdist and National’ Deal Shakes Political Circles,” Al-Masry Al-Youm (Arabic) 
14 Mar. 2010: <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/87143>. 
368 Farida Mohamed, “Taher Hazeen: I will Not Run in the Next Parliamentary Elections,” Roz al-Yusuf 
(Arabic) 1 Dec. 2009: <http://www.rosaonline.net/Daily/News.asp?id=31525>. 
369 Mona El-Nahhas, “The ‘No’ People Return” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 978 (24-30 Dec. 2009): 
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/eg5.htm>. 
370 Interview with Sherif Taher, 2 Aug. 2010; Mohamed Abdel Kadir and Adel el-Daragli, “Opposition 
Alliance Calls for Joint Protests, Vigils” Al-Masry Al-Youm English 15 Mar. 2010: 
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/21155>. 
371 Mohamed El-Sayed, “Wafd Wrangles.” 
 99
spectacle, he said, which confused him at the time.372  Abaza also approached Mona 
Makram-Ebeid, and told her, “I spoke to the [NDP] … and I think they’ll leave three to 
four seats for women in our party.  And it will include you.”373  Sure enough, Makram-
Ebeid was named in the al-Masry report, along with a number of other Wafdists who 
were seen as being particularly close to Abaza.374 
 Whether or not the al-Masry report was accurate, it represented a tremendous 
embarrassment for Abaza, affirming for many Wafdists what they had come to believe 
about their chairman: that he was overly conciliatory towards the regime, and had done 
little to actually build the party into a relevant political force.  Four years after Abaza’s 
triumph over Gomaa, the party remained dormant: the headquarters were typically empty; 
the governorate offices were in disarray; and the party seemed completely cut off from 
the Egyptian “street,” with new youth-led organizations supplanting the Wafd’s liberal 
voice within public discourse.375  So as the May 2010 Wafd elections approached, many 
Wafdists began looking for an alternative. 
IV. A New Chairman Stays Trapped 
Forty days before the chairmanship elections, A-Sayyid Al-Badawy, a billionaire 
media mogul and owner of Egypt’s largest pharmaceutical company, threw his hat into 
the ring.376  Al-Badawy had been the Wafd’s secretary-general under Naaman Gomaa 
and, after siding with Abaza during the 2006 intra-Wafd fight, was promised that he 
would remain secretary-general in the new high committee.  But when Abaza reneged at 
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the last moment, thereby causing Al-Badawy to lose the election for secretary-general by 
a single vote to Abdelnour, the jilted Al-Badawy suspended his involvement in the party 
for most of the next four years.377  Al-Badawy thus entered the 2010 chairmanship race 
highly motivated, building a relatively large campaign staff and using his extensive 
media contacts to publicize his run.378 
a. A Competitive Chairmanship Race 
For many Wafdists, the election was, first and foremost, a referendum on Abaza’s 
tenure, and Al-Badawy’s most salient feature was that he was not Abaza.379  But the 
competitiveness of the election also inspired hope.  After all, neither Fouad Serageddin 
nor Abaza had ever faced a challenger, while Naaman Gomaa’s 2000 election had been a 
landslide victory.  Al-Badawy’s run for the chairmanship thus indicated that, even after 
years of ineffectiveness, the Wafd might still become a model of Egyptian democracy. 
Yet, as even some of his supporters realized380, Al-Badawy was no more likely 
than Abaza to steer the party towards a more confrontational approach vis-à-vis the 
regime.  In fact, Al-Badawy was completely reliant on the regime for his livelihood: he 
required government licenses to operate al-Hayat, one of Egypt’s biggest privately-
owned satellite television channels, and additionally needed strong government relations 
to secure loans and keep the ever-intrusive security services at bay.  And Al-Badawy’s 
regime connections ran deep: he frequently touted his close relations with State Security 
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chief Hassan Abdel Rahman381 and Shura Council speaker Safwat Sherif382, both of 
whom were among the most powerful figures in the Mubarak regime.  Moreover, in 
2003, President Mubarak had attended the opening of one of Al-Badawy’s factories – a 
rare honor that signaled Al-Badawy’s strong relations with the government.383  The 
Mubarak regime thus viewed the Al-Badawy-Abaza match-up as a battle between two 
similarly unthreatening figures, which is why it permitted Dream TV, an Egyptian 
satellite network, to broadcast a debate between them.384  And when Al-Badawy won 57 
percent of the vote to defeat Abaza, the state-run media celebrated it.385 
b. Another Trapped Chairman 
In turn, although the Wafd elections marked the first time that power had changed 
hands within an Egyptian political party through competitive elections386, Al-Badawy’s 
victory yielded few substantive changes in the party’s approach vis-à-vis the regime.  
Shortly after winning, Al-Badawy conceded that the Wafd “cannot be expected to 
compete with the NDP in such a short time,” and he set his sights on challenging the 
Muslim Brotherhood – the regime’s ultimate nemesis.387  Al-Badawy further pleased the 
regime by taking populist, anti-interventionist stances, including spurning calls for 
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international election monitors388 and lambasting attempts to “impose democracy from 
outside” in his first meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey.389 
Moreover, much as Abaza had done, Al-Badawy used the Wafd’s membership in 
the coalition of opposition parties to keep the opposition squarely within the regime’s red 
lines.  In this vein, when the Democratic Front Party announced in July that it would heed 
Mohamed ElBaradei’s call to boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections, Al-Badawy 
pulled the Wafd out of the coalition.390  A month later, after returning to the coalition, the 
Wafd hosted a 3000-person opposition party conference boldly titled “No Elections 
Without Guarantees” and, in his keynote address, Al-Badawy vowed to consider an 
elections boycott if a variety of voting reforms – such as judicial monitoring and 
amendments to the 1956 political rights law – weren’t implemented by September 17.391  
But it was a bluff: on September 17, 56.7 percent of the Wafd’s General Assembly voted 
to participate in the elections – despite the fact that none of Al-Badawy’s demands had 
been met – and Al-Badawy hailed the outcome.392   
 Yet Al-Badawy’s most audacious kowtow to the regime involved his August 
purchase of al-Dustour, an independent daily most famous for its vociferously anti-
Mubarak editor-in-chief, Ibrahim Eissa.  Eissa had long been in the regime’s crosshairs: 
the government had shut down al-Dustour for seven years in 1998; fined Eissa for 
libeling Mubarak in 2006; and imprisoned Eissa for two months in 2008, after al-Dustour 
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ran articles speculating on Mubarak’s declining health.393  With Al-Badawy now in 
control of al-Dustour, the regime sensed opportunity to rid itself of the outspoken editor, 
and demanded that Al-Badawy fire Eissa.394  Initially, Al-Badawy resisted, and 
encouraged Eissa to tone down his criticisms of Mubarak.395  But Eissa refused and, after 
attempting to run an op-ed by ElBaradei – a major red line – Al-Badawy fired him.396 
 The al-Dustour incident, as it came to be known, was a major scandal for Al-
Badawy and a tremendous embarrassment for the Wafd party.  The regime’s distaste for 
Eissa was well known and, by doing the regime’s dirty work, Al-Badawy had destroyed 
his reputation as an opposition leader.397   He had further tarnished the Wafd’s image, as 
it was widely assumed that Al-Badawy had fired Eissa to win more seats in the 
parliament.  In response to the firing, al-Dustour journalists staged sit-ins outside the 
Press Syndicate in downtown Cairo398 and chanted slogans against Al-Badawy outside of 
the Wafd’s headquarters.399   
Al-Badawy tried to quell the uproar by selling his al-Dustour shares to a partner, 
and he later apologized to the Wafd high committee, saying that the al-Dustour incident 
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was the worst decision he’d ever made.400  But the damage had been done.  Though Al-
Badawy retained his chairmanship, three high-profile Wafdists quit the party in 
disgust401, and calls for a more confrontational posture vis-à-vis the regime started 
growing.402   
 If the al-Dustour incident was a major blunder for Al-Badawy, it was arguably a 
bigger blunder for the Mubarak regime, which had undermined the credibility of a mostly 
pliant opposition leader by demanding too much of him.  As high committee member and 
al-Masry owner Salah Diab noted, “Vanity made the regime overlook the value of 
accommodating Al-Sayyid Al-Badawy.”403  This would come back to haunt the regime: 
Al-Badawy’s weakened state complicated his efforts to keep his fellow Wafdists within 
the regime’s red lines. 
c. The 2010 Parliamentary Elections: The Regime Pushes Too Hard 
 Even despite the al-Dustour incident, the Wafd entered the November 2010 
parliamentary campaign season feeling optimistic.  The Wafd leadership believed that it 
had a deal with the regime that would guarantee the party strong representation in the 
next parliament, which is why it strongly supported participating in the elections.  “So 
many people were looking for jobs in the parliament,” high committee member Refat 
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Kamel, one of the few leaders calling for an electoral boycott, told me.  “The impression 
was that the Wafd would take many seats and replace the Muslim Brotherhood.”404   
The Wafd was not alone in this assessment: Egyptian commentators 
overwhelmingly expected that the Wafd would replace the Muslim Brotherhood as the 
largest opposition bloc in the parliament and win 20-30 seats, thereby echoing the terms 
of the Abaza-NDP deal that al-Masry had reported back in March.405  Meanwhile, the 
regime did a great deal to bolster these expectations: in the state-run press, Wafdist 
candidacies were seemingly highlighted in every article on the elections.406  The regime 
also permitted the Wafd to register 205 candidates, and NDP leader Moufid Shehab noted 
that the large number of opposition party candidates “will make it difficult for the 
[Muslim] Brotherhood to win any seats.”407  The fix seemed to be in. 
 But on Election Day, the Wafd was stunned: only two of its candidates won their 
races outright, and only thirteen others achieved enough votes to force run-off elections, 
which would be held the following week.  Rampant forgery, of course, had been expected 
– but the Wafd anticipated being a beneficiary of that forgery, not a victim.  Yet even the 
Wafd’s most popular candidates, including former parliamentarians with strong ties to the 
regime, found their elections forged against them.  “Mounir [Fakhry Abdelnour], Fouad 
[Badrawy], Mohamed Sherdy … were looked at as, you know, soft opponents – soft 
opposition members,” said high committee member Ali ElSalmi.  “They were not fanatic, 
like, for instance, Ibrahim Eissa … or like some members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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They were easy-going with the regime.  …  So it was expected that the regime should 
tolerate these kinds of people.”408 
 Sherdy’s experience is illustrative.  He had represented Port Said in the 
parliament since 2005, but didn’t particularly enjoy the experience and considered not 
running in 2010.  “But I was pushed [to run] by the [Wafd] party and the NDP,” he told 
me.  “So I expected fair play.”  Yet when he arrived at his polling place on November 28, 
he found few judicial monitors, and poll workers asked him for 10 Egyptian pounds 
(approximately $1.67) per vote to stuff the boxes in his favor.  “I could have won for 
500,000 Egyptian pounds,” he said.409  But he declined, and was slated to lose in the first 
round before Al-Badawy contacted the regime on his behalf, at which point the regime 
cancelled enough ballot boxes so that Sherdy could advance to the second round.410  
Meanwhile, even candidates who were initially declared winners – such as Abdelnour411 
and Makram-Ebeid412 – lost because of belated forgery, and few of the Wafd’s top 
leaders advanced past the first round.  With the leadership feeling dejected and pressure 
rising within the party to change course413, the Wafd began considering what had once 
been unthinkable:  boycotting the run-off elections that were scheduled for December 5. 
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 Boycotting the elections was, of course, a major red line for the regime: 
opposition parties’ participation in its tightly held elections was critical for making those 
elections – and the ruling party’s electoral “successes” – appear legitimate.  So the 
regime moved immediately to convince the Wafd to not to withdraw.  NDP leader 
Moufid Shehab called Al-Badawy, telling him that the Wafd’s withdrawal would hurt 
Egypt’s image.  “We know that you’re a good Egyptian, so don’t do it,” Shehab said.414  
Regime officials and State Security also reached out to high committee members, 
guaranteeing victory to those candidates who participated in the December 5 run-off.415 
 While most of the Wafd’s high committee supported a pullout, there were some 
exceptions.   Mohamed Sarhan, whom Mubarak had appointed to the Shura Council in 
2007, was particularly insistent on staying in the race.416  But the dilemma was toughest 
for those Wafdists who had advanced to the run-off, and the regime intervened with them 
very aggressively.  “‘Egypt needs you.  What happened was a mistake,’” Mohamed 
Sherdy was told.  “So I said, ‘you should tell the people who put us in this place to stop.’  
I was mocking him.  ‘If you make me succeed, make sure it doesn’t look forged.’  [He 
replied,] ‘No problem.  Everything you want will be done.  Just please go.’”417   
In its bid to win the Wafd’s participation, the regime also used force.  The Interior 
Ministry thus prodded Atef al-Ashmony, a former NDP parliamentary candidate who had 
run in this election as a Wafdist candidate and advanced to the second round, to bring 
hundreds of thugs to occupy the Wafd’s headquarters.  So on December 2, just as the 
Wafd high committee was convening to discuss a pullout, al-Ashmony’s thugs barged 
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through the doors, nearly sparking a bloody confrontation with Wafd youth activists, who 
had come to demand the Wafd’s withdrawal.418   
But it was too little, too late for the regime: by a 13-1 margin, the Wafd high 
committee voted for a pullout.  In his announcement of the decision, Al-Badawy boldly 
declared the elections to be a fraud.   “We will expose this parliament by all means till we 
prove it is null and void,” he reportedly said.419  A week later, the Wafd doubled down on 
its refusal to play ball with the regime, freezing the party memberships of those Wafdist 
candidates who had stayed in their respective races – and won – despite the party’s 
pullout.420 
d. Still Trapped 
The Wafd’s elections pullout was the boldest move it had taken since its 1990 
elections boycott.  But there was no afterglow, or any sense that the party was now 
“untrapped.”  The Wafd had, after all, just suffered a tremendously dispiriting defeat, and 
the party showed little inclination towards developing a more confrontational approach 
vis-à-vis the regime.  There were two reasons for this. 
First, the Wafd is a legacy party: its leadership largely consists of individuals 
whose ancestors were active Wafdists, and many of its top leaders descend from 
foundational Wafdist leaders.  In this vein, Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour, who served as the 
Wafd’s secretary-general until February 2011, is the grandson of Fikry Abdelnour, who 
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served as a Wafdist parliamentarian from 1924-1942, and both of his uncles were Wafdist 
leaders during the 1940s421; spokesman Mohamed Sherdy’s grandfather was on the Port 
Said governorate’s Wafdist high committee, and his father was a Wafdist MP from 1984 
until his death in 1989422; honorary chairman Mustafa al-Tawil’s father was the Justice 
Minister in the 1950-1952 Wafdist government423; vice-chair Yasin Tag el-Din’s 
grandfather was a Wafdist MP and served as Minister of Endowments in the 1950 
Wafdist government424; assistant secretary-general Hussein Mansour’s grandfather was 
an associate of Wafdist founder Saad Zaghloul, and served as MP from 1926-1927425; 
and high committee member Mona Korashy’s father was Wafdist Senator Ahmed Pasha 
Korashy.426   
These legacy Wafdists thus saw themselves as torchbearers for Egypt’s authentic 
liberal heritage, and they believed that transmitting this heritage required – first and 
foremost – surviving the Mubarak regime.  “The Wafd party has been around for 100 
years in all of Egypt,” one legacy Wafdist told me.  “We have a family in every state.  
Everyone has a grandfather or grandmother who was a Wafdist.  Our key ideas are 
freedom, human rights, and centrism.  …  And [those ideas] will always continue.  Our 
goal is survival because we have a military regime.”  Participating in the regime’s tightly 
controlled electoral system was critical for survival, because it reassured the regime that 
the Wafd would work through the regime’s “political machinery,” and would not take 
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more radical action that would force the regime to destroy it.427   Participation also 
allowed the party to keep its ideas alive, since campaign periods provided vital space for 
criticizing the regime on liberal terms.428  Thus, even after the Wafd’s bold 2010 electoral 
pullout, the party was still inclined towards playing by the regime’s rules, because leaders 
recognized that further protests against the regime could invite destruction. 
The second reason why the Wafd remained trapped despite its 2010 electoral 
pullout has to do with the party’s social character.  It was a party of elites, with many of 
its members maintaining close relationships with the regime.  This was particularly true 
of its chairmen: as previously mentioned, Gomaa and Al-Badawy were dependent on the 
regime’s good graces for their respective livelihoods, while Abaza was tied to the 
regime’s highest echelons through multiple family connections.  But it was also true of its 
lower ranking leaders, whose lucrative careers similarly required strong government 
connections.  In this vein, assistant secretary-general Ramzi Zaqalama owns a lucrative 
public relations company, which is wife operates, and his villa is located behind that of 
(now imprisoned) NDP leader Safwat Sherif429; assistant chairman Baha Abu Shaqa is a 
wealthy legal consultant with clients who are close to the regime, and he was appointed 
by Mubarak to the Shura Council in 2010430; High Committee member Ali ElSalmi, who 
served as vice-president of Cairo University until he retired in 1994, was previously the 
Minister of Economics under Sadat431, and his political connections remained so strong 
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that Egypt’s ruling military junta appointed him vice-prime minister in July 2011, 
following Mubarak’s ouster.   
In turn, many Wafdist leaders simply had too much to lose by continuing to 
confront the regime.  Abu Shaqa’s own story is telling: in the immediate aftermath of the 
NDP’s massive electoral forgery, he bravely announced that he would resign from the 
Shura Council seat to which Mubarak had only recently appointed him.432  But he very 
quickly retracted from this promise, telling NDP leader and Shura Council speaker 
Safwat Sherif that he would never resign.433  There was, presumably, a great deal to be 
lost by taking such a strong stand against the regime. 
 In the aftermath of its elections pullout, the Wafd’s commitment to obeying the 
regime’s red lines was best demonstrated through its “shadow government.”  The Wafd 
had founded the “shadow government” ten days before the parliamentary election, 
appointing experts from various policy fields as “ministers” to provide policy 
recommendations, much like a think tank.434  But in the aftermath of the Wafd’s electoral 
defeat, it took on a new significance: the Wafd was no longer a parliamentary party, and 
it therefore hoped that its “shadow government” would be a mechanism through which 
the party could remain visible.435 
 Yet, in keeping with the Wafd’s supplicant ways, the “shadow government” very 
deliberately avoided criticizing the regime directly.  As Wahid Fawzi, who served as 
“foreign minister,” told me only days before Egypt’s January 2011 anti-Mubarak began,  
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“The plan is not to be in conflict with the government.  [The ‘shadow government’] just 
believes that Egypt can do better.”436   
The “shadow government” also became the Wafd’s way of avoiding participation 
in the “popular parliament,” a much more stridently anti-Mubarak government-in-
waiting-type body that a coalition of former opposition MPs assembled immediately 
following the 2010 elections.  Although the Wafd initially announced that it would 
participate in the “popular parliament,” the party quickly retreated.437  The Wafd thereby 
kept a distance from the Muslim Brothers and Kefaya activists who filled the “popular 
parliament’s” ranks438, committing itself to its own “government” that it believed the 
regime would be more likely to tolerate. 
 As I will discuss in Chapter 7, the “popular parliament” ultimately participated in 
the January 25 protests that would catalyze Mubarak’s ouster.  The Wafd, meanwhile, 
kept its distance – the final confirmation of the Mubarak regime’s success in trapping it.  
V. Conclusion 
 For much of its Mubarak-era history, the Wafd party demonstrated little 
inclination to challenge the regime’s red lines.  After the debacle of its 1990 
parliamentary elections boycott, the party’s leadership was mostly content to tone down 
its anti-regime outlook in exchange for political patronage.  Moreover, its four chairmen 
– as well as many of its top leaders – were well-heeled elites with multiple ties to the 
regime, and crossing the red lines would have come at tremendous personal costs.  Yet 
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these factors never stopped the Mubarak regime from interfering in the party to ensure its 
permanent dysfunction, such as by keeping competing Wafdists at odds with one another 
and nearly forcing the party’s demise during the 2006 intraparty leadership struggle. 
 Not all opposition parties, however, were so pliant.  In the next chapter, I examine 
the liberal Ghad party – a Wafdist offshoot that tested the Mubarak regime’s red lines 
very aggressively and, ultimately, to its peril.  
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Chapter 4 
The Ghad Party: Displaced Renegades and Regime Puppets  
 
 As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, the Mubarak regime sought to trap 
its opponents in legal opposition parties that, because of the structure of incentives and 
disincentives, ultimately adhered to the regime’s red lines.  The regime rewarded their 
cooperation with seats in parliament, further compelled their cooperation through the 
threat of the party’s destruction, and punished non-cooperation by denying them 
parliamentary seats and interfering with their internal activities.  By the eve of Mubarak’s 
ouster, this pattern of carrots and sticks had ultimately rendered most opposition parties 
not particularly oppositional.  
 And yet there were exceptions.  Opposition party leaders, after all, are 
opportunistic, and in some instances they tested the regime’s red lines, which they 
occasionally flaunted entirely.  These episodes, however, never ended well for the red-
line-breakers: the regime was impelled to punish them, since failing to do so risked the 
breakdown of its strategy for using a manipulated multiparty system to weaken its would-
be opponents. 
 This chapter uses a case study of the Ghad party for examining these dynamics.  
During the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, Ghad party leader and 
presidential candidate Ayman Nour crossed four major “red lines”: he named a prominent 
regime opponent as the editor of his party’s newspaper; called for far-reaching 
constitutional change that would have undermined the power of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP); courted foreign leaders 
without governmental approval; and, after losing in the September elections, publicly 
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declared the electoral system a fraud.  In response, the regime quietly worked to 
undermine Nour, deploying State Security agents to foment divisions within the Ghad 
party and encouraging a group of Ghad leaders with close connections to the regime to 
form their own offshoot under the exact same name.  When Nour was later convicted on 
dubious charges, the regime granted this second, heavily co-opted “Ghad” party license 
to the “Ghad” name, thereby displacing Nour and his allies from electoral politics.   
I. The Ghad Party Emerges 
 The Ghad party emerged on the Egyptian political scene in late 2004 as a liberal 
competitor to the Wafd party.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Wafdist chairman Naaman 
Gomaa’s brittle style sowed significant internal dissent, and many Wafdists complained 
that he administered the party “like a dictator”439 and “was not a real liberal.”440  
Meanwhile, among Egyptian liberals, the Wafd was viewed as a “pasha’s party” – too 
elite, too politically cautious, and too close to the regime to effect any real change.   
a. Ayman Nour’s New Party 
 MP Ayman Nour was one of these disaffected Wafdists.  Nour had been one of 
the party’s brightest young stars.  Born in 1964, he had served as the president of his high 
school student union in Dakhaliya; president of the nationwide student union during his 
university years; and leader in the Wafd youth organization since the time of the party’s 
re-founding in 1984.  Nour’s charisma won him many admirers, and his 1995 election to 
Parliament, when he was only 31 years old, demonstrated his knack for working within 
the strict confines of Egypt’s political system and his willingness to abide by the regime’s 
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“red lines.”  Indeed, Nour won his first election by promising then-Minister of 
Parliamentary Affairs Kamal al-Shezli – a top NDP power broker – that he would “go on 
the line,” meaning that he would not criticize President Hosni Mubarak,441 and then-
Wafdist chairman Fouad Serageddin also dealt with al-Shezli to secure Nour’s seat. 442 
Once elected, Ayman Nour started building connections within the Parliament, 
hoping to gain enough support so that he could attain higher office.443  In addition, he 
developed excellent relations with high-ranking government ministers, and provided 
State Security with information on Wafd party activities to curry favor with the regime.444  
This work quickly paid off.  When Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son, began forming 
the Mustaqbal (“future”) party in 1999 as a vehicle for developing his political persona, 
First Lady Suzanne Mubarak sent messages to Nour asking him to assist Gamal.445  
Ultimately, Wafdist chairman Serageddin persuaded Nour to pass on Mubarak’s offer.446   
But Nour’s political success soon became a source of concern for the regime.  
After winning re-election in 2000, Nour ran for deputy speaker of the parliament and 
received 161 votes in the 454-seat body – a vote total suggesting widespread support 
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from NDP parliamentarians.447  Unnerved, Hosni Mubarak called a meeting with the 
NDP’s parliamentary block and threatened to dissolve the parliament if Nour’s high vote 
total was repeated.448  Shortly thereafter, Nour was dismissed from the Wafd party.   
While the cause of Nour’s banishment is disputed – some claim that the regime 
pressured Gomaa to fire to Nour, while others claim that Gomaa and Nour simply had a 
personal conflict449 – his subsequent political difficulties indicate regime involvement in 
sidelining him.  Following his ouster from the Wafd, Nour sought refuge in the Misr 
2000 party, which had been defunct until that point, and was easily elected its chairman.  
But shortly thereafter, another Misr 2000 member emerged, claiming that he had held a 
meeting with 500 members of Misr 2000 at his home and had been elected party 
chairman.  Despite the dubiousness of this claim – the individual’s home was too small to 
hold 500 people – this gave the Shura Council’s Political Parties Committee (PPC) a 
pretext for declaring the Misr 2000 party’s leadership “disputed” and freezing its 
activities.  Since the PPC was comprised of NDP members and headed by powerful NDP 
leader Safwat el-Sherif, the regime’s role in blocking Nour from finding a new party was 
obvious.450 
 Still, Nour was determined.  In mid-2003, he began forming the Ghad 
(“Tomorrow”) party, approaching former colleagues from the Parliament, as well as 
businessmen and journalists, to join.451  Yet the PPC refused to approve the party on three 
occasions, claiming that Ghad’s platform did not differ significantly from those of 
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existing parties.452  In August 2004, Ghad attempted to circumvent the committee by 
joining the opposition alliance, but the PPC intervened to block this.453 
 Finally, in October 2004, the Ghad party sued the PPC in administrative court, 
arguing that Ghad’s platform differed significantly from those of other parties and that 
the PPC had rejected it on false premises.  After Ghad won its first of three lawsuits454, 
PPC chairman Sherif sought to avert further embarrassment by offering Nour a deal: if 
the Ghad party stopped the judicial process, it would be awarded its party license.455  
Nour accepted the deal on October 28, 2004, and Ghad received its license.   
b. The Expectation that Ghad Would Abide By the “Red Lines” 
By being granted a party license, Nour had implicitly agreed to abide by the 
Mubarak regime’s “red lines.”456  He was, after all, a longtime Egyptian political player, 
and thus knew the limits under which his party was supposed to operate quite well.  
Indeed, shortly after the Ghad party was legalized, Nour seemingly signaled his 
acceptance of the “red lines” by going on satellite television and voicing his support for 
Hosni Mubarak’s continued reign, saying, “If Mubarak was one of several nominees, I 
would vote for him.”457  And while the regime had worked to prevent Nour from 
founding his new party, it likely viewed the establishment of a new competitor to the 
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Wafd as useful for dividing its opposition458, especially given the prevalence of former 
Wafdists within Ghad’s leadership ranks459 and the fact that 25 percent of the Wafd’s 
membership joined Ghad at the time of its founding.460 
Yet the regime had an additional reason to believe that the newly approved party 
would abide by the “red lines”: many of Ghad’s founding leaders had very close ties to 
top regime figures and State Security, and could easily be used as pressure points against 
the Ghad party if it strayed.461  Of course, this included Nour himself who, throughout his 
tenure as a parliamentarian, had cultivated relationships with a number of the NDP 
leaders closest to Hosni Mubarak and, as previously mentioned, had acted as an 
informant for State Security.462  But beyond Nour, there was Ibrahim Saleh, a former 
member of the Gamal Mubarak-run NDP Policy Committee and deputy minister in the 
Ministry of Economic Development,463 whose brother is in the mukhabarat (intelligence 
police)464; Mohammed Sadiq Okasha, a wealthy hotel proprietor and former NDP 
parliamentarian465; Naguib Gabriel, a former Mubarak-appointed judge and lawyer for 
Coptic spiritual leader Pope Shenouda, who was viewed as close to the regime466; Fawzi 
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James, a wealthy businessman who grew up playing soccer with Hosni Mubarak’s 
sons467; Adel Shorbash, a general in the police force468; Ahmed Taha Abouleila, a police 
chief469; and Walid Riad, a former NDP member and owner of a large printing shop, 
whose clients included the Egyptian Interior Ministry and a number of foreign 
governments.470 
In addition to these individuals, it is important to highlight two men who stood 
higher in the Ghad hierarchy, and possessed even deeper relationships to the regime.  
These relationships bolstered the expectation that Ghad would abide by the “red lines.” 
 The first of these individuals was Moussa Mustafa Moussa.  Born to a wealthy 
family that traces its lineage back to Moorish Spain, where they lived in Granada’s 
Alhambra, Moussa’s father had been a prominent student leader, Wafdist politician, and 
parliamentarian from 1949 to 1951.  When Nasser nationalized the family’s contracting 
company in 1962, Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella drafted the elder Moussa as an 
adviser and hired him to develop Algiers, where he remained until his death in 1975.471   
The family returned to Egypt permanently in the late 1970s, and quickly formed 
good relations with the regime.  In this vein, Moussa’s sister married former NDP 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regime.  In this vein, the EOHR held a conference on July 31s, 2010, which Minister of Parliamentary 
Affairs Moufid Shehab – a top official close to Hosni Mubarak – headlined. 
467 Interview with Fawzi James, 5 Jul. 2010. 
468 Interview with Ahmed Ashour, 27 Jul. 2010. 
469 Interview with an anonymous source within Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s faction of the “Ghad” party, who 
requested that his name be kept secret because he feared retribution. 
470 Interview with Walid Riad, 7 Jul. 2010.  Riad said that his work for the Interior Ministry accounted for 
30% of his total income until approximately 2005, and he has also printed materials for the Israeli Tourism 
Ministry, the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, the Sudanese regime’s party Hizb al-Watani al-
Islah al-Taqiyyah, and Hamas.  Typically, this kind of international work requires the approval of State 
Security, and thereby forges a relationship between the business owner and the Egyptian security services. 
471 The Moussa family remains close to the Algerian regime to this day.  When Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s 
father died in 1975, flags in Algeria were flown at half-mast.  Moreover, when Algerian President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika visits Cairo, he stays at the Moussa family mansion in Heliopolis.  Interview with 
Moussa Mustafa Moussa, 29 Jul. 2010. 
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parliamentarian Hesham Mustafa Khalil and Moussa’s brother, Ali Moussa, served on the 
NDP Policy Committee and was close to Gamal Mubarak.  Since the 1980s, Ali and 
Moussa Mustafa Moussa have partnered with Egyptian telecommunications magnate 
Naguib Sawiris in a variety of lucrative ventures; these include major Egyptian 
construction projects, SCIB Paints, and a dry-mix factory.  As of mid-2010, the entire 
Moussa enterprise was worth approximately 1.4 billion L.E. ($246 million), and 
Moussa’s personal share was worth approximately 200 million L.E. ($35 million).472  
Little of this would have been possible without close regime relations for securing 
necessary permits and approvals. 
 Yet despite his familial and business ties to the regime, Moussa embraced his 
Wafdist father’s relatively liberal outlook, and also developed close personal connections 
with important opposition figures.  In this vein, he married into the Wafdist Badawy 
family, and his father-in-law is a direct nephew of Fouad Serageddin.  Moussa also grew 
up with many of the Wafd party leaders of the 2000s, including Mahmoud Abaza, Yasin 
Tag el-Din, Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour, and Sameh Makram-Ebeid.473   
Knowing only that Moussa’s father had been a prominent Wafd leader, the 
nascent Ghad party sent Moussa a text message in late 2003, inviting him to join.474  
Moussa soon became one of the party’s top financiers, and was elected deputy chair in 
November 2004, shortly after the PPC granted Ghad its license.  While Moussa’s Wafdist 
heritage encouraged him to join the opposition, his ties to the regime and lucrative 
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business enterprises provided ample pressure points for the regime if, and when, the 
Ghad party strayed too far from the “red lines.” 
 The second key leader just below Nour with substantial ties to the Egyptian 
regime was MP Rageb Helal Hemeda.  Hailing from the heartland of Egyptian Islamist 
activism in the Nile Delta, Hemeda’s father was a government employee and a member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Hemeda first became involved in political activities as an 
elementary school student, where he served as a preacher in a daily student broadcast.  In 
high school, he participated in seminars at the radical Islamist cleric Abdul Hamid 
Kishk’s Ain al-Hayat mosque475, where he was recruited to join al-Takfir wa’al-Hijra – a 
violent fundamentalist group whose members withdrew to the countryside in preparation 
for future jihad against secular society.476  After the assassination of President Anwar 
Sadat on October 6th, 1981, Hemeda was arrested; he was released in late 1984, but 
arrested continually until 1987, when he was released for good.477 
 Shortly thereafter, Hemeda’s fortunes changed dramatically.  It is widely believed 
that this was because of the relationship he had forged during his imprisonment with 
State Security, which viewed his prior involvement in radical Islamist organizations as an 
asset.  Although Hemeda initially returned to work selling ful (beans) sandwiches out of a 
pushcart in downtown Cairo, he took a mysterious trip to Tehran in 1990, where he met 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and then-Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.  Upon 
returning, Hemeda met with State Security and, by his own admission during an August 
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2010 interview, provided State Security with information on the Iranian regime.478  In 
1995, this relationship helped the Hemeda win a seat in the Parliament as a member of 
the Ahrar party.479  By 1998, he suddenly had enough money to open an electronics shop 
and invest in agriculture, and he later purchased a mini-mall in downtown Cairo.480 
 But new struggles soon emerged.  When Ahrar party leader Mustafa Kamel 
Murad died in August 1998, a violent leadership battle erupted between Hemeda and 
eight other competitors.481  Although the dispute was technically resolved in 2005482, the 
party ceased to function, as the regime used the internal power struggle to discredit it.  In 
the interim, Hemeda lost his parliamentary seat: after a high-profile clash with Prime 
Minister Atef Ebeid over banking corruption in January 2003, a court invalidated the 
results of Hemeda’s 2000 electoral victory.  The ruling party then rigged the subsequent 
special election in favor of Hemeda’s opponent.483   
Hemeda was thus available when his former parliamentary colleague, Ayman 
Nour, started forming the Ghad party.  Yet within Nour’s camp, there was considerable 
debate over bringing Hemeda on board.  Ismail Ismail, Nour’s brother-in-law and a 
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founding leader in the Ghad party, supported the move, arguing that Hemeda’s good 
connections with State Security would be an asset to the party.484  But others opposed 
drafting Hemeda, viewing Hemeda’s involvement in the Ahrar party’s destructive 
squabbles as worrying.485  Despite his misgivings486, Nour ultimately admitted Hemeda, 
believing that Ghad needed strong parliamentary candidates to raise its profile.487 
In short, the Egyptian regime had good reasons for believing that the newly 
approved Ghad party would abide by the “red lines.”  First, Ghad chairman Ayman Nour 
had served in Parliament for nearly ten years, which had given him high-ranking 
connections in the regime and a deep awareness of the “red lines.”  Second, the regime 
anticipated that Ghad’s primary goal would be establishing itself as Egypt’s preeminent 
liberal opposition party, and that its primary target would be the Wafd party, rather than 
the regime itself.  Third, its leadership ranks were filled with individuals who were 
closely tied to the regime, and therefore understood the “red lines” – as well as the 
consequences for crossing them.  Fourth, Ghad vice-chair Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s 
brother was a close ally of Gamal Mubarak, and he was also a multi-millionaire whose 
assets could be targeted with ease if he strayed from the “red lines.”  Fifth, Ghad leader 
Rageb Helal Hemeda had long-standing relations with State Security, and his high-profile 
role in the Liberal party’s violent infighting demonstrated a divisive streak that could 
hamper Ghad’s activities – if the regime needed him to do so. 
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Yet almost immediately after its founding, the Ghad party defied these 
expectations and broke the “red lines.” 
II. Renegade Party 
In early November 2004, the newly approved Ghad party held its inaugural 
convention at the Cairo International Conference Center, with over 2,000 people in 
attendance.488  Ayman Nour was elected chairman, trouncing one of his own supporters 
when his anticipated opponent, MP Mohammad Farid Hassanein, left the conference 
following a dispute with Nour.489  Meanwhile, Moussa Mustafa Moussa was elected vice-
chair; Rageb Helal Hemeda was elected assistant chair; former Wafd parliamentarian 
Mona Makram-Ebeid was elected secretary-general; and Gameela Ismail, Nour’s wife 
and a Newsweek correspondent, was elected assistant secretary-general.  All of these 
newly elected leaders – including Ismail, who needed State Security clearance in order to 
work for a foreign media company490 – were known quantities to the regime and, as 
previously emphasized, expected to abide by Egypt’s “red lines.” 
 Yet Ghad’s first convention came at a seemingly propitious – though ultimately 
misleading – moment in Middle Eastern affairs.  Following the March 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq and subsequent toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the George W. 
Bush administration began pursuing the “freedom agenda,” arguing that democratization 
was essential to promoting political moderation and undermining Islamist terrorists.  
Though controversial within the Arab world, this effort seemingly scored a series of early 
victories: the Palestinian Authority and Iraq held relatively free and competitive elections 
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in January 2005; Syria ended its twenty-nine-year occupation of Lebanon in April, 
following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; and 
Lebanon later held free elections in May.  
 Given its size and regional influence, Egypt was an important “freedom agenda” 
target.  In his speech at the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, 
President Bush declared, “The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way 
toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the 
Middle East.”491  The following year, the U.S. increased its funding for democracy and 
governance programs in Egypt from approximately $12 million to $37 million, and it 
further restructured the way those funds were distributed to prevent the Egyptian 
government from administering them.492  
 In response to these developments, the Egyptian regime attempted to signal its 
commitment to reform.  In July 2004, President Mubarak reshuffled his cabinet, filling it 
with younger NDP leaders who promised to modernize Egypt’s bureaucracy and promote 
economic liberalization.493  Yet many Egyptians viewed these moves skeptically, 
believing that they were facades for forestalling political change.  Shortly thereafter, a 
new anti-regime movement began circulating a petition demanding real constitutional 
reforms.  Named Kefaya, or “enough,” this movement quickly gained strength, and on 
December 12, 2004, hundreds of Kefaya activists gathered on the steps of the High Court 
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in Cairo for the first rally ever convened exclusively for the purpose of demanding 
Mubarak’s resignation.494 
 Kefaya’s protests set Egypt’s political tone through the September 2005 
presidential elections.  Its relatively large rallies in public squares signaled that many 
Egyptians were hungry for political change and willing to confront the aging Mubarak 
regime in pursuit of it.  Although Kefaya and Ghad never formally affiliated with each 
other, they shared many activists in common.  More importantly, the political moment 
that it embodied encouraged Ghad to take a more aggressive approach vis-à-vis the 
regime.  As Ghad strategist and current secretary-general Wael Nawara commented: 
I think people at that time genuinely believed in two things.  One, that it was about 
time for change.  Two, that it was safe to join political parties.  The regime had given 
those signals.  I think part of it was also the strong American rhetoric, starting around 
[the] NED in November 2003.  There was a very strong speech from George W. Bush, 
and he talked about Egypt, which led the way to peace, should now lead the way to 
democracy. … And everyone was, like, great!495 
 
The Ghad party sought to capture the pro-democratic enthusiasm of this moment, and it 
used its first convention to signal its commitment to promoting far-reaching political 
reform.  The choice of venue was, itself, part of this effort: the Cairo International 
Conference Center was the location of the NDP’s conferences, and the Ghad party thus 
meant to showcase itself as the ruling party’s direct competitor.496  
Yet beyond this important symbolic act, the Ghad party used the convention to 
begin implementing a confrontational strategy vis-à-vis the regime that Nawara had been 
developing for months.  In this vein, Ghad announced the appointment of Ibrahim Eissa 
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as editor-in-chief of the party’s newspaper, al-Ghad, which was to begin printing in 
January 2005.  Eissa had a long track record of anti-regime agitation, and was considered 
to be one of Mubarak’s harshest.497  He had previously been the editor of al-Dustour, 
which the regime shuttered in 1998 after the newspaper criticized top businessmen.498  By 
naming a banned figure as the editor-in-chief of the party newspaper, Ghad had crossed a 
major “red line.”  In response, the regime announced that it would reissue al-Dustour’s 
license, hoping that it would lure Eissa away from the Ghad party; however, Eissa 
refused, declaring his intention to remain with Ghad.499 
 At approximately the same time, Ghad began distributing orange booklets 
containing its own proposal for a 200-article constitution.  In addition to calling for 
greater freedoms, as was common among Mubarak-era legal opposition parties and 
considered within the “red lines,” Ghad’s constitution proposed the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy and abolishing the referendum system for electing the 
president.  Most importantly, it called for undercutting the power of the presidency, and 
for granting Parliament the authority to approve the government’s annual plan and 
withdraw confidence in the government.  Provocatively, Nour announced that he would 
collect one million signatures in support of Ghad’s constitution, which he would take to 
Parliament.500  When the Ghad party submitted its constitution to Parliament in mid-
January 2005, Hosni Mubarak and Safwat el-Sherif declared the Ghad party “traitors.”501 
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 Then in late January, the Ghad party received an invitation to attend the “national 
dialogue,” an event that the regime had been planning on and off for nearly two years.  
The dialogue was to feature NDP leaders exchanging views with representatives of the 
legal opposition parties, and the regime party hoped that it would signal their openness to 
political reform to an American patron increasingly focused on Arab democratization.  
Before the start of the dialogue, the other opposition parties – Wafd, Tagammu, and the 
Nasserists – all issued statements completely compatible with Egypt’s “red lines.”  The 
three parties announced jointly that they would not press the issue of broad constitutional 
reforms during the dialogue, and Tagammu leader Rifaat al-Said said that amending the 
constitution could wait until Mubarak was nominated for a new term.502 
 Ghad, however, took an entirely different approach, responding to the “national 
dialogue” invitation by saying that it would attend if three demands were met.  First, 
chairmanship of the sessions had to be rotated among the parties, meaning that NDP 
leaders could not administer every discussion.  As Ghad chief strategist Nawara wrote at 
the time, this was supposed to be a “dialogue, not a monologue.”  Second, the level of 
representation had to be equal: if the NDP sent its president, Ghad would send its 
chairman; if the NDP sent its secretary-general, Ghad would send the same; and so on.  
Third, the size of each party’s delegation had to be equal.  Ghad did not want to send ten 
of its members if NDP was only sending one leader, because this would look desperate.  
In addition, Ghad requested that the agenda of each session be determined by the parties 
together, rather than dictated.  Taken aback by these demands, the regime privately 
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promised Nour that there would be constitutional reform after Mubarak was elected.  Yet 
Nour rejected this, insisting that reforms take place before the elections.503 
 A few days following this incident, Mubarak accused foreign powers of allocating 
$70 million to fund campaigns demanding constitutional reforms.504  Given Ghad’s 
prominence in the campaign for constitutional reform, many interpreted this accusation as 
a charge against the party.505  Then, on January 26, 2005, Nour met with former U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who was heading a Council of Foreign Relations 
taskforce on promoting reform in the Arab world.506  Nour does not speak English and, 
according to most accounts, he and Albright merely exchanged pleasantries.  
Nevertheless, the regime used it as a pretext for casting Nour as an American agent, and 
rumors quickly circulated suggesting that he had made a deal with Albright.507 
III. The Ghad Party’s Punishment  
Barely three months after granting Nour the Ghad party license, the regime had 
concluded that he had no intention of abiding by the “red lines.”  The Ghad party had 
hired a prominent, outspoken, and banned critic of the regime to edit its newspaper; 
called for far-reaching constitutional reform; refused to delay this demand until after 
Mubarak’s re-election; refused to participate in the “national dialogue” on the regime’s 
terms; and had seemingly courted a respected former American diplomat at the very 
moment that the U.S. was putting unprecedented pressure on the regime to change.  The 
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domestic and regional context – Kefaya’s anti-regime demonstrations at home, and 
relatively free elections being held in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority – caused the 
regime to view Nour’s dissidence as especially threatening. 
a. Nour’s arrest 
 So the regime moved quickly to punish Nour.  Two days after Nour’s meeting 
with Albright, parliamentary chairman and NDP leader Fathi Sarour signed orders for 
State Security, the attorney general, and the Justice Ministry to investigate Nour for 
forging signatures on the Ghad party’s authorization papers.  Then, on January 29, Prime 
Minister Ahmed Nazif stripped Nour of his parliamentary immunity, and Nour was 
arrested on forgery charges.508 
 From my perspective, it is impossible to ascertain whether these forgery charges 
had any merit.  The essential issue is this: to apply for a political party license under 
Mubarak, a prospective party was required to submit fifty signatures on its authorization 
forms to the Shura Council’s PPC.  Nour, however, wanted to gain wide media exposure 
for his new party, and insisted that Ghad collect 2005 signatures as a salute to the 
upcoming 2005 elections.509  His allies within the party contend that, since Ghad 
submitted its application four times before the regime finally granted the party its license, 
all of the signatures on those four applications combined added up to 2005.  They 
maintain that, with each subsequent application, Nour re-submitted copies of signatures 
from previous applications, along with new sets of original signatures.  The regime, they 
say, declared the submission of photocopied signatures from previous applications as 
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forgeries, because it was looking for an excuse to punish Nour for breaking the “red 
lines.”510  
Alternatively, Nour’s detractors maintain that he was so insistent on gaining 2005 
signatures that he, or one of his associates, forged all the signatures that were necessary 
to make up the difference.511  Rageb Helal Hemeda argues that, by submitting forged 
authorization papers, Nour had insulted the various government ministers who had helped 
him attain the Ghad party’s license in the first place.  This, Hemeda argues, is the most 
significant “red line” that Nour breached, and he therefore “deserved” his ultimate 
punishment.512  Moussa agrees, and emphasizes that Ayman Nour “isn’t a martyr.”513 
Either way, it is worth making two points.  First, nobody disputes that Nour 
submitted fifty clean signatures to the PPC, which is all that is needed to apply for a party 
license.  Even one of Nour’s most fervent detractors estimated that Ghad had collected 
1464 legitimate ones.514  Second, and more importantly, it is worth remembering that 
Mubarak’s Egypt was hardly a country of perfect legal rationalism.  Crimes were 
prosecuted inconsistently, and criminal charges against politicians were notoriously 
selective.515  Therefore, whether or not Nour was actually guilty of forging signatures, the 
regime still chose to arrest him – and only him – because he had challenged the “red 
lines” in a variety of significant ways. 
b. State Security Sows Divisions Within the Ghad Party 
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 Given international pressure on the Egyptian government to institute political 
reforms, it was perhaps unsurprising when news of Nour’s arrest made international 
headlines.  Within days, the U.S. State Department denounced the regime’s action516, and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cancelled a planned trip to Egypt a month later in 
protest.517  The regime was thus faced with a challenge: how could it restore the 
credibility of its “red lines” without risking further international alienation for its 
authoritarian ways? 
 Evidently, the regime had anticipated this quandary.  On January 27, 2005, two 
days before Nour’s arrest, Ghad vice-chair Moussa Mustafa Moussa suddenly left Egypt 
and flew to Dubai on business. Given Moussa’s high-ranking position within the Ghad 
party, his name was also on the allegedly forged authorization forms, and he was 
therefore as responsible for the alleged forgery as Nour.  So when he told Ghad officials 
that he would return to Egypt immediately, they advised him to stay in Dubai rather than 
risk arrest by returning to Egypt.518  Moussa was in regular contact with Ghad officials as 
he monitored Nour’s situation, and he finally returned to Egypt on February 8.519  
 Upon arriving at Cairo International Airport, Moussa was promptly seized by 
State Security, which held him at the airport for three days of interrogations in an 
investigations court.520  The precise content of these interrogations are unknown.  Moussa 
contends that State Security informed him that, “Ayman Nour was trying to do dirty 
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tricks,” such as telling State Security that Moussa had forged the Ghad party’s 
authorization papers.521  Alternatively, Nour supporter Abdel Rahman al-Ghamrawy 
contends that State Security ordered Moussa to rid the party of Nour and his allies, and to 
make himself chairman.522 
Either way, it is clear that State Security sought to set Moussa against Ayman 
Nour, and it probably used a variety of tactics to gain Moussa’s cooperation with this 
goal.  One of these tactics might have involved passing on negative information regarding 
Nour to Moussa, as Moussa’s account suggests.  But it is also worth recalling who 
Moussa is: a multi-millionaire businessman; a member of Egypt’s elite class; the brother-
in-law of a then-NDP parliamentarian; and the brother, as well as business partner, of Ali 
Moussa, who was on the NDP Policy Committee and a close confidante of Gamal 
Mubarak.  Moreover, since Moussa’s name was also on the allegedly forged Ghad party 
authorization documents, State Security had an obvious pretext for subjecting him to the 
same fate as Nour if it chose to do so.  In short, State Security possessed ample pressure 
points for gaining Moussa’s cooperation in undermining Nour, and – whether or not these 
pressure points were actually used – Moussa likely realized that he was cornered.  Indeed, 
when Moussa finally left State Security’s custody after three days, he was determined to 
seek Nour’s ouster. 
 Moussa did not have any difficulty in finding other Ghad leaders who were eager 
to turn on Nour.  In interviews, many of these leaders asserted that they viewed Nour as 
dictatorial, and were put off by his unwillingness to solicit their input on major party 
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decisions.523  Moussa’s more modest disposition and preference for soliciting their input 
also pulled them in the vice-chair’s direction.524 
 State Security contributed to Moussa’s efforts in drawing supporters away from 
Nour.525  One Nour supporter said that a State Security general came to his apartment and 
offered him a 30,000 L.E.-per-month salary in a state-owned company – plus a two-year 
advance – if he declared that Ayman Nour was a CIA agent and bolted from the party.526  
Another Ghad member, who was previously denied hotel building permits, was suddenly 
promised that if he joined the NDP, “everything will be okay.”527  Meanwhile, 
Muhammad Abu el-Ezm, the Ghad member who had run against Nour for the party 
chairmanship, was promised the party chairmanship if he wrote a police report claiming 
that the November 2004 intra-party elections had been fraudulent.528  Moussa similarly 
tried to peel certain individuals away from Nour, offering Nour supporter Faryal Gomaa a 
car.  Moussa further promised el-Ezm a share of the advertising revenues from al-Ghad 
newspaper, which Moussa was administering during Nour’s imprisonment.529 
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 In his bid to draw Ghad members away from Ayman Nour, Moussa had an eager 
partner in Rageb Helal Hemeda.  As previously mentioned, Hemeda had a long-running 
relationship with State Security, and he communicated with State Security regarding the 
Ghad party’s activities for nearly a year.  Indeed, in May 2004, Hemeda faxed a Ghad 
memo to State Security Captain Amer Mohsen530, and he later provided information 
regarding Nour’s psychological condition and financial issues.531  While Nour was in 
prison, Hemeda passed around negative information to other members, including proof of 
Nour’s alleged forgery and claims of Nour’s financial malfeasance.532   
Meanwhile, Moussa took concrete steps to bring Ghad back within the “red 
lines.”  In late February, he informed the PPC that he was removing Ibrahim Eissa as 
editor of al-Ghad533, and he later replaced Eissa with Muhammad el-Baz, a journalist 
allegedly tied to – and almost certainly vetted by – State Security.534  When this upset 
Nour’s supporters within the party, Moussa went to meet Nour in prison, where he 
reportedly told the jailed party chairman that Eissa could not serve as chief editor because 
he was “not in the state’s good graces.”535  Moussa further tried to smooth over Ghad’s 
previously confrontational stance on participating in the “national dialogue”: in mid-
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February, he appeared at the dialogue as Ghad’s acting chairman and, when asked 
whether Ghad wanted constitutional amendments, Moussa said no.536 
 In response to mounting international pressure, President Mubarak announced on 
February 26 that he would amend Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution to permit the 
first multi-candidate elections in Egyptian history.  Two weeks later, shortly before being 
released from prison, Nour declared his intention to run for president in September.  This 
exacerbated tensions within the party leadership: many Ghad leaders hoped that the party 
would focus on its parliamentary races so that it could develop deeper grassroots support, 
and thought it was too soon to mount a nationwide presidential campaign.  For a number 
of party members, Nour’s announcement confirmed their belief that he was simply using 
the Ghad party as a vehicle for his own self-aggrandizement, and that he had no real 
interest in developing a competitive liberal party.537  Paradoxically, however, Nour’s 
announcement may have been an attempt to signal to the regime that, by participating in 
its elections, he would now abide by the “red lines.”538  
 When Nour was finally released from prison on March 12, his allies urged him to 
fire Moussa and Hemeda, arguing that they had been co-opted by State Security and 
would undermine his campaign.539  These accusations were validated in May, when 
Hemeda suspended the production of al-Ghad indefinitely.540  Nour, however, believed 
that keeping Moussa and Hemeda in the party would cause him fewer problems.  Yet it 
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became increasingly clear that a severe rift had developed within the party: when the 
Ghad high committee held its elections for nominating a presidential candidate in the 
summer of 2005, Hemeda and Moussa nominated Ibrahim Saleh – a former NDP Policy 
Committee member and deputy minister of economic development.  Though Nour beat 
Saleh 21-12, the twelve votes that Saleh received were telling.  After all, given Nour’s 
prominence and already-stated intention of running for president, the nomination process 
was supposed to be a formality.541 
 After Nour officially filed his candidacy in July, Moussa and Hemeda’s allies 
overwhelmingly stopped participating in Ghad activities.542  Hemeda occasionally 
appeared at events.  However, for his parliamentary campaign, he handed out palm cards 
featuring his photo underneath that of Hosni Mubarak’s, with the slogan: “We’re all 
behind you, oh leader!”543  Meanwhile, Nour started holding campaign events across the 
country, drawing large crowds and inspiring new, young members – many of whom were 
affiliated with the pro-democratic protest movement Kefaya – to join.544  This cemented 
the divide within the Ghad party, as the activist wing of the party practically came to 
idolize Nour, while many in the original leadership – which included individuals who had 
long played according to the regime’s “red lines” – came to resent him. 
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 On September 7th, 2005, Nour finished a distant second to Hosni Mubarak, 
receiving 7.6% of the vote to Mubarak’s 88.6%.545  According to Wael Nawara, Nour 
was pleased with this outcome, and viewed it as a first step towards pushing liberalization 
in Egypt.546  But publicly, Nour used the occasion to declare the illegitimacy of the 
elections, telling a post-elections press conference: 
What elections are they talking about? What happened today has nothing 
to do with elections. It's a repetition of the same old scenario of rigged 
referendums and elections. … They are leading the state to a very 
dangerous route.  It would have been wiser for Hosni Mubarak to win by 
a small margin or even lose, than win in a fabricated or forged way.547 
 
This would be the final “red line” that Nour would be permitted to cross – and, arguably, 
it was the most consequential.  After all, the multi-candidate elections had been the 
regime’s attempt to free itself from increasing foreign pressure to liberalize, and Nour’s 
brazen declaration of its fraudulence undermined that strategy.  Moreover, by 
participating in the regime’s elections, Nour had implicitly agreed to abide by their rules 
and accept their outcome quietly.  He had now defected from that agreement. 
 Over the next three months, the regime would punish Nour and the Ghad party 
severely.  Meanwhile, it would hand over the “Ghad” name to Moussa – who, not 
coincidentally, went on Egyptian television following the elections and declared that they 
had been “fair.”548 
e. Ghad’s Internal Divisions Deepen 
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 On September 18th, 2005 – eleven days after the presidential elections – Nour 
convened a meeting of the Ghad general assembly with two goals in mind.  First, he 
hoped to gain a vote of confidence from Ghad’s membership, so that he could continue 
serving as chairman despite his loss in the elections.  Second, he wanted to hold a higher 
committee meeting on firing Moussa Mustafa Moussa, Rageb Helal Hemeda, Ibrahim 
Saleh, and Morsi Sheikh from the party; this happened two days later.549 
 The fired leaders were outraged, and they encouraged their allies to join them in 
splitting from Nour.  The anti-Nour bloc overwhelmingly consisted of those original 
Ghad members who had close ties with the regime and State Security, and they were both 
resentful of Nour’s management style and fearful that his confrontational approach vis-à-
vis the regime spelled trouble.550  Thus, on October 1, the anti-Nour faction held its own 
“Ghad” conference.  According to Morsi Sheikh, who was elected “Ghad” vice-chair at 
this conference, Moussa filled the conference room by bringing workers from his 
brother’s factory; two of these workers later filed police reports, saying that they had 
been misled to believe that they were attending a rally to support Hosni Mubarak.551  
Hemeda, who was elected secretary-general at this conference, also admits that most of 
the attendees had no prior relationship with Nour’s original Ghad party: 
I gathered 3000 citizens and we held a big conference and took a decision to fire him 
and chose Moussa Mustafa Moussa as leader of the party.  From this moment, the fight 
grew bigger. … Yes, the 3000 people were not members of Ghad, but 500 were.  And 
the other 2500 joined after.  This is how politics works in Egypt.552 
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It is important to note that this kind of mass gathering couldn’t have happened without 
the regime’s tacit support: this faction was not entitled to the protections – however 
minimal – of a legal party.  In turn, it could not have held a conference for thousands of 
people – especially under the name of a legally recognized party – without State 
Security’s knowledge and permission.  Following their conference, the anti-Nour faction 
applied for official recognition from the PPC. 
 To enhance its standing with the regime, Moussa’s “Ghad” faction continued 
working to sideline Nour.  In mid-October 2005, Moussa issued a newspaper under the 
“Ghad” name, and the front-page headline of its inaugural edition called for Gamal 
Mubarak to be the next president of Egypt and touted Hosni Mubarak’s “commitment to 
democracy.”553  When Nour’s faction filed a police report claiming that its newspaper 
had been “stolen,” the regime refused to act.554 
 The Ghad party’s divisions deepened during the subsequent November 2005 
parliamentary elections, in which both Ghad factions ran candidates.  Nour’s Ghad 
faction ran candidates in 200 of Egypt’s 222 electoral districts, while Moussa’s anti-Nour 
bloc ran 65 candidates.  In some districts, candidates from each Ghad faction ran against 
each other.555  Hemeda, now secretary-general of Moussa’s Ghad faction, ran hardest 
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against Nour, accusing him of forgery and of being an American agent.556  Ultimately, 
only one of Ghad’s combined 265 candidates prevailed: Hemeda regained the 
parliamentary seat from which the regime had ousted him in 2003, which signaled his 
return to the regime’s good graces.  Meanwhile, despite his convincing victories in the 
previous two parliamentary elections, Ayman Nour lost his parliamentary seat to NDP 
candidate Yahya Wahdan, a former State Security colonel.557  
 Nour’s most severe punishment for his breaking of the “red lines,” however, came 
on December 24, 2005, when an Egyptian court convicted him of forgery and sentenced 
him to five years of hard labor.558  In the aftermath, many Ghad members who had 
remained loyal to Nour fled his party, fearing the wrath of the regime.559  Others 
gravitated towards Moussa’s faction, assuming that he would soon be recognized as Ghad 
party chairman given Nour’s imprisonment.560 
c. Moussa’s “Ghad” Replaces Nour’s 
 With Nour imprisoned and therefore out of his way, Moussa pursued a three-
pronged strategy for establishing his “Ghad” faction’s political and legal legitimacy.  
First, he built its membership ranks, including by paying individuals to join the party.561  
Moussa and his deputies further recruited new members through various professional 
connections. 
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 Second, he pursued a complicated set of legal cases in multiple courts.  In the 
regular courts, Moussa sued the PPC for refusing to recognize him as Ghad party 
chairman.  When this failed, he sued one of his deputies, Ahmed Abaza, claiming that 
Abaza – who chaired the anti-Nour “Ghad” faction’s October 2005 electoral process – 
had failed to inform the PPC that Moussa had been elected chairman.  Finally, in June 
2007, the regular court ruled in Moussa’s favor, and the PPC recognized him as chairman 
of the Ghad party.   
 This, however, didn’t entirely settle the matter, thanks in large part to the Nour 
faction’s continued litigation, which often produced competing rulings.  For example, a 
February 2009 ruling declared that Ihab el-Kholy, of the pro-Nour faction, was the 
rightful party chairman, though this ruling was overturned on Moussa’s appeal in July 
2010, effectively leaving the party with no chairman at all.562  In short, the ultimate effect 
of these cases was to grant the party leadership to Moussa, but not definitively.  As 
Moussa’s colleagues admitted, this ambiguity forced Moussa to remain politically 
cautious and embrace the regime’s “red lines,”563 because Moussa feared that not doing 
so would allow the regime to simply declare Ghad’s chairmanship “disputed” and rid 
itself of the party entirely. 
 Third, Moussa sought to purge Nour’s Ghad party from existence.  This proved 
challenging: despite Nour’s imprisonment, his original Ghad party maintained its 
headquarters in downtown Cairo’s well-trafficked Talaat Harb Square, and established a 
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visible presence within various pro-democratic opposition movements.  With Nour’s wife 
Gameela Ismail as its public face, the Ghad party participated in various anti-regime 
demonstrations; helped orchestrate workers protests outside of Cairo; undertook a public 
outreach campaign in various governorates; and garnered substantial international 
attention and sympathy for Nour’s plight.564  Naturally, one of the pro-Nour faction’s 
biggest issues was demanding Nour’s release from prison, and the prominence of this 
campaign undercut Moussa’s credibility as “Ghad” leader, his court victories and PPC-
granted license notwithstanding.  Initially, Moussa sought to sue the pro-Nour Ghad party 
for using the “Ghad” name without a party license.565  But when this failed, he took 
matters into his own hands. 
 On November 6, 2008, Nour’s Ghad party was set to hold elections for a new 
higher committee.  For days, Ghad leaders had received threats that Moussa’s faction 
would attack the meeting, and Gameela Ismail contacted the authorities to request 
protection.  But on that morning, even the police officers normally stationed outside of 
Nour’s Ghad headquarters to monitor its activities failed to show up.566  As Hemeda 
admits, Moussa and his higher committee had decided to put an end to pro-Nour faction’s 
elections by occupying Nour’s headquarters, and Hemeda summoned his gangs – which 
he maintained for “protection” – to execute this plan.  However, when Moussa’s “Ghad” 
contingent arrived outside of Nour’s headquarters, they found that the doors had been 
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chained shut, and Nour’s supporters began pelting Moussa’s group with glass bottles 
from the third floor.  Hemeda was surprised: 
We intended to occupy the headquarters and stop the meeting.  We did not know that 
they would throw bottles or lock the door.  Otherwise, I would have occupied it earlier 
– at two in the morning!  And I have the ability to do it – I have my men, and they 
could have snuck in before it was locked in chains and blended in among the members 
and then helped us get in.567    
 
But this was no longer an option, so Hemeda’s gangs tried to pry the front door of Nour’s 
headquarters open using bug-spray aerosols and cigarette lighters as improvised 
blowtorches. 
 The entire affair ended with Nour’s third-floor headquarters being burned, though 
it is not clear who is responsible for this.  One member of Nour’s faction claims that the 
fire started accidentally within Nour’s headquarters, when a Ghad activist “got excited” 
and set his shirt on fire to intimidate Moussa’s supporters down below; his ignited shirt 
inadvertently set the window curtains on ablaze, and the fire spread from there.568  This is 
the version that Moussa’s supporters typically confirm.  But others within Nour’s faction 
claim that Moussa’s gangs threw Molotov cocktails into Nour’s headquarters, and that 
these caused the fire.  After having reviewed photos that were printed in al-Badil 
newspaper and video footage of the attack that members of the neighboring Tagammu 
party filmed, I am unable to state definitively which account is accurate. 
 The more important point, however, is that the authorities – whom Nour’s Ghad 
faction had been contacted days before – did not intervene until after the damage was 
done.  It is worth emphasizing that this incident occurred in downtown Cairo’s Talaat 
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Harb Square, where security officers are stationed on every street corner and, before the 
January 2011 revolt, typically intervened to prevent even the most minor confrontations 
between frustrated drivers.  In other words, given the tight control that the regime 
otherwise exerted in downtown Cairo and the watchful eye it maintained over Egyptian 
opposition activities, the regime ultimately permitted Moussa’s “Ghad” party to violently 
confront Nour’s faction with the aim of destroying it. 
 In the years that followed the attack on Nour’s headquarters, up until the January 
2011 uprising, the Mubarak regime continued bolstering Moussa’s public legitimacy as 
Ghad party chairman.  In this vein, on June 4, 2010, Moussa was elected to the Shura 
Council, the upper house of Egypt’s bi-cameral parliament, by capturing nearly 120,000 
votes – a virtually impossible figure given the notoriously low turnout in these elections, 
which suggests the regime’s direct forgery.569  During the Shura Council campaign, the 
regime backed Moussa by flooding the street with his banners, while opponents were 
attacked by the regime and prevented from holding rallies.570  At the time, Moussa’s 
victory was viewed as paving the way for him to run for president in September 2011 as 
the Ghad party candidate, perhaps against Mubarak.571  This would have raised Moussa’s 
profile while cementing Nour’s displacement from Egypt’s electoral arena. 
 It was, of course, not to be.  The January 2011 uprising shattered Moussa’s hopes 
of having any political currency, and he has been practically invisible ever since.  
Meanwhile, Ayman Nour, who was released from prison in February 2009 as a goodwill 
gesture from Mubarak to the newly inaugurated Obama administration, played a 
                                                           
569 Interview with Muhammad Salah Sheikh, 27 Jun. 2010; interview with Naguib Gabriel, 3 Jul. 2010; 
interview with Mohammed Sadiq Okasha, 3 Jul. 2010; interview with Rageb Helal Hemeda, 9 Aug. 2010. 
570 Interview with Ahmed Salah, 28 Jun. 2010. 
571 Interview with Mohammed Sadiq Okasha, 3 Jul. 2010; interview with Hala Mustafa, 1 Jul. 2010. 
 147 
prominent role in publicizing and organizing the January 25, 2011 demonstrations that 
catalyzed Mubarak’s ouster.  Nour remains politically active, though his actual political 
influence remains dubious given the rise of Islamists since the revolt.  
IV. Inside a “Puppet” Party 
 Moussa’s quick political rise during Mubarak’s final years and instant fall after 
Mubarak’s ouster demonstrates the extent to which his “Ghad” party was almost entirely 
propped up by the regime.  While Moussa’s “Ghad” party wasn’t necessarily more co-
opted than either the Wafd or Tagammu, it differed insofar as it had no real base of 
support or history of actual opposition activity whatsoever.  And yet it had members – 
real people who affiliated with it, attended its meetings, and presented themselves as the 
leaders of an Egyptian opposition party.  Who were these individuals who signed up for 
this vacuous political enterprise, and how did they justify their enterprise to themselves? 
 For starters, the leaders of Moussa’s “Ghad” party did not view themselves as 
opposing the regime, but rather as working within the system to propose policy changes.  
In approximately two-dozen interviews I conducted with Moussa and his colleagues, they 
rarely expressed outright disagreements with the regime, but argued that the regime’s 
policies could be improved – if only the regime would accept their advice.  Moreover, 
they viewed a confrontational approach with the regime as not only counterproductive, 
but impolite.  Vice-chair Fawzi James’ statement on this matter was illustrative: 
I am not in politics to challenge someone, because I believe that anyone who will take 
over – whether it’s us, others, whoever has a gun – no one can do a fully waterproof, 
air-proof job.   I believe that all parties should assist in filling the gaps that need to be 
filled.  So being a liberal party, I personally believe that our party should assist the 
government in filling the holes.  Wherever they have troubles, the party should come in 
and assist.  Yes, you want to take over.  Yes, you want to challenge.  Yes, you want to 
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show that you can do better.  But I believe that anybody who will take over – they 
might do better in certain fields, but they might have some setbacks.572 
 
Here, James exhibited one of the ticks of “Ghad” party discourse: using the word 
“liberal” to mean “working with others,” and contrasting it with “wanting to take over.”  
This framing allowed “Ghad” members to cast their cooperation with the Mubarak 
regime as “liberal,” thus making Ayman Nour’s challenge to the regime “illiberal.” 
 One corollary of pro-Moussa “Ghad” party’s non-oppositional approach was that 
its leaders frequently declared their respect for Mubarak.  For example, in an interview, 
Moussa emphasized, “We respect [Mubarak]. He is the President of Egyptians.  We are 
not against him.  Going in elections does not mean that you disrespect someone.”573  
Vice-chair Mohammed Sadiq Okasha similarly stated, “Mubarak stayed thirty years, but 
did lots of good things.  Mubarak keeps things steady and this is good.  I like 
Mubarak.”574 As members admitted, this approach helps the party avoid State Security’s 
interference; according to party administrator Moussa Salah al-Din Moussa: 
We’re not targeted by security because we are well known and our policies are known.  
We think of opposition as not about problems with the government or Mubarak.  We 
respect them, but have a different vision.575 
 
Yet this “different vision” rarely came through in speaking with “Ghad” leaders.  When 
asked what their chief criticisms of the regime are, “Ghad” leaders typically complained 
that the regime didn’t “listen to other opinions.”576 
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 Another corollary of the “Ghad” party’s non-oppositional approach is that it 
didn’t participate in demonstrations against the regime.577  In this respect, it was much 
like other regime-recognized opposition parties, which were prevented from taking to the 
streets as part of the regime’s strategy for keeping parties separate from mass movements.  
However, the “Ghad” party’s refusal to participate in anti-regime demonstrations put it in 
stark contrast with Nour’s faction of the Ghad party, which participated in 
demonstrations regularly from the time of its 2004 founding through the January 2011 
uprising. 
 So if the “Ghad” party avoided criticizing the regime, never demonstrated against 
it, only participated in elections twice in its five-year existence, and had few members 
beyond its Cairo headquarters, what exactly did it do the rest of the time?  The answer, it 
turns out, is nothing.  Indeed, most of the leaders on its 53-member high committee were, 
essentially, just names on a list.  In this vein, Fawzi James told me that he spent one hour 
a month – maximum – on party activities, but mostly did nothing578; Samir al-Atifi 
claimed during a July 2010 interview that he hadn’t been active in over a year579; Ibrahim 
el-Tobgui similarly hadn’t been involved in over a year580; Reda Fanoos stopped 
attending meetings in 2007, because “we have nothing to do in politics”581; Ali Abu-Nega 
froze his membership years before I interviewed him in 2010, because of the party’s 
inactivity582; Ibrahim Nasser el-Din claimed that he went to the party only twice a year583; 
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Hassan Abu el-Enein claimed that he had never gone to any meetings at all584; Hamdi 
Layali similarly confessed his near-total absence585; and Ahmad Ashour said he has 
mostly “boycotted” the meetings for over a year.586   
 Despite their inactivity, many of these party leaders kept their names on the 
party’s high committee list because they were doing a costless favor for Moussa, whose 
wealth and political connections made him a valuable ally.  As one inactive member, who 
preferred to remain anonymous explained: 
I tried to leave the party.  Moussa Mustafa Moussa called and asked me to stay, and 
promised that the party would improve and do various things.  I tried to say that I’m 
too busy, but I don’t want to upset Moussa.587 
 
Others claimed that they remained on the party’s leadership rolls because this prevented 
the regime from bothering them.  For example, Ibrahim Nasser el-Din said that his work 
as a political scientist led the government to view him, incorrectly, as either a Marxist or 
an Islamist; his membership in the “Ghad” party, therefore, reassured the regime that he 
is neither.588  Another leader-in-name-only claimed that he remained affiliated with the 
“Ghad” party because it allowed him to avoid the fate of his father – an Islamist cleric 
whom the regime targeted for decades.589 
 Yet the “Ghad” party tried to hide the inactivity of these leaders by giving them 
absurdly specific titles.  In this vein, Fawzi James was the “vice-chair for international 
organizations and civilian affairs”; Reda Fanoos was the “vice-Chair for industry and 
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energy”; and Ali Abu-Nega was the “administrator for general security in eastern Cairo.”  
Even those members who frequented Moussa’s “Ghad” headquarters had severely 
embellished titles.  For example, Fatima el-Sheib was the “secretary for women,” and 
claimed to chair a nationwide “‘Ghad’ women’s committee,” with members in each 
governorate.  Yet Sheib was unable to name her subordinate in Matrouh governorate, and 
secretary-general Hemeda later admitted that her “women’s committee,” in fact, had no 
members at all.590  In short, the Moussa’s “Ghad” party used misleading titles to hide its 
inactivity, while projecting itself as a party that was serious about narrow policy matters.   
 Finally, the handful of “Ghad” leaders that was truly active retained very close 
ties with the regime, as has been previously noted.  Yet despite these close connections to 
the regime, State Security maintained a watchful eye over Moussa’s “Ghad” party.  In 
this vein, “Ghad” leaders said that their meetings were previously transmitted to State 
Security via a colleague’s open cell phone, after which “Ghad” leaders were required to 
leave their cell phones outside of the party’s conference room during meetings.591  Other 
members reported that the party received specific instructions from State Security 
regarding whom to nominate for Shura Council and parliamentary elections.592  
Meanwhile, Rageb Helal Hemeda – whose connections to State Security have been 
previously discussed – maintained detailed files on each “Ghad” leader, including 
personal information that can be easily used to threaten them, as necessary.593  Another 
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leader admitted speaking frequently with State Security, and said that State Security 
officials threatened to close the party if it “pushed too hard.”594 
 Beyond these communications between Moussa’s “Ghad” leadership and State 
Security, the regime used other tools for ensuring the party’s adherence to its “red lines.”  
For example, it informed Ibrahim Saleh that, if he wanted to keep his leadership post in 
the Ministry of Economic Development, he could not write for the party’s newspaper.595  
It further forced Moussa to negotiate with Shura Council Speaker Safwat el-Sherif to win 
seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections, which bolstered Moussa’s political docility.596  
Meanwhile, the regime kept the investigation into the 2008 attack on Ayman Nour’s 
Ghad headquarters open, using the threat of prosecution as means of ensuring the “Ghad” 
party’s continued compliance.597  This is, of course, similar to the regime’s use of an 
open investigation into the 2006 fighting at the Wafd headquarters to prevent Mahmoud 
Abaza from challenging the “red lines.” 
IV. Conclusion 
 While the Mubarak regime’s co-optation of Egyptian opposition parties mostly 
served to trap opposition activists and constrain their anti-regime behavior, there were 
exceptions.  Ayman Nour’s Ghad party was, perhaps, the most visible and vocal 
exception, in that it crossed the regime’s “red lines” repeatedly from the moment it was 
legalized in 2004 and challenging the regime’s legitimacy in a very public way.  Yet the 
regime dealt with Nour effectively: it used trumped up charges against Nour to imprison 
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him, as well as to threaten Nour’s then-vice-chair, Moussa Mustafa Moussa, who 
ultimately fomented divisions within the Ghad party to save himself.  The result was two 
Ghad parties – one with a well-known leader in prison without legal recognition from the 
PPC, and a legalized one with a completely unknown leader who was entirely dependent 
on the regime for any political success.  The Mubarak regime had thus succeeded, for a 
while, to displace Ayman Nour – its most outspoken and politically visible opponent at 
the time – from politics, and replace him with an uncharismatic political novice. 
 Still, despite the regime’s successes in cornering and/or outmaneuvering many of 
its opponents, there were some opponents who were simply too politically strong for the 
regime to trap in opposition parties or manipulate out of its electoral system.  In these 
instances, the regime used the only tool it had left – repression, which ultimately had the 
same effect in preventing these “untrappable” opponents from challenging the regime too 
aggressively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 154 
Chapter 5 
The Muslim Brotherhood: Cornered By Repression 
 
 The Muslim Brotherhood stands apart from the other parties discussed in this 
dissertation in three important respects.  First, the Brotherhood isn’t a party whose 
primary purpose is participating in elections and winning parliamentary seats, but, 
according to its own self-description, a gama’a – a society – whose foremost aim is to “to 
Islamize life” as a grassroots strategy for establishing an Islamic state in Egypt.598  This 
made it different from the legalized opposition parties that existed during Mubarak’s 
reign. Whereas those parties merely objected to various regime policies and the manner 
of Mubarak’s rule, the Brotherhood thoroughly rejected the regime itself and sought to 
replace it with an Islamic state.599 
 Second, the Muslim Brotherhood differed from the legalized Mubarak-era 
opposition parties in that it had actual grassroots support.  This was partially because it 
had strong appeal among Egypt’s religiously conservative, predominately Muslim 
population.  But it was also because it was not a co-opted party, and operated under a 
different set of constraints.  Whereas the Wafd, Tagammu, and Ghad parties, among any 
others, were confined to their headquarters and typically prevented from reaching out 
beyond their small number of members, the Muslim Brotherhood built an extensive 
social services network through which it directly engaged Egypt’s under-serviced 
communities.  This made it especially threatening to the Mubarak regime, given the 
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regime’s mounting failures in providing adequate services to an increasingly poor and 
desperate country.  
 Third, given that the Brotherhood’s primary purpose was effecting societal 
transformation rather than winning parliamentary seats, the regime was unable to use 
parliamentary elections to co-opt the Brotherhood.  This is not to say that the 
Brotherhood was uninterested in winning parliamentary seats – that it participated in 
almost every Mubarak-era election indicates otherwise.  But given its strong grassroots 
support, the Brotherhood was far less dependent on electoral victories for preserving its 
public profile than any of the previously discussed opposition parties. 
 Since it couldn’t effectively co-opt the Brotherhood with lucrative political 
patronage, the regime ultimately resorted to repression, launching mass arrests of its 
members and leaders during various periods, and often trying them before military courts.  
These crackdowns probably would have destroyed ordinary political parties – as occurred 
with the original Ghad party after Ayman Nour was imprisoned.  Yet the Brotherhood 
survived by relying on an intricate system for promoting its members, which vetted them 
for their commitment to the cause and ensured their willingness to withstand intense 
regime pressure. 
 Still, the regime’s crackdowns on the Brotherhood had an effect.  Though the 
organization survived, its leaders responded to decades of repression by acting with 
tremendous caution toward the Mubarak regime.  Indeed, by the last decade of 
Mubarak’s rule, the Muslim Brotherhood had significantly toned down its anti-regime 
rhetoric and, much like the other parties discussed in this dissertation, negotiated directly 
with State Security to coordinate its electoral participation.  Though the Brotherhood 
 156 
never dropped its ambition of replacing the Mubarak regime with an Islamic state, it 
accepted the reality of the regime’s strength and ultimately abided by many of the same 
“red lines” under which the legal opposition parties operated. [it seems to have been 
better at avoiding penetration & cooption] 
I. Background 
 To understand why successive Egyptian rulers considered the Muslim 
Brotherhood politically threatening, the organization’s emergence on Egypt’s political 
scene needs analysis.  The Brotherhood’s appeal to Egyptians’ religious sensibilities 
undermined the legitimacy of non-Islamist leaders, while its effective provision of social 
services – often to underprivileged communities – cemented its popularity. Since it had 
not governed it also offered the promise of not being corrupt. Successive Egyptian 
leaders recognized the Muslim Brotherhood as the only force capable of challenging 
them for power, and by the mid-1940s began repressing the organization quite severely. 
a. The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood 
 Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in the Suez Canal town of 
Ismailia in 1928.  Although he was only twenty-two years old at the time, al-Banna was 
already an Islamist entrepreneur.  Since the age of twelve, he had led a variety of 
fundamentalist organizations that aimed to preserve Islamic morality, resist Christian 
missionaries, and threaten Muslims whom al-Banna regarded as “living in violation of 
the teachings of Islam.” Al-Banna’s activism intensified after he moved to Cairo for his 
secondary education at the age of sixteen. Put off by the capital’s increasingly secular 
political scene, he established the Islamic Society for Nobility of Character, which 
organized university students to preach in public meeting places, such as coffee shops.  
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Upon graduating, some of these students were sent to the Egyptian countryside, where 
they carried “the call to the message of Islam.”600  After moving to Ismailia to become a 
schoolteacher in 1927, al-Banna continued his activism, preaching in local coffee shops 
and touring Egyptian villages to spread “the Islamic call.”601  
 Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in March 1928, when – according to 
Brotherhood lore – six members of the British-occupied Suez Canal labor force came to 
see him and, expressing their weariness “of this life of humiliation and restriction,” called 
for forming a group that “contracts with God sincerely that it live for His religion and die 
in His service.”  Al-Banna responded by taking an oath to God to be “troops for the 
message of Islam,” and calling the organization the Muslim Brotherhood because “we are 
brothers in the service of Islam.”602 
b. Ideology and Aims 
 The Brotherhood emerged in response to the concern, widely shared by prominent 
Islamic thinkers of its era, that the Muslim world had fallen behind the west politically 
and technologically.603  Al-Banna was particularly concerned about the proliferation of 
secularism within Egyptian society, as well as European political domination of Muslim 
lands.604  In his 1935 article “Our Mission,” al-Banna lists the “symptoms” of the 
“disease” affecting the Muslim world as follows: 
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[Muslims] have been assailed on the political side by imperialist aggression on the part 
of their enemies, and by factionalism, rivalry, division, and disunity on the part of their 
sons.  They have been assailed on the economic side by the propagation of usurious 
practices throughout all their social classes, and the exploitation of their resources and 
natural treasures by foreign companies.  They have been afflicted on the intellectual 
side by anarchy, defection, and heresy which destroy their religious beliefs and 
overthrow the ideals within their sons’ breasts.  They have been assailed on the 
sociological side by licentiousness of manners and mores …605 
 
Al-Banna added to this list non-Islamic educational systems and legal systems governed 
by “positive law,” as opposed to the sharia – Islamic law.606   
The cure for Islamic decline, al-Banna argued, was the return to Islam, which he 
viewed as “an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on 
every one its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order.”607  The 
institution of Islam as society’s organizing principle, al-Banna believed, would unify 
Muslims and replace their man-made legal systems with Islamic ones, in which God is 
sovereign.608  It should be emphasized that this agenda was not – and is not – unique to 
the Brotherhood, since the basic aim of establishing an Islamic social and political order 
is what defines Islamists, though there is wide variation in how individual Islamist 
organizations pursue these aims.609 
The Brotherhood’s strategy for establishing an Islamic social and political order 
emphasized grassroots social transformation, in which an increasingly pious society 
would pressure the government to implement Islamic law more completely.610  This 
strategy was largely the product of pragmatic considerations: the Brotherhood realized 
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that it could not Islamize the Egyptian state overnight, so it aimed to “create a milieu 
conducive to the ‘truly Islamic life’” by encouraging Egyptian piety.611  The Brotherhood 
pushed various social “reforms,” including the Islamization of Egyptian education, 
encouraging social modesty, banning prostitution, and outlawing bars.612  It used its 
provision of social services to “demonstrate the viability of Islam as a coherent program 
of social organization.”613  In this vein, the Brotherhood offered Islamic education “to 
raise a new generation of Muslims who will understand Islam correctly,” and additionally 
focused on rehabilitating and building mosques.614 
The focus on inspiring religious awareness among the Egyptian public through 
the provision of social services remains a key component of the Brotherhood’s activities.  
“They key to the Muslim Brotherhood is its social part,” youth activist Amr al-Beltagi 
told me in March 2011.  “We are a social movement.  We have a lot of community and 
dawa [outreach] services, and most [Muslim Brothers] are more active in society – in 
hospitals, schools, civil society run by Muslim Brotherhood – not in politics. … We want 
people to be more religious.”615  It is through these services that the Brotherhood 
maintained a constant presence within Egyptian society, even during long periods of 
brutal repression under various rulers. 
c. Growth, Politicization, and Repression 
 The Brotherhood’s various social activities required it to fundraise, and it used its 
surplus to develop organizational branches beyond Ismailia.  It opened its first Cairo 
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headquarters in 1931, and al-Banna moved to the capital the following year to build the 
Brotherhood into a national organization.616   
 Thereafter, the Brotherhood expanded significantly, expanding its social service 
networks to include the provision of education, cheap medical care, financial aid, and 
vocational training, as well as preaching.617   It grew from having fifteen branch offices in 
1932 to 300 in 1938,618 developing support among Egypt’s civil servants, students, urban 
laborers, and peasants, and establishing itself as “one of the most important political 
contestants on the Egyptian scene.”619   
Though the Brotherhood initially limited its political activities to lobbying the 
government on various issues – such as protesting Christian missionary activities – its 
rapid growth and increasing interest in the Arab-Jewish struggle for Palestine catalyzed 
its politicization.  At its fifth conference in 1938, al-Banna called for the “execution” of 
the Brotherhood’s aims through direct political participation.620  This unnerved the ruling 
Wafd party, which began repressing it.  Thus, in 1942, Prime Minister Mustafa el-Nahhas 
closed down all Brotherhood branches, except the headquarters.  Then, when the 
Brotherhood participated in the 1945 parliamentary elections, the Wafd forged the results 
against it.621 
While the Brotherhood continued to strengthen politically despite these setbacks, 
the emergence of its violent “secret apparatus” made it a target of British and 
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governmental authorities.  In January 1948, authorities discovered 165 bombs and cases 
of arms belonging to the Brotherhood just outside of Cairo, and in March, two members 
of the Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus” assassinated a judge.  A new cache of 
Brotherhood arms were discovered in October 1948 and, on December 8, 1948, after the 
Brotherhood was blamed for inciting campus rioting, the Interior Ministry dissolved the 
organization.  Later that month, a young Brother assassinated Prime Minister Mahmud 
Fahmi al-Nuqrashi and, after negotiations to calm the situation between the Brotherhood 
and the government fizzled, al-Banna was assassinated on the orders of the Egyptian 
government in February 1949.622 
 After two years under martial law, the Brotherhood reemerged in May 1951 and 
opened dialogue with the Free Officers, who were planning to overthrow the Egyptian 
monarchy.  As the coup approached, the Brotherhood assisted the Free Officers by 
agreeing to protect foreigners and foreign establishments; monitor the movements of 
“potentially treasonous” Egyptians; set off mass protests if “immediate popular 
enthusiasm for the army movement [appeared to] be lacking”; help restore order; and, if 
the revolt failed, assist in the Free Officers’ escape from Egypt.623  The extent of the Free 
Officers’ cooperation with the Brotherhood – far surpassing their engagement with the 
communists, discussed in Chapter 2 – was a testament to the Brotherhood’s political 
strength and popularity. 
But shortly after the Free Officers ousted the Egyptian monarchy and took power 
in July 1952, their relations with the Brotherhood deteriorated.  The ruling Revolutionary 
Command Council denied the Brotherhood’s demands for four portfolios in the new 
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cabinet in October and, in January 1953, the military and police cracked down on 
Brotherhood protests against the junta’s ban on political parties.  The crackdown on the 
Brotherhood intensified the following year: the Brotherhood backed President Mohamed 
Naguib in his power struggle with Nasser, which Naguib ultimately lost and, on October 
26, 1954, a young Brother attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was delivering a 
speech.  The Nasser regime responded with a sweeping assault on the organization: 
thousands of Brothers were arrested and tortured, eight members were sentenced to death, 
and the organization was again dissolved.624 
For the remainder of Nasser’s presidency, which ended with his death in 1970, the 
Brotherhood was subjected to extremely harsh treatment, which is why many Brothers 
left Egypt during this time and established Brotherhood organizations abroad.  
Meanwhile, within Egypt, many of its top leaders remained imprisoned, and the regime 
used deadly force to quell instances of prison unrest.  It was during this period that 
Brotherhood chief ideologue Sayyid Qutb emerged and, from his prison cell in 1965, 
wrote Milestones, which lambasted the Nasser regime as un-Islamic; Qutb was 
subsequently executed.625  
c. Reemergence, Then Repression, Under Sadat 
 Upon becoming president in 1970, Sadat reversed Nasser’s anti-Brotherhood 
policies.  Viewing the Brotherhood as a counter-weight to leftists and Nasserists, whom 
he considered his greatest domestic challengers,626 Sadat began releasing Muslim 
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Brothers from prison in 1971.  Four years later, the Brotherhood was granted amnesty 
and all imprisoned Brothers were freed.  Yet the official ban on the organization was 
never lifted, preventing it from being recognized as either a social organization or 
political party.  So in its “half-official” status, the Brotherhood spent much of the 1970s 
reorganizing, building its influence through student unions, professional organizations, 
and civil society institutions.627  It additionally founded a newspaper, al-Dawa, which 
operated under unofficial sanction628 and ultimately reached a circulation of 100,000, 
making it one of the most widely distributed non-state papers.629 
 For much of the 1970s, Sadat and the Brotherhood shared certain mutual interests.  
In this vein, both increasingly feared the emergence of smaller, more radical Islamist 
organizations: Sadat feared these groups’ embrace of violence, while the Brotherhood 
feared being outflanked politically.  For this reason, in 1977, the regime approved the 
publication of Preachers Not Judges, which had been written by former Brotherhood 
Supreme Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi in 1969 and refuted Qutb’s theological arguments 
against the regime.630  The Brotherhood further embraced Sadat’s infitah privatization 
policies, at least initially, because they believed it would open “economic space for 
individual initiative and reward.”631 
The relationship between Sadat and the Brotherhood, however, soon soured.  The 
Brotherhood increasingly criticized the corruption and inequalities that accompanied 
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privatization632, and it opposed Sadat’s pro-western tilt, advocating instead for greater 
cooperation with other Islamic countries.633  These tensions intensified after Sadat began 
his peace overture to Israel: the Brotherhood publications attacked the regime harshly634 
and, after the peace treaty with Israel was signed in 1979, Sadat shut down al-Dawa.635   
While popular sentiment against the treaty was not limited to the Brotherhood, the 
Brotherhood offered the most strident criticism, calling for war against Israel to liberate 
what, in its view, is Islamic territory.  It thus became a primary target of Sadat’s 
September 3-5, 1981 crackdown: the Brotherhood’s top leadership, including Supreme 
Guide Omar al-Telmissany, was arrested, and approximately 1,000 of the 1,500 activists 
that Sadat’s regime detained were from Islamist groups.636  Non-Brotherhood Islamic 
militants assassinated Sadat a month later. 
II. Mubarak Struggles to Trap the Brotherhood 
To some extent, the Brotherhood’s experience under various Egyptian rulers from 
its 1928 founding until Sadat’s 1981 assassination shares many similarities with that of 
other parties that have been previously discussed.  Like the Wafd, it emerged under the 
monarchy; like the Wafd and various communist groups, it was repressed, albeit far more 
brutally, under Nasser; and like the Tagammu party, Sadat tried to co-opt it, but its 
criticism of Sadat’s policies soon made it a target of Sadat’s final crackdown.  After 
succeeding Sadat as Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak similarly treated the Brotherhood 
like most other previously repressed parties, e.g. by permitting its political participation. 
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a. The Brotherhood in Mubarak’s First Elections 
 Upon taking power in October 1981, President Hosni Mubarak dealt permissively 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, offering them “de facto toleration,” but not legalization.637  
To some extent, Mubarak viewed the Muslim Brotherhood, which had renounced 
violence638, as preferable to more radical Islamist organizations, such as those involved in 
Sadat’s assassination.  Mubarak thus released Supreme Guide Telmissany and other 
Brotherhood leaders whom Sadat had imprisoned639, and invited the Brothers to criticize 
the views of more extreme Islamists in public forums, which were occasionally broadcast 
on television.640  Though the Brotherhood was not permitted to form a political party, 
Mubarak eventually allowed its members to participate in elections as independents.  He 
apparently hoped that allowing the Brotherhood’s members to participate in the regime’s 
manipulated elections would “diminish the strength of the Islamic opposition that denied 
the regime’s legitimacy.”641 
 For the Brotherhood, electoral participation represented an opportunity to advance 
their long-term pursuit of establishing an Islamic state. Brotherhood founder al-Banna 
had argued that gaining entry into official governmental bodies, such as the parliament, 
provided one mechanism for promoting Islamization of Egyptian society, which is why 
the Brotherhood had participated in parliamentary elections during the 1940s.642  
Electoral participation also allowed the Brotherhood to reassure the regime that it had no 
designs on launching a revolution.  Given the organization’s “long time horizon with 
                                                           
637 El-Ghobashy 377. 
638 Abdel-Kotob 333. 
639 William E. Farrell, “Mubarak: Shaping the Issues at Home,” The New York Times (7 Jan. 1982) A3. 
640 Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 84. 
641 Nachman Tal, Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005) 53. 
642 Tal 49. 
 166 
respect to its political role in Egyptian society,” it would pursue political influence 
through legitimate means, even if those means presented no realistic opportunity for 
displacing Mubarak.643 
 In the 1984 elections, the Brotherhood circumvented Mubarak’s ban on religious 
parties by forming an electoral coalition with the Wafd party.  The Wafd, however, 
controlled the candidacy selection process: of the 70 candidates that the Brotherhood 
proposed, the Wafd accepted only eighteen, and only eight of the 58 seats that the 
coalition won belonged to Brothers.644  Despite the small number of Brothers in 
parliament, the coalition’s success was largely attributed to the Brotherhood’s 
mobilization.645  Three years later, the Brotherhood demonstrated its political clout once 
again: after its attempt646 at forming its own party was rejected, the Brotherhood formed 
the Islamic Coalition with the Socialist Labor Party and Ahrar Party, which won 60 of 
448 elected seats, 38 of which went to Muslim Brothers.  Without the Brotherhood’s 
support, the Wafd’s representation slipped to 35 seats, and the Brotherhood-led Islamic 
Coalition thus became the dominant opposition bloc in parliament.647 
 Shortly thereafter, the regime soured on its experiment of using parliamentary 
elections to weaken the Brotherhood, partly because of the Brotherhood’s strong criticism 
of the regime from the parliamentary floor.  The Brotherhood pushed to have sharia as 
the exclusive source of all legislation, and its parliamentarians submitted numerous 
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complaints to the Interior Minister regarding various abuses, including torture and 
unlawful imprisonment,648 to which Interior Minister Zaki Badri responded by accusing 
the Brotherhood of terrorist connections.649  But perhaps more importantly, the 
Brotherhood’s growth in popularity, reflected in its improved electoral performance 
between the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections, unnerved the regime, which 
recognized it as the strongest challenge to its authority.   
The regime used a court decision that invalidated the 1987 parliamentary 
elections, based on party-list voting, to implement a new electoral format, consisting of 
222 two-member constituencies.  When new elections were held in November 1990, the 
Brotherhood joined the Wafd party, among others, in boycotting, protesting both the new 
format of the elections as well as the regime’s repressive policies, such as the emergency 
laws.650  As discussed in Chapter 3, this electoral boycott backfired terribly on the Wafd 
party: the regime did not respond with any meaningful concessions, and the Wafd’s 
absence from parliament over the next five years kept it from popular view.  Its support 
thus diminished rapidly, and it never truly regained its previous stature. 
b. The Brotherhood Prospers Anyway 
The Brotherhood, however, did not share the Wafd’s fate.  Over the next five 
years, its social influence grew tremendously despite its lack of parliamentary 
representation for two reasons. 
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First, while shut off from the parliament, the Brotherhood bolstered its political 
influence through Egypt’s 22 professional syndicates.  As of 1995, these syndicates had 
approximately 3.5 million members, and the Brotherhood’s involvement in the syndicates 
enhanced its support among “the educated middle class.”  The Brotherhood’s ascendancy 
in the most politically active syndicates began in 1984, when Brothers won 7 of 25 seats 
in the Doctors Syndicate and, three years later, won 54 of 61 seats in the Engineers 
Syndicate.  By 1995, it controlled a majority of the seats on the councils of five of the six 
most politically active syndicates: Doctors (87 percent of the council seats), Engineers 
(74 percent), Lawyers (72 percent), Pharmacists (68 percent), and Scientists (68 percent).  
It was also gaining a foothold in the influential Journalists Syndicate, with two prominent 
Brotherhood-affiliated journalists sitting on its council.651 
Second, the Brotherhood continued developing its social services networks, 
contributing what Wickham has termed a “parallel Islamic sector.”  This sector first 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, when an unprecedented wave of private mosque 
construction provided spaces in which Brothers organized a wide range of religious and 
community services.  These included religious lessons, after-school programs, Qur’an 
recitation contests, and charity distribution centers, among other functions.  Islamists also 
established thousands of voluntary associations, which similarly served a variety of 
religious and social functions, such as health clinics, Islamic banks, and publishing 
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houses.  For the Brotherhood, these institutions were conduits for vital financial support, 
as well as mechanisms for ideological outreach.652 
 The extent of the Brotherhood’s rising societal influence became clear in the 
aftermath of the October 1992 Cairo earthquake, in which over 12,000 people were 
injured and 50,000 buildings were damaged.  Within hours, the Brotherhood’s 
representatives in the Doctors Syndicate and Engineers Syndicate directed activists to set 
up first-aid centers and distribute food, medicine, and money.  The Islamists’ efficiency 
contrasted sharply with the regime’s response, which was slow and inefficient, and the 
Brotherhood used its intervention in grief-stricken areas to promote its political agenda, 
such as by displaying banners with its slogan, “Islam is the Solution.”653   
Unnerved by the Brotherhood’s strong response to the earthquake, the regime 
responded by ordering that only state-licensed charitable organizations could distribute 
aid.654  But once the crisis subsided, the regime began taking a variety of measures to 
substantially curtail the Brotherhood’s activities. 
c. Renewed Repression 
 The Mubarak regime began its assault on the Brotherhood’s rising influence 
shortly after the 1992 Cairo earthquake.  In February 1993, the NDP-dominated 
parliament passed a law that substantially changed the rules through which syndicates’ 
governing councils were elected.  The new rules mandated that at least fifty percent of a 
syndicate’s members had to cast ballots for the elections to be valid without requiring a 
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rerun;  this was intended to disadvantage the Brotherhood, whose syndicate members had 
often won elections with very low turnouts.655  These efforts, however, failed to thwart 
the Brotherhood’s influence, as its members continued winning syndicate board elections.  
In response, the regime closed the Engineers Syndicate in 1995 and the Lawyers 
Syndicate in 1996, freezing their assets and ultimately placing them under state-appointed 
officials who curtailed the syndicates’ activities.656 
 The regime also began cracking down on the Brotherhood’s societal outreach.  On 
university campuses, the regime directed State Security to monitor Brotherhood-affiliated 
students, prohibit political activities, and interfere in student union elections to prevent 
Muslim Brothers from winning.  New laws were also introduced to undermine the 
Brotherhood’s influence in university teachers’ clubs, and the regime’s increasing 
intervention in the syndicates against the Brotherhood decimated revenues that were 
needed to support various social services.657 
 Meanwhile, the regime began enacting laws that provided stiffer punishments for 
belonging to radical organizations.  These efforts began in July 1992, when the regime 
issued a new anti-terrorism law under which those found guilty of “assisting or 
expressing sympathy for terrorists” could be punished with forced labor, life sentences, or 
the death penalty.658  Then, in 1993, the regime began referring suspected terrorists to 
military courts, which allowed for quicker verdicts thanks to the laxer evidentiary 
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standards.659  It should be emphasized that these new laws comprised part of the 
government’s response to a rising wave of Islamist terrorism, which targeted foreign 
tourists, Egyptian Christians, and state officials, including Mubarak himself.660  For this 
reason, the Brotherhood was initially unaffected by these laws, because it repeatedly 
declared its commitment to nonviolence and distanced itself from the terrorists’ attacks. 
 But before the November 1995 elections, the Mubarak regime began using its 
new anti-terrorism laws to repress the Brotherhood.  The assault began in January 1995, 
when 82 of the Brotherhood’s leading middle-aged activists were rounded up, charged 
with plotting to overthrow the regime, and referred to military tribunals.  Then, on 
November 23, one week before the elections, the military tribunal sentenced 54 of these 
individuals, including some of the Brotherhood’s best-known leaders, to three-to-five-
year prison terms.  Finally, days before the elections, the Interior Ministry detained 
hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood poll watchers, and the regime ultimately used brute 
force to ensure that only one of the Brotherhood’s approximately 150 candidates was 
elected.  The 1995 elections were the most violent in Egypt’s history: 61 people died, 
1313 were injured, and 2400 were detained.661 
 While the regime’s crackdown on the Brotherhood – and, in particular, its 
imprisonment of some of the Brotherhood’s most important leaders – took a serious toll 
on the organization’s internal administration, the Brotherhood remained popular.  Five 
years later, when a court order forced the regime to permit judicial monitoring of 
parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood won 17 seats in the 2000 parliamentary 
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elections.662  This was more than what all of the other opposition parties won combined, 
and it reinforced the notion that the Mubarak regime’s various attempts to trap the 
Brotherhood – including accommodation during the 1980s to repression in the 1990s – 
had failed. 
III. Untrappable 
 There are three reasons why the Mubarak regime was unable to trap the 
Brotherhood or repress it into irrelevance. 
a. The Benefits of Not Being a Political Party 
 First, the Brotherhood’s ability to prosper despite having minimal parliamentary 
representation from 1990-2000 was a testament to the advantages of not being a 
recognized political party.  As discussed previously, Mubarak-era political parties 
received recognition from the Shura Council’s Political Parties Committee (PPC) and, in 
many cases, lucrative political patronage in exchange for a variety of limitations on their 
activities.  One of the most important limitations was that parties confined their activities 
to their headquarters, which effectively kept them out of public view and made them even 
more dependent on the regime’s manipulations for “winning” seats in elections.  Indeed, 
the Tagammu and Wafd parties both became trapped in the regime’s clientelist system in 
the early 1990s, and both parties remained largely irrelevant for the remainder of 
Mubarak’s reign. 
 The Brotherhood, however, did not suffer this fate because, from the 1990s 
onward, it studiously avoided becoming an official political party.  When a group of 
prominent Brotherhood members began establishing a party in 1996, the Brotherhood’s 
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executive Guidance Office responded by banishing them and their supporters.663  A 
number of reasons have been given to explain the Guidance Office’s decision-making 
during this episode.  The leadership seemingly feared that regime would respond to the 
establishment of a Brotherhood party by intensifying its anti-Brotherhood crackdown664, 
and the Guidance Office also viewed the establishment of a semi-autonomous party as a 
undermining its control of the organization.665  There is also some evidence that the 
party’s reform-minded platform unnerved the Brotherhood’s more conservative 
leadership, which viewed the party as an ideological threat.666 
By remaining a “society,” as opposed to a political party, the Brotherhood was 
able to evade the government’s restrictive regulations on political activities and continue 
its public outreach through social work.  Moreover, through this social work, the 
Brotherhood was able to create new spaces – including mosques and health clinics – for 
advancing its political agenda, which was an advantage denied to headquarter-confined 
political parties.  Finally, because it was not a formal political party, the Brotherhood’s 
aspirations were not limited to winning regime-manipulated elections.  As a result, its 
success did not depend entirely on its willingness to respect the regime’s red lines. 
Of course, not being a formal political party also had a tremendous downside for 
the Brotherhood.667  Since it could not be trapped in the Mubarak regime’s clientelist 
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system, the regime was left with only one option for curtailing its influence: repression, 
including constant harassment of Brotherhood activists by State Security, significant 
restrictions on Brotherhood activities, and the periodic imprisonment of top leaders.  Yet 
while repressed political parties, such as the Ghad party, crumbled under this pressure, 
the Brotherhood remained strong thanks to an internal structure that kept its members 
committed to its cause, and further prevented the regime from infiltrating it with agents. 
b. A Committed – and Vetted – Membership 
 The second reason why the Mubarak regime was unable to trap the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as it did with the Tagammu and Wafd parties, or infiltrate it so as to destroy 
it from within, as it did with Ayman Nour’s Ghad party, has to do with the Brotherhood’s 
intricate system of internal promotion.  Whereas political parties are relatively open 
organizations that members join by filling out written applications, joining the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a five-to-eight year process, “during which aspiring members are closely 
watched for their loyalty to the cause and are indoctrinated in the Brotherhood’s 
curriculum.”668  This makes the Brotherhood nearly impossible for the government to 
infiltrate, since those who become full-fledged members have been thoroughly vetted by 
their superiors for their commitment to the organization. 
 The process of becoming a Muslim Brother begins at recruitment.  On university 
campuses and in mosques throughout Egypt, specially designated local Brotherhood 
members scout for pious individuals, e.g. by examining whether prospective recruits pray 
five times a day or have memorized parts of the Qur’an.  Initially, Brotherhood recruiters 
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engage their recruits in non-Islamist social activities, such as football or tutoring, and 
they formally ask the recruits to join the Brotherhood only after the recruits’ religiosity 
has been confirmed, which could take as long as one year.669  The Brotherhood also has a 
division for children aged 9-13 years old, which mostly caters to the children of Muslim 
Brothers and integrates them into the organization at a younger age.670 
 Once a recruit agrees to join the organization, he becomes a muhib, or a “lover.”  
During this first stage in the five-stage promotional process, the recruiter continues 
monitoring the muhib’s personal piety, including whether he prays regularly and fasts on 
Ramadan, as well as whether he gets along with other Muslim Brothers.671  The muhib 
also begins participating in the Brotherhood’s social activities, which include recreational 
activities with other Muslim Brothers as well as community work, and begins a rigorous 
study of the Qur’an, Sunna, and religious exegeses.672  Muslim Brothers typically remain 
muhibs for six months to one year, and their superiors test their religious knowledge and 
practice before they advance to the next stage.673 
 At the second stage, the rising Muslim Brother becomes a muayyad, or 
“supporter.”  At this stage, which lasts for one-and-a-half to three years, the muayyad 
becomes more involved in the Brotherhood’s political and social activities, such as 
preaching and teaching in mosques, as well as recruiting new Muslim Brothers.  The 
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muayyad is also introduced to a more rigorous curriculum, which emphasizes 
memorization of the Qur’an and the teachings of Hassan al-Banna.  Before moving to the 
next stage, the muayyad is once again tested, and his superiors assess his progress in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s curriculum, as well as his willingness to follow the decisions of 
the Brotherhood’s central leadership.674 
 Next, the Muslim Brother becomes a muntasib, or “affiliated.”   This stage lasts 
approximately one year, and it constitutes the first step towards full Brotherhood 
membership.  (“He’s a member, but his name is written in pencil,” Islam Lotfy, a former 
Brotherhood youth leader, told me.)  As a muntasib, the Muslim Brother begins working 
in the Muslim Brotherhood’s official divisions, such as those dedicated to serving 
workers, students, or youths, and he also begins paying membership dues that range from 
5-8 percent of his earnings.  To advance to the next level, the muntasib is tested on both 
his knowledge of religious texts and political views to ensure his compatibility with the 
organization’s ideology.675 
 At the fourth level, the Muslim Brother is called a muntazim, or “organizer.”  At 
this stage, which often lasts two years, the Muslim Brother is expected to play an active 
role within the organization, and can form his own local Brotherhood usra, or “family,” 
which consists of five-to-eight individuals and forms the most basic unit of the 
Brotherhood’s national hierarchy.  He is also expected to memorize the Qur’an and 
sayings of the Prophet Muhammad,676 and his superiors may test his loyalty to the 
organization by “acting like State Security and giving [him] wrong information, to see if 
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[he] talks.”677  Finally, at the fifth stage of internal promotion, the candidate becomes an 
ach amal, or “working Brother,” at which point he is considered a full-fledged member 
with voting rights.678 
 Hassan al-Banna inaugurated the first version of this multi-stage promotional 
process at the Muslim Brotherhood’s Third General Conference in 1935, it has evolved 
slightly over time.679  But its purpose has remained the same: promoting the 
Brotherhood’s organizational strength by ensuring that its members are completely 
dedicated to its cause and activities.  This made the organization nearly impossible to 
infiltrate with State Security agents.  “Agents can become a muhib, but they won’t move 
up,” Alexandria Brotherhood leader Ali Abdelfattah told me.  “You have to be patient to 
become a muayyad.  And if you’re an agent, you won’t be patient enough.”680 
c. An Impenetrable Hierarchy 
 The third reason why the regime was unable to trap the Muslim Brotherhood is 
the Brotherhood’s strong nationwide hierarchy, through which Brotherhood leaders 
command the rank and file members as foot soldiers.  This structure enabled the 
Brotherhood to mobilize its members in practically every neighborhood nationwide 
during elections, which meant that it was less dependent on the regime for winning seats 
than the legalized political parties that were largely shut off from the broader society. 
The Brotherhood’s hierarchy first emerged in the early 1930s and was 
reconfigured in the mid-1940s, aiming to ensure that the Brotherhood could act as a 
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“highly disciplined instrument” for executing the leadership’s policies and initiatives.681  
At the lowest level is the five-to-eight-person usra, or “family,” which is headed by a 
naqib, or chief.  The usra’s members generally live within the same neighborhood, and 
all Muslim Brothers meet in their usras weekly to study the Brotherhood’s religious 
curriculum, discuss political and cultural issues, organize the usra’s local social activities, 
and discuss their private lives.682  The usra thus serves two key purposes: it provides a 
mechanism through which the Brotherhood can continue verifying that its members are 
adhering to the organization’s principles, and it reinforces the social bonds among 
Brotherhood members, thus making defections relatively rare.683 
 Four layers of leadership stand above the usra.  Approximately six to twelve 
usras comprise a shoaba, or populace; three-to-five shoabas comprise a muntaqa, or 
area; a number of muntaqas fall under leadership of their respective muhafazas, or 
governorates; and a number of muhafazas are grouped under a qita,’ or sector.684  At the 
very top of the Brotherhood’s hierarchy sits the 20-member executive Maktab al-Irshad, 
or Guidance Office, which is headed by a Supreme Guide and advised on doctrinal 
matters by a 120-member Shura Council, which is the Brotherhood’s legislative body.685  
When the Guidance Office wants to execute a decision – such as organizing for elections 
or social services – it communicates through this hierarchal chain to the administrative 
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offices that sit at each subsidiary level.  The top officials in these administrative offices, 
as well as in the Guidance Office, are all at the ach amal level of membership.686 
 This structure, especially when coupled with a process of internal promotion that 
ensures a deeply committed membership, made the Brotherhood a uniquely strong 
organization.  As a result, it won more seats than any other opposition party in the 2000 
parliamentary elections – even despite the heavily rigged nature of those elections, and 
despite regime’s imprisonment of many of its top leaders and thousands of its activists.  
So as the 2005 elections approached, the Mubarak regime sought a new strategy for 
addressing the challenge that the Brotherhood posed to it. 
IV. Mubarak’s Containment of the Brotherhood 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the Mubarak regime faced unprecedented international 
pressure to liberalize in the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections.  These elections 
coincided with the height of the Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda.” Successfully 
conducted elections in the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, as well as the February 2005 
“Cedar Revolution” that ousted Syrian troops from Lebanon, reinforced international 
demands for the Mubarak regime to hold fair and free elections.  In response, the regime 
passed a constitutional amendment that allowed for Egypt’s first-ever multi-candidate 
presidential elections, and it agreed to allow judicial monitoring of the subsequent 
parliamentary elections. 
 These developments provided an unprecedented political opportunity for the 
Brotherhood.  The top – and relatively young –  leaders who had been arrested during the 
1995 crackdown had been released in 2000, and the organization was thus operating once 
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again at nearly full capacity.  Meanwhile, in the September 2005 presidential elections, 
the Brotherhood demonstrated its willingness to challenge the regime when it ordered its 
members to vote for Ghad party candidate Ayman Nour as a protest vote against Hosni 
Mubarak.687  Fearing that the Brotherhood might exploit the relatively free November 
parliamentary elections to win an unprecedented share of seats, the regime thus reached 
out to the Brotherhood’s leadership and, for the first time, offered it a deal.688 
a. The Regime’s 2005 Electoral Deal With the Brotherhood 
 In the years before the 2005 parliamentary elections, communication between the 
Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime improved considerably.  The regime’s ongoing 
repression of the organization and mass arrests of its leaders and activists, which began in 
1995 and persisted into the early 2000s689, had made the Brotherhood much more 
cautious, and it increasingly sought the regime’s approval for its political activities.  
Thus, in the run-up to the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Brotherhood 
received the regime’s approval to hold a massive anti-war rally at Cairo Stadium, which 
was reportedly attended by over 100,000 people, and the Brotherhood abided by 
Mubarak’s red lines insofar as the rally focused its ire on the U.S., while avoiding 
criticism of the regime.690  Similarly, when the Kefaya movement emerged in late 2004 to 
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demand political reform, the Brotherhood coordinated with State Security to hold 
thousands-strong protests in at least eleven governorates.691   
To be sure, this communication did not end the regime’s repression of the 
Brotherhood.  Indeed, after initially tolerating the Brotherhood’s 2003 anti-Iraq war 
protests, the regime undertook a new wave of arrests to end the demonstrations,692 and 
during the first few months of 2005, it arrested approximately 900 Muslim Brothers, 
including top leaders Mahmoud Ezzat and Essam el-Erian.693  (Many believed that el-
Erian was arrested because of comments he made suggesting that he would run for the 
presidency – which, coming from a Brotherhood leader, would have been interpreted by 
the regime as especially threatening.694) But Brotherhood-regime communication 
seemingly afforded the Brotherhood greater operating space than at any point since the 
1995 crackdown and, by 2005, a formal channel was established between State Security 
and three top Brotherhood officials: deputy supreme guides Mohamed Habib and Khayrat 
al-Shater, and Brotherhood parliamentary bloc head Mohamed Morsi.695 
 As the November 2005 parliamentary elections approached, the regime used this 
channel to offer the Brotherhood a deal.  The offer began with State Security chief 
Hassan Abdel Rahman contacting Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mehdi Akef, and 
expressing his concern that the Brotherhood might run for – and win – a large share of 
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parliamentary seats, given the international pressure that the regime was facing to hold 
relatively open elections.  Akef responded by indicating that he was willing to run for 
fewer seats so long as the regime didn’t arrest Muslim Brothers en masse, as it had done 
during previous parliamentary elections, and he authorized deputy supreme guides al-
Shater and Habib to handle subsequent communications.696 
 Over the course of a few meetings with State Security that occurred in the weeks 
before the election, al-Shater and Habib agreed to reduce the number of Brotherhood 
parliamentary candidacies from approximately 200 to 120, with the aim of winning 50-55 
seats.697 In deference to the regime the Brotherhood further withdrew candidates from 
districts in which major NDP candidates were running.698  In exchange, the regime 
agreed to let some Brothers win, and to run the elections relatively fairly.699  The regime 
additionally afforded the Brotherhood unprecedented media access, including hosting 
Guidance Office member Abdel Monem Abouel Fotouh on public radio, and it permitted 
Brotherhood candidates to use the slogan “Islam is the Solution” – a religious rallying cry 
that, in previous elections, would have been considered a clear breach of the red lines and 
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invited immediate repression.700  The regime, however, refused the Brotherhood’s request 
for legal recognition.701 
While the first of Egypt’s three rounds of parliamentary elections was hardly 
pristine and reports of vote-buying abounded, the regime mostly kept its promise and 
prevented the police from interfering in polling stations.702  But the Brotherhood did not 
keep the promise it had made to the regime: it ultimately ran 161 candidates,703 and in the 
first round, 34 of its 50 candidates won parliamentary seats704 – a shocking victory, 
considering that the Brotherhood’s 17 seats in the previous parliament had already made 
it the largest opposition bloc.   
In response, the regime tightened the noose on the Brotherhood in the second 
round, and arrested 731 Brotherhood members.  But it was to no avail: the Brotherhood 
won an additional 42 seats, bringing its total to 76 and feeding expectations that it could 
emerge with nearly a quarter of the parliament.705  Finally, in the third round, the regime 
deployed Central Security Forces to cordon off polling stations, only allowing NDP 
supporters to pass through in many cases while continuing the crackdown on 
Brotherhood activists, which held the Brotherhood to winning only twelve additional 
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seats.706  By the end of the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood-regime deal 
was in tatters: the Brotherhood had won an astounding 88 of 454 seats – 20 percent of the 
parliament – while the regime had detained 1200 Brotherhood activists.707  
b. Intensified Repression 
The Brotherhood’s strong performance in the 2005 parliamentary elections 
unnerved the regime.  To halt the Brotherhood’s ascent, the NDP-dominated parliament 
voted in February 2006 to postpone that year’s local council elections until 2008.708  
Then, for the next five years, the regime subjected the Brotherhood to an unrelenting 
crackdown, arresting thousands of Brotherhood members and many of its top leaders. 
This crackdown began in March 2006, when twenty Muslim Brothers, including 
university professors and Guidance Office members, were arrested, and hundreds more 
were arrested over the next two months.709  In May, after the Brotherhood participated in 
demonstrations to support two judges who had been arrested for exposing vote rigging 
during the parliamentary elections, the regime arrested 500 Brotherhood members and six 
top leaders.710  In July, seventeen activists and two top leaders were detained when 
Supreme Guide Akef expressed his willingness to send Brotherhood volunteers to 
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Lebanon to aid Hezbollah militarily in its war with Israel, which suggested that the 
Brotherhood retained military capabilities.711 
The crackdown intensified further in December 2006, when dozens of masked 
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated students staged a martial arts demonstration at Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo in front of approximately 2000 students, which aimed to mimic 
demonstrations held by Hamas and Hezbollah.  The demonstration’s bold appeal to 
militancy shocked the regime, which responded by arresting several hundred more 
Brotherhood members, including seventeen senior officials.  Among those arrested was 
deputy supreme guide Khairat al-Shater, a millionaire businessman widely considered the 
Brotherhood’s most capable administrator, as well as one of the organization’s chief 
financiers.712  Al-Shater and Brotherhood business colleague Hassan Malek were referred 
to a military tribunal and sentenced to seven years imprisonment, while the regime seized 
their assets.713 
Thereafter, the regime’s brutality against the Brotherhood intensified with each 
new election.  Ahead of the 2007 Shura Council elections, thirty Brotherhood members 
were arrested.714  When nominations opened for the 2008 local council elections, 700 
Muslim Brothers were arrested within the first two weeks.715 In the run-up to the 
November 2010 parliamentary elections, widely considered the most forged in Egypt’s 
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history, the regime arrested sixteen top leaders716 and, in the weeks before the election, 
over 1000 Muslim Brothers were arrested, including eight candidates.717 Throughout this 
crackdown, the regime targeted top leaders, apparently aiming to throw the organization 
into disarray.  Political section chief Essam el-Erian was arrested in 2006, 2007 and 
2010718; Brotherhood parliamentarians Sabri Amer and Ragab Abu Zeid were detained in 
2007, despite holding parliamentary immunity719; Guidance Office member Ali Beshr 
was sentenced in 2008 to three years in prison720; and Guidance Office member Abdel 
Monem Abouel Fotouh was arrested in 2009 on charges of money laundering.721 
c. Contained, And Increasingly Cautious 
 The crackdown forced the Guidance Office to handle conflicting impulses: the 
Office increasingly embraced caution, fearing that bold action against the regime would 
catalyze an intensified crackdown and, worst of all, decapitation, but prompted by its 
younger members and others who raised questions regarding whether the organization 
had a “deal” with the regime it needed to be active.  These competing pressures often led 
the Brotherhood to respond to emerging anti-regime movements ineffectually, which 
ultimately rendered it a somewhat peripheral player during the final years of Mubarak’s 
dictatorship, despite its tremendous political potential. 
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 The Brotherhood’s response to the April 6, 2008 workers strikes illustrates its 
ineffectiveness.  At the time, the Brotherhood was awaiting a verdict in the trial of al-
Shater and other Brotherhood members, so it announced on April 5 that it would not 
participate.722  Yet when the April 6 protests proved somewhat successful in galvanizing 
young people against the regime,723 the Brotherhood quickly embraced a follow-up 
protest that was scheduled for Mubarak’s birthday on May 4.724  These plans, however, 
ultimately fizzled when the regime announced a 30 percent increase in public wages a 
few days before the protest was scheduled, and the protest thus crumbled.725   
One year later, when a nationwide day of protest was called to mark the first 
anniversary of the April 6, 2008 protests, the Brotherhood endorsed it.726 Fearing that the 
regime would accuse it of trying to seize power, the Brotherhood ultimately backtracked 
and only encouraged its university students to participate.  As a result, the protests failed 
– and the Brotherhood’s partial involvement enabled the regime to declare in state-run 
media that the Brotherhood had lost popularity.727 
The Brotherhood similarly sent mixed messages regarding its stance on 
presidential succession – specifically, whether Gamal Mubarak should succeed his father 
as Egypt’s president.  By late 2009, this issue dominated Egyptian politics: Hosni 
Mubarak’s reportedly declining health raised questions about whether he could stand for 
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elections in September 2011, and the emergence of Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei 
as a possible presidential candidate added urgency to this issue.  Initially, the 
Brotherhood took a bold move against the regime and joined Ayman Nour’s “Against 
Succession” campaign in October 2009.728  Two months later, however, when the 
Brotherhood held Guidance Office elections, newly elected Supreme Guide Mohamed 
Badie reversed course: in his first interview with satellite television station Al-Jazeera, 
Badie declared that he had no problem with Gamal Mubarak becoming the next president 
of Egypt through fair and free elections.729  Though the Brotherhood attempted to walk 
this statement back,730 it was widely interpreted as a concession to the regime,731 and the 
“Against Succession” campaign was ultimately overtaken by ElBaradei’s newly founded 
National Association for Change. 
Once again, however, the Brotherhood demonstrated tremendous ambivalence.  
Brotherhood parliamentary leader and Guidance Office member Saad al-Katatny met 
with ElBaradei in March 2010 and supported ElBaradei’s call for constitutional change, 
but declined to endorse his presidential candidacy.732  Then, following the regime’s 
massive forgeries during the June Shura Council elections, in which all twelve 
Brotherhood candidates lost, the Brotherhood welcomed ElBaradei to its headquarters 
and vowed to participate in collecting one million signatures on behalf of ElBaradei’s 
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constitutional reform initiative733 -- a gesture that led ElBaradei to declare his “political 
partnership” with the Brotherhood.734  But when ElBaradei called on political forces to 
boycott the November 2010 parliamentary elections as a strategy for isolating the 
regime,735 the Brotherhood refused.   
To be sure, the Brotherhood knew that the November 2010 elections would be 
forged.736  By that point, the anti-Brotherhood crackdown was in its fifth year, and it was 
widely expected that the regime would shut the Brotherhood out of parliament to 
facilitate Gamal Mubarak’s succession.737  But like other opposition parties, the 
Brotherhood saw a number of benefits to participating, including the opportunity to 
connect with ordinary voters, as well as the belief that participation would enable the 
Brotherhood to expose the regime’s forgery, which is why 72 percent of the 
Brotherhood’s internal Shura Committee voted in favor of electoral participation.738  
Initially, the regime tried to deter the Brotherhood from running so many candidates, and 
though 22 of the Brotherhood’s 88 parliamentarians withdrew, approximately 150-170 
candidates remained in the race.739  The regime responded by arresting over 1000 Muslim 
Brothers, tearing down the organization’s “Islam is the Solution” posters, and running the 
most fraudulent elections in Egyptian history.  Only 27 of the Brotherhood’s candidates 
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qualified for the second round and, to protest the widespread forgery, the Brotherhood’s 
Shura Committee voted overwhelmingly to withdraw from the second round of voting.740  
As noted in Chapter 3, the Wafd similarly withdrew. 
For the Mubarak regime, the Wafd and Brotherhood’s withdrawals from the 
second round of the 2010 parliamentary elections were a tremendous embarrassment.  It 
depended on opposition groups’ participation in elections for bolstering its competitive 
façade, and it therefore appealed to the Brotherhood’s remaining candidates to stay in the 
race by promising them victory.741  But when the candidates refused this offer, the regime 
turned its attention to the one Brotherhood candidate who preferred to continue running: 
Magdy Ashour.742 
Ashour, it seems, intended to abide by the Brotherhood’s boycott decision despite 
his personal misgivings.  But shortly after the first round of the election, he says he faced 
tremendous pressure within his district to continue running, and attempted to resist this 
pressure by fleeing to Alexandria.  The regime, however, had something else in mind: 
State Security officers instructed Ashour’s brother to file a police report claiming that 
Muslim Brothers had kidnapped him, which prompted police to retrieve Ashour from 
Alexandria and arrest the Brothers who were with him.  State Security then ordered 
Ashour to go on national television and confirm that Muslim Brothers had kidnapped 
him, but Ashour refused, instead agreeing to continue his campaign to ensure his 
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colleagues’ safe release.  When Ashour subsequently won his parliamentary race, the 
Brotherhood banished him, viewing him as weak for having caved to pressure.743 
V. A Cornered, Cautious Group 
In December 2010 – five years after winning one-fifth of the parliament – the 
Brotherhood was cornered.  Thousands of its members were detained.  Some of its top 
leaders, including key financiers, were serving long prison sentences.  And it now had no 
representation in parliament.  Though it was still Egypt’s best-organized political force, 
the Brotherhood believed that the regime was simply too strong to challenge,744 and that 
any attempt to protest its excesses would invite an even more massive crackdown. 
The regime’s threats reinforced these fears.  As youth activists began organizing 
the January 25, 2011 demonstrations that would catalyze Mubarak’s ouster, the regime 
threatened the Brotherhood that, if it participated, “there would be no red lines.”  This 
meant that even the Supreme Guide could be arrested, and the Brotherhood’s leaders in 
every governorate were also threatened with imprisonment and, in some cases, torture.745  
Like the trapped Tagammu and Wafd parties, the Brotherhood thus distanced itself from 
the protests, disappointing many of its younger members, who increasingly viewed the 
Brotherhood as yet another supine Mubarak-era opposition movement.  Turning their 
backs on the Brotherhood’s leadership, these youths began working with their colleagues 
in other political groups to find new channels for opposing the regime, given that the old 
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channels – including even the highly capable Muslim Brotherhood – had apparently 
failed. 
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Chapter 6 
The Emergence of Egypt’s Untrappable Activists 
 
 In January 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak appeared to be laying the 
groundwork for either running for a sixth term that September, or ensuring his son 
Gamal’s succession.  The November 2010 parliamentary elections seemed to be a key 
component of that strategy.  The ruling National Democratic Party’s campaign was 
managed by steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz, a close confidante of Gamal Mubarak, and yielded 
the most heavily forged outcome in Egypt’s history, with the NDP and independent 
candidates associated with it winning over 90 percent of the seats, leaving the opposition 
with only 31 of 518 seats.  This practically ensured that the NDP would retain the 
presidency unchallenged: under the 1971 constitutions, presidential candidates required 
the support of at least 65 members of the People’s Assembly to be nominated. 
 Egypt’s organized opposition appeared incapable of changing this apparently 
foreordained outcome.  The legalized opposition parties were not, in fact, opposing the 
regime in any meaningful way.  Tagammu’s parliamentary representation rose 
considerably from winning just two seats in 2005 to five in 2010, and it declined to get 
involved in any anti-regime activities.  Meanwhile, although Wafd stood up to the regime 
by withdrawing from the second round of the 2010 parliamentary elections, its leaders 
refused to take any additional aggressive action, which is why the party even avoided 
joining the “popular parliament” that other opposition groups formed to protest the 
electoral forgery.  And the Ghad party was practically non-existent: the legalized “Ghad” 
entity under Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s control deliberately avoided confronting the 
regime and was barely visible, while Ayman Nour’s felony conviction legally preventing 
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him from running for the presidency and had driven away many of his earlier supporters.  
Even the Muslim Brotherhood – widely regarded as the only opposition group with true 
grassroots support and mobilizing capabilities – was playing it safe, fearing that any 
move against the regime might catalyze an unyielding crackdown.  
 The Mubarak regime’s firm control over its organized opponents, and these 
opponents’ apparent unwillingness or incapacity to do oppose it, was a big part of the 
reason that this dissertation was originally titled “Durable Authoritarianism.”  This is not 
to say that there weren’t plenty of signs of popular discontent within Egypt, including 
frequent labor strikes, scattered protests, and vociferous criticism of the Mubarak regime 
in emerging social media outlets.  Indeed, during my pre-dissertation trip in 2008, 
Egyptians frequently spoke of a looming “infigar” – explosion – on account if mounting 
economic and political distress.746  Yet there appeared to be no group or party that could 
translate this very apparent, widespread discontent into any kind of movement that might 
challenge Mubarak. 
  It turns out that I was looking in all the wrong places.  My observation that the 
organized opposition was trapped – either co-opted by the regime or contained by its 
repression – was correct, but a newly emerging generation of opposition activists also 
recognized this fact, and were about to side-step it.  In turn, these activists deliberately 
avoided the legalized opposition parties and the regime’s autocratic electoral system, 
which they viewed as political dead ends.  Instead, they formed a variety of loosely 
connected opposition movements and developed a series of protest strategies that made 
them less trappable for the regime.  It was these activists who organized the January 25, 
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2011 protests that kicked off Egypt’s anti-Mubarak uprising and catalyzed Mubarak’s 
ouster – all while the legal opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood predictably sat 
on the sidelines. 
I. The Genealogy of Egypt’s Revolutionary Activists 
 The loose coalition of young activists who collaborated to organize the pivotal 
January 25, 2011 protests came from a number of different organizations, and subscribed 
to a diverse set of ideologies.  They were united exclusively by the shared cause of 
bringing down Mubarak, and became acquainted with one another while participating in 
various protest movements that came and went during the final decade of Mubarak’s rule. 
a. Early 2000s Protests on Foreign Policy 
 Many of activists who helped organize the 2011 anti-Mubarak uprising cut their 
political teeth during the second Palestinian intifada, which began in September 2000.  
The intifada coincided with the expansion of pan-Arab satellite television networks, 
which broadcast images of “the Israeli military machine – soldiers, guns, tanks and 
helicopters – giving chase to unarmed Palestinian men, women and children” and 
glorified Palestinian suicide bombers as “resistance” martyrs.747  This depiction of the 
conflict engendered mass sympathy for the Palestinian cause within Egypt, and university 
activists held semi-regular protests against Israel.748  “I worked on the Palestinian cause 
since 2000,” Hossam Moones, a self-described “democratic Nasserist” activist, told me.  
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“We had community groups, raising money for Palestine all over Egypt.  Not just money 
– we collected seeds and food as well.”749 
 These demonstrations represented the first sustained protest movement of the 
Mubarak era, beginning with the first mass demonstrations at universities nationwide in 
early October 2000 as the intifada commenced, then picking up steam following Israel’s 
March 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, and returning during practically every episode 
of Arab-Israeli violence thereafter.  The regularity of these protests was permitted:  they 
unified a large segment of politically interested Egyptians, ranging from Nasserists on the 
far left to Muslim Brothers on the far right.750  However, though these protests focused 
overwhelmingly on the Palestinian cause, they often contained implicit criticisms of the 
Mubarak regime, which was viewed as ineffective in alleviating Palestinian suffering.  
Demonstrators called on the regime to end its relationship with Israel and close the Israeli 
Embassy in Giza.751  Moreover, the mere existence of the demonstrations – as well as the 
fact that they were occurring all over Egypt, as opposed to just in Cairo752 – challenged 
the Mubarak regime, which forbade demonstrations under the 1981 emergency laws.   
So after initially tolerating pro-Palestinian activity, the regime began cracking 
down. Central Security Forces (CSF) police, who operate under the Interior Ministry, 
would surround the protests and often clash with demonstrators, leaving many injured 
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while detaining dozens of activists.753  “During this period the police were so strong and 
going to the street was risky,” said Moaz Abdel Karim, a former Muslim Brotherhood 
youth leader who participated in these demonstrations.  “You could die.  They could 
arrest you and sentence you under the Emergency Law.”754  Of course, this heavy-handed 
response validated the activists’ still-implicit criticism of the regime: that it was more 
interested in upholding its relationship with Israel than in responding to Egyptian 
demands for a more pro-Palestinian posture. 
The United States’ March 2003 invasion of Iraq intensified this line of attack 
against the regime.  While the Mubarak regime publicly criticized the invasion and 
declined to join an international coalition as it had done during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, it nevertheless permitted U.S. warships to pass through the Suez Canal and, given 
its close diplomatic relations with Washington, was increasingly viewed as a “tool of 
imperialism.”755  Perhaps hoping to contain mounting popular outrage in the run-up to the 
war, the regime permitted the Muslim Brotherhood to hold a major anti-war protest at 
Cairo Stadium on February 27, which over 100,000 reportedly attended.756  But it was to 
no avail.  On March 20, the day after the U.S. invasion began, tens of thousands of 
protesters marched towards Tahrir Square, which was occupied for the first time since the 
1972 student demonstrations, before CSF police finally beat them back.  The massive 
outpouring included strong denunciations of the Mubarak regime’s foreign policy, with 
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protesters chanting, “Why are the Arab leaders silent?” and tearing down a Mubarak 
poster hanging outside the ruling party’s downtown Cairo headquarters.757   
The regime responded erratically to these protests.  At first, Interior Minister 
Habib Al-Adly affirmed that demonstrations were illegal, and the regime arrested dozens 
of participants.758  But as anti-Iraq war demonstrations persisted nonetheless, the regime 
relented, permitting the Muslim Brotherhood, along with other parties, to hold orderly 
anti-war protests at Cairo’s historic Al-Azhar mosque, which were broadcast on state 
television.  Many opposition groups and activists, however, rejected the regime’s attempt 
at cooption, and organized their own unsanctioned anti-war activities at the Journalists 
Syndicate in downtown Cairo.759  The Journalists Syndicate became a center of anti-
regime activity for the remainder of Mubarak’s rule. 
b. Kefaya 
The ultimate effect of the pro-Palestinian and anti-Iraq war protests of the early 
2000s was to bring together a loose coalition of ideologically diverse opposition activists, 
whose focus gradually transitioned away from foreign policy concerns and towards the 
lack of democracy at home.  By late 2003, this loose coalition became more formalized, 
and leading opposition figures from across the political spectrum met to establish a 
unified movement.  Initially calling itself the Popular Campaign for Change, its leaders 
included former Muslim Brotherhood member Abouleila Madi, liberal Coptic activist 
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George Ishak, Arab nationalist Mohamed Said Idrees, Nasserist Amin Iskander, Muslim 
Brother Said Abdel Sittar, and Communist Ahmed Baha Shaaban.  The diversity of this 
coalition complicated efforts at drafting a declaration, which ultimately took about ten 
months to complete.760 
Finally on September 9, 2004, the Popular Campaign issued its “statement to the 
Egyptian people.”  The statement pulled no punches: it declared the Mubarak regime an 
“obstacle to opportunities for change and development that our country,” and squarely 
blamed the regime for “rampant corruption, the deterioration of facilities and services, the 
explosion of prices, and the deterioration of citizens’ standards of living,” as well as for 
“the continuation of the aggressive policies of the Zionist state and the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq.”  The statement closed with three demands: amending the constitution to allow for 
competitive presidential elections, a two-term limit, and a reduction of presidential 
powers; abolishing the state of emergency; and ensuring full judicial supervision for all 
stages of elections.761  Over 100 prominent intellectuals signed the statement, as well as a 
number of opposition organizations and parties, none of which – of course – were legally 
recognized by the Shura Council’s Political Parties Committee (PPC).762  After security 
forces surrounded the movement’s first meeting, an exasperated attendee recommended 
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that the Popular Campaign change its name to “Kefaya” – meaning “enough” in 
Arabic.763  
Kefaya held its first demonstration in front of the High Court in downtown Cairo 
on December 12, 2004, and drew approximately 500 people.  While this turnout paled in 
comparison with the anti-war protests of the previous year, its key achievement was 
being the first protest that explicitly denounced Mubarak’s rule, including chants of 
“Enough for Mubarak” and “No to hereditary rule,” which protested emerging concerns 
that Mubarak was grooming his son Gamal as his successor.764  When Kefaya announced 
a second demonstration to coincide with the annual International Cairo Book Fair on 
February 4, the regime preempted it, arresting three activists one week beforehand and 
accusing them of handing out leaflets that “incite hatred of the regime.”765  But on 
February 21, Kefaya held its third demonstration at Cairo University, once again drawing 
approximately 500 protesters.766 
Five days later, Kefaya achieved its first victory when the Mubarak regime 
partially fulfilled one of its demands, announcing that it would amend Article 76 of the 
Constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections, and put this amendment 
to a May 25 referendum.767  To be sure, U.S. pressure played an important role in this 
concession. Under the “Freedom Agenda,” the George W. Bush administration had been 
pressuring Mubarak to liberalize his regime since late 2003, and the successful January 
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2005 elections in Iraq followed by the “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon had amplified 
these international demands.  But after only a few protests, Kefaya could still claim to 
have pushed the regime successfully – an achievement that the legalized political parties, 
despite having formed a typically supine “National Front” two years before, could not 
claim.768 
Kefaya continued holding protests throughout the spring of 2005.  On April 27, 
Kefaya held coordinated protests in fourteen Egyptian cities and 2000 activists, including 
100 professors, attended a May rally at the Cairo Faculty Club.769  But as Kefaya’s rise to 
prominence inspired other groups, including workers and the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
similarly demonstrate against Mubarak, the regime began cracking down.770  Thus, at a 
rally before the May 25 referendum on amending the constitution to allow for multi-
candidate presidential elections, police attacked the demonstrators and, according to one 
participant, stripped its female participants.771  The regime additionally began tapping 
Kefaya leaders’ phones, and interfering with the business interests of its financiers, such 
as wealthy Kefaya founder Hany Enan.772  Meanwhile, the regime increasingly infiltrated 
Kefaya rallies with State Security agents, who would beat protesters and detain them 
without charges or trials.773 
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If the Mubarak regime’s increasingly aggressive handling of Kefaya doomed it to 
failure, Kefaya’s own political incompetence didn’t help matters.  In this vein, its call for 
a boycott of the May 25 constitutional referendum on multi-candidate presidential 
elections, which it criticized for lacking judicial oversight, backfired when the 
referendum passed overwhelmingly, albeit with substantial evidence of regime 
tampering.774  Then, as the September 2005 presidential elections approached, Kefaya 
declined to field a challenger to Mubarak and, surprisingly, declined to endorse Ayman 
Nour despite the fact the Nour’s criticisms of the Mubarak regime echoed Kefaya’s.  The 
parliamentary elections that winter represented the final blow: Kefaya played no 
perceptible role, though its leadership claimed that twelve of 454 elected parliamentarians 
were part of its alliance.775  Although Kefaya never entirely faded away, it was never 
again politically prominent. 
As other analysts have noted,776 the cause of Kefaya’s quick emergence was, 
ironically, also the cause of its quick downfall.  The diversity of its leadership had 
enabled it to draw sufficient support for launching sizable protests against Mubarak.  But 
this diversity ultimately inhibited it from making the necessary transition from anti-
regime protest movement to a coherent political entity that could mobilize for supporting 
candidates in elections.  Indeed, Kefaya’s Islamist and non-Islamist members disagreed 
on the extent to which Kefaya should emphasize foreign policy, as well as on ideological 
matters, such as whether ritual veiling (hijab) should be encouraged for women.777 
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These divisions, and Kefaya’s inability to act as an electoral vehicle, led many 
young non-Islamist activists to distance themselves from Kefaya’s activities during the 
2005 elections and dedicate their energies to the Ghad party’s campaign for Ayman Nour.  
“It was either Kefaya or Ghad,” said Amr Ezz, a leading youth activist behind the 
January 2011 anti-Mubarak protests.  “And Ghad was closer to me.  Ghad represented a 
liberal way of thinking in a social way, and it was very close to the Egyptian people.”778   
Indeed, whereas Ayman Nour’s nationwide presidential campaign forced the 
Ghad party to engage the Egyptian public, Kefaya increasingly became viewed as an 
elitist organization that focused on theoretical issues like democratization while giving 
more common complaints, such as the country’s mounting economic woes, short shrift.  
“Kefaya was weakened because it wasn’t flexible,” said Ahmed Maher, another leading 
January 2011 activist who first experienced political activism as a Kefaya protester 
before joining the Ghad party.  “Kefaya would hold a conference and strikes, but they did 
not have a technique for connecting with the people.”779 Though Kefaya faded almost as 
quickly as it had emerged, it inspired many of its younger participants to continue 
working outside the framework of political parties for promoting change. 
II. The Revolutionaries’ Untrappable Movements 
 In the years following Kefaya’s downfall and the regime’s crackdown on Ayman 
Nour’s Ghad party, numerous youth-dominated activist groups sprung into existence.  
University students, many of whom had participated in Kefaya’s “Youth for Change” off-
shoot, founded chapters of “Haqqi” – meaning “my right” – at campuses nation wide and, 
in 2007, a coalition of students from various different background founded “Gamaatna” – 
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“our university” – which held a number of opposition events.780  Leftist and socialist 
youth organizations became more engaged as well, staging protests for reduced university 
tuition and helping laborers organize strikes.781  Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, there 
were approximately 1900 separate labor actions that involved 1.7 million workers, and 
youth organizers often joined these strikes and helped publicize them.782  Meanwhile, 
technological innovations fueled new outlets for opposition activity: a vibrant online 
community of mostly pseudonymous anti-Mubarak bloggers emerged in 2005, and 
activists often used their blogs to post photos of State Security agents who infiltrated their 
demonstrations.783 
a. The April 6th Youth Movement 
 The most consequential outgrowth of the opposition activity that Kefaya spawned 
was the April 6th Youth Movement.  The organization took its name from a 2008 labor 
strike at Egypt’s largest textile factory in Mahalla al-Kobra, which featured two days of 
violent confrontations between workers and riot police, in which three people were killed 
and many arrested.784  Two weeks before, on March 23, activists Ahmed Maher and 
Esraa Abdel Fattah created a page on Facebook to express their solidarity.  Maher and 
Abdel Fattah met each other as members of the Ghad party during Ayman Nour’s 2005 
campaign – Abdel Fattah had remained active with Nour’s fledgling wing of the party 
while Maher had become more active in Kefaya – and they anticipated that their 
Facebook group would draw roughly 1000 members.  Within days, however, it attracted 
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over 76,000 members, and the Facebook group became an important forum for young 
Egyptians – including some who identified themselves as police officers – to vent their 
frustrations with the Mubarak regime.  This attracted the attention of the regime, which 
warned against participating in the workers’ strike as the April 6 date approached.785  
 Abdel Fattah and Maher’s Facebook group never developed a unified plan of 
action for supporting the Mahalla workers strike.  Abdel Fattah urged its members to stay 
home in solidarity with the workers, though other members of the group independently 
handed out leaflets to publicize the strike and some even went to Mahalla to support it 
directly.786  But as the day approached, Abdel Fattah announced that she would meet 
people in front of a café in downtown Cairo, while activists whom she and Maher had 
met through the Ghad party and Kefaya planned associated protests in governorates 
nationwide.787 
 Ultimately, the April 6th movement’s inaugural protests to support the labor strike 
in Mahalla failed to generate any kind of sizable street activity.  But they were viewed as 
a success because they had demonstrated the extent to which social networking tools 
could aid communication among opposition activists.  The activists further succeeded in 
getting the regime’s attention, albeit with very negative effects.   
Indeed, many activists were arrested on April 6, 2008 – including Abdel Fattah, 
who was nabbed as she approached downtown Cairo’s al-Shabab Cafe, which was 
surrounded by security officers.  She was held for eighteen days, during which State 
Security officers blindfolded her for many hours at a time and twice interrogated her, 
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demanding that she hand over the password to the April 6th group’s Facebook account.  
When she was finally released, state television broadcast images of a crying Abdel Fattah 
running towards her mother, whom she reassured that, “They treated me well! … They 
let me remain a girl. I missed you, Mom. I prayed to God every day.”  While Abdel 
Fattah says that she was trying to calm her mother, who was understandably shaken by 
her daughter’s imprisonment, the regime used these images to depict Abdel Fattah as 
remorseful for her opposition activity.  As a result, Abdel Fattah’s colleagues distanced 
themselves from her, accusing her of giving the regime an easy propaganda victory.788 
One of these colleagues was Maher.  After learning that the regime had arrested 
Abdel Fattah and other activists on April 6, Maher went into hiding, even shutting off his 
cell phone because he had seen State Security vehicles parked outside his parents’ home 
and feared that he was being tracked.  During this period, he also changed the April 6th 
Facebook group’s password as a safety precaution, which he refused to divulge to Abdel 
Fattah once she was released because he feared that she had been co-opted by the regime 
during her imprisonment.789   
But shortly after Abdel Fattah’s release, Maher believed that he was safe and, on 
May 7, he switched his cell phone back on.  Police arrived at his home that day and 
arrested him, subjecting him to two days of torture during which he was blindfolded, tied, 
and beaten with sticks and electric cables while being thrown repeatedly to the floor.  
When they asked about specific details regarding the April 6th Facebook group, Maher 
claimed to not remember, which led to more intense beatings.790 
                                                           
788 Interview with Abdel Fattah, 6 Mar. 2011; Shapiro, “Revolution, Facebook-Style.” 
789 Interview with Ahmed Maher, 9 Mar. 2011. 
790 Interview with Ahmed Maher, 9 Mar. 2011. 
 207 
On the final morning of his detention, a State Security officer walked into 
Maher’s cell and, acting surprised that he had been arrested, apologized to Maher.  
“We’ll never do it again,” the State Security officer told Maher.  “But you’ll have to 
cooperate with us.”  The officer proceeded to make Maher an offer: “You will be the 
youngest party leader in Egypt and you’ll be in media everyday,” said the officer.  “And 
you’ll be in the opposition by using your mind.”791  The regime, in other words, was 
trying to trap Maher in a political party, in which he could build his profile so long as he 
“used his mind” – i.e., wisely adhered to the regime’s well known “red lines.” 
Maher’s first response was to debate the State Security officer, whom he accused 
of faking the parliamentary elections and “serving corrupt people.”  But after being 
released, Maher says he considered the offer and discussed it with a close friend.  “If you 
listen to State Security and accept his phone calls, he won’t save you,” the friend advised 
Maher.  “You’ll be as cartoonish as any party leader.  But if you refuse to take his calls, 
he’ll never call you again.”  Ultimately, Maher declined the offer to establish his own 
political party and held a press conference at which he showed the scars that police had 
inflicted on him during his imprisonment.792 
State Security made a similar, though less specific, offer to Abdel Fattah during 
the April 6th Movement’s formative stage.  “They would say, ‘you are our kids and we 
need you to continue your work,” recalled Abdel Fattah.  “‘You can join a party – why 
work as an independent?  … Why can’t April 6th work in any party?’”  Abdel Fattah, 
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however, viewed a movement as harder to infiltrate than the legalize parties of the 
Mubarak era – a conclusion that was likely formed, in part, by her experience in the Ghad 
party.  “It’s easier to recruit agents in a party, because someone can enter and join more 
easily,” she said.  “But April 6th … is harder to join: you need to attend two or three 
workshops – welcome and training meeting, so [we] get a better idea of who joins.”793 
Indeed, April 6th’s founders were deeply worried that their organization would 
suffer the same fate as the Mubarak-era legal opposition parties.  So they developed an 
internal structure that would complicate the regime’s efforts to infiltrate their 
organization and co-opt individual leaders.  Maher, whom the April 6th leaders viewed as 
highly trustworthy, was placed at the top of this structure and named general coordinator.   
Just below April 6th’s general coordinator is the 25-person central committee, 
which consists of the heads of five subsidiary groups – media, students, organization and 
communication, education, and legal – as well as the April 6th secretaries from each 
governorate in which the movement operates.  The central committee meets weekly, and 
its members transmit directives down to the members of their respective groups.  Just 
below the central committee is the main committee, which meets monthly and consists of 
50-70 members, all of whom are founding members of the organization.  To ensure this 
structure’s security from the Mubarak regime’s predation, only founding April 6th 
members on the main committee can join the central committee and become group heads.  
Meanwhile, new members can join the main committee only after they have been April 
6th members for at least a year. To further ensure the group’s security, certain types of 
information are shared only with certain levels of leadership.  Moreover, this information 
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– for example, the sites for planned protests – was typically transmitted through face-to-
face communication, since State Security monitored April 6th leaders’ cell phone and 
online communications.794 
April 6th leaders knew, however, that their organization was not entirely immune 
from the regime’s infiltration, because its general membership was not thoroughly vetted, 
even if group leaders were.  So when leaders became suspicious that lower level April 6th 
activists were relaying information to State Security, they would test them be giving them 
fake information about a supposed demonstration location.  If police forces surrounded 
that location, April 6th would know that it had a rat on its hands.795 
Yet despite April 6th’s efforts to minimize its susceptibility to the regime, it 
remained a relatively small organization.  To some extent, this was the consequence of 
the group’s focus on maintaining a secure structure, which made it hard for lower level 
members to be promoted and fueled resentment for top leaders – especially Maher, whose 
appointment of April 6th leaders and refusal to hold more open elections led even some of 
his co-founders to view him as a dictator.796   
But more importantly, the regime used a mix of devious maneuvering and 
repression to frustrate April 6th’s efforts to engage Egyptian society more broadly.  The 
maneuvering began almost immediately after the inaugural April 6, 2008 action, when 
April 6th activists planned a follow-up protest for May 4, to coincide with President 
Mubarak’s 80th birthday, during which they aimed to raise economic demands.  To 
preempt this protest, however, the regime announced a 30 percent raise for state workers’ 
                                                           
794 Interview with Amr Ezz, 8 Mar. 2011; interview with Ahmed Maher, 9 Mar. 2011. 
795 Interview with Amr Ezz, 8 Mar. 2011; interview with Ahmed Maher, 9 Mar. 2011. 
796 Interview with Bassem Fathi, 10 Mar. 2011; interview with Bilal Diab, 20 Mar. 2011. 
 210 
wages on May 1.  Then, once the May 4 demonstration fizzled and passed, the regime 
complemented the wage increases with massive price hikes for gasoline (46 percent!), 
cigarettes, and other goods on May 6.797   
Moreover, despite April 6th’s best efforts, the regime largely succeeded in 
controlling its demonstrations.   During the next three years, the regime arrested many of 
April 6th’s leaders and top activists multiple times, and typically overwhelmed April 6th’s 
protests with more CSF officers than there were protesters.  The regime also improved its 
ability to monitor April 6th’s online communications – particularly on Facebook, which 
remained an important mechanism through which the group communicated with its 
supporters nationwide.798 
Still, April 6th kept struggling: the regime never trapped it in its formally 
democratic – but thoroughly manipulated – political structures, nor did the repression 
against April 6th deter it from protesting again.  It thus maintained a small but committed 
pool of activists, who seemingly attached themselves to every protest movement that 
emerged during the final three years of Mubarak’s reign.  
b. The ElBaradei Campaign 
In late 2009, just as he was leaving his post as head of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei signaled that he might run for 
president of Egypt if the constitution were amended to allow all Egyptians to compete.  In 
subsequent interviews, ElBaradei criticized Mubarak’s autocratic rule, and said that his 
new purpose would be to “nudge Egypt towards democracy,” since “democracy here is a 
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farce.”799  Given ElBaradei’s tremendous international stature, and the broad respect he 
enjoyed in his native country, his political emergence unnerved the Mubarak regime, and 
Egypt’s state-run media attacked him almost immediately.800   
For Egypt’s opposition activists, however, ElBaradei represented the possibility 
of unifying the disparate anti-Mubarak movements of the previous decade around a single 
leader untainted by any previous involvement in Egyptian politics.801  So starting in late 
2009, a small group of activists who had gotten to know each other through Kefaya and 
subsequent protest activities, such as April 6th and Ayman Nour’s Ghad party, started an 
online campaign to support ElBaradei’s presidential candidacy. They held their first 
major event on February 19, 2010, when they mobilized approximately 1000 people to 
Cairo International Airport, as ElBaradei returned home after decades of living as an 
international diplomat in Vienna.802 
In the weeks and months that followed, activism focused on the possibility of 
ElBaradei’s presidential candidacy intensified.  On February 24, activists founded the 
National Association for Change (NAC) and invited ElBaradei to be its chairman.  
Shortly thereafter, ElBaradei released a manifesto calling for seven democratizing 
constitutional reforms.803  The manifesto was soon transformed into a petition, and the 
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NAC began a campaign to collect one million signatures, which included an ElBaradei 
public appearance in Mansoura in April and a handful of media events.804  Meanwhile, a 
pro-ElBaradei Facebook page, which attracted over 70,000 members by April, became an 
important forum for disseminating information to activists nationwide.805 
ElBaradei’s emergence also drew the attention of Egypt’s legalized opposition 
parties.  Within these parties’ leaderships, some were frustrated with their parties’ 
unwillingness to forcefully confront the Mubarak regime, and they appreciated that 
ElBaradei’s political stature didn’t prevent him from engaging with Egypt’s pro-
democratic protest movements.  “If you organize anything against the regime, like 
Kefaya, [you’ll] get arrested.  So the Wafd party until now did not participate in street 
movements,” Iglal Rafit, a member of the Wafd’s high committee, told me during a July 
2010 interview.  “But I am sympathetic to them, and I support ElBaradei’s movement.  
And I think ElBaradei movement may unify the street movement and the youth 
movement, and I joined it already.”806  Indeed, ElBaradei drew considerable support 
among the Wafd’s younger members807, as well as within the Tagammu Party, whose 
politburo urged chairman Rifaat al-Said to engage him.808 
Predictably, however, these legal opposition parties ultimately refused to unify 
with ElBaradei’s cause.  Then-Wafd chairman Mahmoud Abaza rejected calls to put 
ElBaradei on the high committee, which would have given ElBaradei an avenue through 
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which he could run for the presidency, and Tagammu’s al-Said also kept his distance, 
issuing a party decree that forbade his members from supporting ElBaradei.809   
The parties’ rejection of ElBaradei was partly because of their tendency to look 
skeptically on the suddenly exciting trend of the day.  As previously noted in Chapter 3, 
these opposition party leaders resented ElBaradei’s sudden emergence as Egypt’s knight 
in shining armor, especially given the many years that – in their views – they had 
dedicated to working for (barely perceptible) change within Mubarak’s regime.  “We 
believe that we can open a breach in this atmosphere and give people hope that one day it 
will change through democratic elections if they mobilize around an alternative, which is 
the essence of democracy,” Wafd vice-chair Yasin Tag el-Din told me during a July 2010 
interview.  “We succeeded partially.  All of these protest movements would not exist 
without us as an alternative.  This is how we have ElBaradei and Kefaya.”810 
But for the activists who joined ElBaradei’s cause, these parties’ refusal to engage 
ElBaradei confirmed what they had concluded long ago: the legalized opposition parties 
were trapped in a fundamentally autocratic system, adhering to “red lines” that made 
them incapable of promoting democratic change.  The parties’ distancing from ElBaradei  
seemed calculated to appease the Mubarak regime, which throughout the spring and 
summer of 2010 continued tarring ElBaradei through the state-run media, as well as 
through a vicious Internet smear campaign.811  And as the November 2010 parliamentary 
elections approached, top opposition party leaders seemingly believed that maintaining 
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distance from ElBaradei would help them win seats in what they knew would be a 
heavily manipulated election.  “My sense is that the government wants Wafd to be a 
substitute for ElBaradei and the Muslim Brotherhood,” said Wafd high committee 
member Ahmed Ezzelarab in July 2010.  “It fears ElBaradei, and nothing shook them 
more than ElBaradei’s appearance.  So they’re being nice to Wafd.”812 
Yet by the autumn of 2010, the ElBaradei phenomenon had faded.  The regime’s 
smear campaign against him, combined with the absence of any political route through 
which ElBaradei could legally run for president, undoubtedly contributed to his downfall 
in public opinion. ElBaradei had made tactical mistakes:  despite his promise to work for 
democratic change in his native country, he had continued to spend roughly fifty percent 
of his time abroad, and when in Egypt he typically retreated to his gated suburban villa, 
where he gave interviews to foreign media, seemingly uneasy with large crowds during 
his few public appearances.813  He maintained a hands-off approach regarding the NAC, 
signaling to his followers that he was not interested in “doing the dirty work” of 
mobilizing people.814  Without his leadership, internal squabbles hampered the NAC’s 
campaign of getting one million signatures for ElBaradei’s seven-point petition.815   
Nonetheless ElBaradei gave Egypt’s largely unorganized, pro-democratic activists 
another focal point around which they could coalesce and cooperate.  Like Kefaya, 
Ayman Nour’s Ghad party, and the April 6th Youth Movement, the NAC was essentially 
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another mechanism through which mostly young activists learned about political 
organizing – all while avoiding the legal parties that the Mubarak regime had permitted 
for the exclusive purpose of trapping this kind of opposition activity. 
c. Summer Before the Storm 
 On June 6, 2010, police officers grabbed twenty-eight-year-old Khaled Said from 
inside an Alexandria Internet café, and beat him to death as horrified pedestrians looked 
on.  Images of Said’s severely mangled face, with its torn lip and dislocated jaw, went 
viral two days later, when Ayman Nour posted them to his Facebook account.816  In the 
days that followed, activists soon constructed a YouTube video that contrasted the image 
of Said’s bloodied corpse with the now iconic passport of photo him, with his hear gelled 
and wearing a hoodie, which circulated rapidly as well.817   
Police violence was hardly new to Egypt, and activists had circulated photos and 
videos of officers assaulting political prisoners before.  But the killing of Khaled Said 
was different in one important respect: whereas the victims of police violence were 
typically from the lower income classes and Islamist, Khaled Said was middle class and, 
by all accounts, not religious.818  In turn, many middle and upper class Egyptians viewed 
Said as someone who, but for the grace of god, could have been “their son.”819 
In the immediate aftermath of Said’s killing, Google employee Wael Ghonim, 
who had previously operated a pro-ElBaradei Facebook group, created a Facebook group 
titled, “We Are All Khaled Said,” and he asked pro-ElBaradei blogger and former 
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Muslim Brother820 AbdelRahman Mansour to join him as co-administrator.  Within days, 
over 100,000 people had joined the group.  “We Are All Khaled Said” quickly surpassed 
ElBaradei’s Facebook page as the foremost clearinghouse for information on opposition 
activities, and it additionally became a forum for organizing protests that focused 
squarely on combatting police brutality in Egypt.821  Activists from April 6th and other, 
smaller movements contributed to these efforts: they communicated regularly with the 
two “We Are All Khaled Said” administrators, who remained anonymous until after the 
January 2011 revolt, and mobilized their respective colleagues to Said-related protests.822 
The first of these protests occurred approximately one week after the images of 
Said spread.  Activists gathered along the Nile Corniche in Cairo and the Mediterranean 
Corniche in Alexandria, where they wore black, stood in a long line with each activist at 
a short distance from the next, and remained silent.823  This protest strategy aimed to 
circumvent the emergency laws and remove any rationale for police intervention, since 
“there was no actual ‘protest’ for the police to break up – just people standing at least five 
meters apart looking at the water, some of them reading the Qur’an or Bible.”824  Then, 
on June 25, “We Are All Khaled Said” called a rally in Alexandria that over 4000 
activists attended, including ElBaradei, who briefly addressed the crowd after visiting 
Said’s mother.825 
While the Said-related protests were the most prominent opposition activity in the 
final summer of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, there were other signs of rising activist 
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mobilization.  In July, after three months of preparation, a group of socialist youths 
established the Justice and Freedom Youth Movement (JFYM), which worked to 
organize laborers and farmers against the regime while campaigning for a number of 
economic demands, including higher salaries and educational improvement.826  Many of 
its leaders had previously participated in April 6th and the ElBaradei campaign, but 
disagreed with the former’s policy of receiving political training from foreign NGOs, and 
also wanted to place economic concerns front and center.  To protect itself from State 
Security infiltration, JFYM developed a leadership structure in which the leaders of its 
twenty subsidiary groups would be directly involved in planning protest activities, and 
would not disclose these plans to their subordinate group members until two hours before 
a protest commenced.827    
At approximately the same time, other leftist groups – such as the unlicensed 
Karama Party, led by Nasserist Party breakaway Hamdeen Sabahi, and Socialist Renewal 
– became more politically active.828  Throughout the summer and autumn, they held 
scattered protests and refused State Security’s attempts to co-opt or contain them.  
Meanwhile, the Democratic Front Party (DFP), a small PPC-licensed party founded in 
2006 by former NDP Shura Council member Osama al-Ghazali Harb, broke with other 
legal opposition parties in declaring its support for ElBaradei and boycotting the 2010 
parliamentary elections.829 
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As previously noted, the 2010 parliamentary elections were considered the 
biggest forgery in contemporary Egyptian history: the NDP won over 90 percent of the 
seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s representation shrunk from 88 to 1.  In response, 
youth activists in April 6th, JFYM, the NAC, and Ayman Nour’s Ghad party organized a 
“popular parliament,” which ultimately included over 100 former MPs and prominent 
opposition figures from across Egypt’s political aisle.830  Predictably, the legal opposition 
parties such as Wafd and Tagammu, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, kept their 
distance, though individual Muslim Brothers participated without their parent 
organization’s approval. 
III. On the Brink Without Knowing It 
Given the revolution that would unseat him only a few months later, Mubarak’s 
response to the “popular parliament” now lives in infamy: “Let them entertain 
themselves,” he told the newly seated People’s Assembly on December 19, 2010.831  Yet 
despite the noticeable upsurge in opposition activity throughout the previous decade, and 
particularly during that year, Mubarak’s confidence was hardly surprising.  In fact, those 
who studied Egyptian politics and had spent much time in the country broadly shared 
Mubarak’s view of his durability, myself included.   
As I saw matters on the eve of Egypt’s anti-Mubarak uprising, the formal 
opposition parties were trapped within an unwinnable system and infiltrated by State 
Security, while all untrapped parties – such as Ayman Nour’s Ghad party, or the newly 
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formed DFP – had been excluded from power.  Meanwhile, the regime’s brutal 
crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood had forced it to act cautiously, effectively 
making it as supine as the Wafd and Tagammu parties.  The plethora of youth-oriented 
protest movements remained mostly small and ideologically divided, with only a handful 
of their demonstrations ever attracting more than a few hundred people.  Hundreds of 
thousands of people might “join” the Khaled Said Facebook group from the comfort of 
their homes, I reasoned, but that was substantively different from risking one’s personal 
safety in street protests.  And as of January 24, 2011, there was little evidence that 
Egyptians – no matter how politically frustrated they claimed to be – were willing to 
make that leap. 
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Chapter 7 
A Revolutionary Coalition versus Non-Revolutionary Parties 
 
 On January 14, 2011, Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi 
Arabia after four weeks of mass protests, thereby ending his twenty-four-year autocratic 
rule.  For the mostly young Egyptian activists who had been demonstrating against the 
Mubarak regime for nearly a decade, Ben Ali’s ouster signified that the same outcome 
could be repeated at home.  “What happened in Tunisia is a model,” Amir Salah, an 
activist affiliated with the Democratic Front Party (DFP) told me during an interview the 
following day. “It shows that can we can do it.”832 
 In the eleven days that followed Tunisia’s toppling of Ben Ali, a loose coalition of 
mostly young Egyptian activists planned a series of protests that – they hoped – would 
bring the masses into the streets to challenge Mubarak.  Their protest strategy built on 
experiences that they had accrued over the course of the previous decade in a variety of 
opposition movements, and at the heart of this strategy was a series of tactics designed to 
circumvent State Security and the Interior Ministry’s notoriously violent Central Security 
Forces (CSF).  This desire to avoid being trapped or contained by the regime contrasted 
sharply with Egypt’s legal opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, which resisted 
internal calls to participate in the protests and stood on the sidelines as Egypt’s uprising 
commenced. 
I. Planning the Uprising 
 In 2009, President Mubarak declared January 25 National Police Day.  Though 
the holiday ostensibly commemorated the deaths of 41 Egyptian police who died during a 
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1952 battle with British forces in Ismailia, Egypt’s pro-democratic activists viewed 
Police Day as a propaganda effort to distract attention from the Interior Ministry’s 
brutality.833  For this reason, the April 6th Youth Movement, among other activist groups, 
staged annual protests on Police Day against police brutality, though – like most of their 
protests – these demonstrations rarely attracted more than a few dozen participants.834 
a. A Loose Coalition Coalesces 
 The spike in protest activity during the second half of 2010, however, brought 
Egypt’s pro-democratic activists in more regular contact with each other than ever before.  
The activists mingled at demonstrations, debated each other in cafes, and continued their 
conversations on the Internet, particularly via the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook 
page, which posed open questions as a way to stimulate dialogue.  As Police Day 2011 
approached, April 6th thus found itself with a broader activist community on which it 
could rely for boosting turnout at its annual anti-police protest.835  These plans began on 
December 30, 2010, when the anonymous administrator of the “Khaled Said” Facebook 
page e-mailed April 6th leader Ahmed Maher about holding a massive demonstration on 
January 25, promising that the page could be used to “energize people to participate.”836   
Other developments, however, kept Egypt’s activists energized in the interim.  On 
January 1, 2011, the Two Saints Church in Alexandria was bombed in an attack that 
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killed 23 people and injured 97 others.837  While the Mubarak regime blamed foreign 
Islamic terrorists for the attack, activists responded by blaming Egypt’s police for failing 
to protect the country, and organized human chains to guard churches on Coptic 
Christmas, which fell the following week.  Then, on January 4, Alexandria police 
tortured 31-year-old Salafist Sayed Bilal to death while investigating the church 
bombing, and a loose coalition of Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist, liberal, and leftist youth 
activists responded with a series of small protests, including a mini-mock funeral in 
downtown Cairo.838   
It was within this context that activists from April 6th, the socialist Justice and 
Freedom Youth Movement (JFYM), ElBaradei’s National Association for Change 
(NAC), and the liberal Democratic Front Party (DFP) began planning for larger-than-
usual Police Day demonstrations, holding meetings at the Social Renewal Trend’s 
headquarters in downtown Cairo.839  The discussions, however, remained general: the 
attending groups agreed to mobilize their followers on January 25, but they were 
conveying their respective plans to the “Khaled Said” Facebook administrators separately 
rather than coordinating with each other.840  This changed on January 15, the day 
following Ben Ali’s abdication, when four groups – April 6th, JFYM, the NAC, and the 
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DFP – decided to unify their plans.  Two days later, on January 17, these groups held 
their first meeting to coordinate activities for the January 25 protests.841   
From January 17-19, these activists communicated with each other regularly, and 
starting on January 20 they held daily meetings in downtown Cairo to plan a unified 
strategy for the protests.  Throughout this period, the activists shared their plans with the 
still-anonymous administrators of the “Khaled Said” Facebook page, who played a 
critical role in publicizing protest locations as the date approached.842  Activists also 
liaised with Egypt’s pro-democratic NGO community, including the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights and the Hisham Mubarak Law Center.  In the days 
leading up to the January 25 protests, these institutions held trainings on how to protest 
peacefully, as well as how to deal with the police if protesters were arrested.843 
While the Muslim Brotherhood did not officially participate in planning the 
protests – as I will discuss shortly, the Brotherhood’s senior leadership kept a studious 
distance – Muslim Brotherhood youths became involved independently.  These youth 
activists had gotten to know their non-Islamist counterparts through the various protest 
activities of the previous decade, and they shared the non-Islamists’ goal of protesting 
police brutality and calling for Mubarak’s ouster.  Prominent Brotherhood youth 
Mohamed Abbas thus joined the emerging activist coalition as it was taking shape in the 
days immediately following Ben Ali’s ouster in Tunisia.  To drum up support among his 
Brotherhood colleagues, Abbas founded a Facebook group called “Kalimat Haq,” 
meaning “right words” in Arabic, which became an online forum for Brotherhood youths 
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who would ultimately participate in the January 25 demonstrations.844  By January 22, 
more Muslim Brotherhood youths had joined the activist coalition, and they gathered 
their local Brotherhood youth colleagues to participate in the demonstrations.845 
While the core organizers of the January 25 protests came from five groups – 
April 6th, ElBaradei’s NAC, the DFP, JFYM, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s youth wing 
– it should be emphasized that other organizations also participated in the January 25 
demonstrations apart from this coalition.  In this vein, though Ayman Nour’s faction of 
the Ghad party sent a representative to the coalition’s first meeting on January 17, it 
ultimately planned its own protest activities, much of which seemingly aimed to position 
Nour as a post-Mubarak leader.846  Thus, on Saturday night January 22, Ayman Nour 
held a press conference at the Ghad party’s downtown headquarters, which had been 
reconfigured to look like a parliament so as to make Nour’s podium look like that of a 
president.  During his speech, Nour bluntly called on Mubarak to step down, and the 
speech was widely circulated on YouTube during the next three days.847  Then on 
January 25, Nour led his own protest from Bab al-Shaariya, the Cairo neighborhood that 
he had represented in parliament from 1995-2005.848 
The Nasserist Karama Party, which – like Nour’s Ghad party – had been denied a 
party license by the PPC, similarly held its own activities.  Karama Chairman Hamdeen 
Sabahi, an outspoken former Nasserist Party MP who had been arrested during the 2003 
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protests against the Iraq war, tweeted on January 19 that his supporters should join the 
nationwide protests on January 25.  Sabahi ultimately went to his hometown in the rural 
Kafr Sheikh governorate to participate in the demonstrations, and Karama also organized 
regular demonstrations in front of the Tunisian Embassy in Cairo in the week leading up 
to the January 25 protests. 849  Youth activists from the Wafd party also made their own 
arrangements for participating in the demonstrations as the date approached – doing so 
independently from the larger coalition and, as I will discuss shortly, without the Wafd 
party’s approval.850 
While these groups’ contributions to the January 25 demonstrations are 
noteworthy, they are not sufficient to explaining the success of those demonstrations in 
jump-starting Egypt’s popular uprising and Mubarak’s ouster.  Indeed, the key to the 
demonstrations’ success lies in the brilliant strategy that the coalition of activists devised 
for bringing the masses into the street and overwhelming the security forces that had kept 
opposition activity so trapped for so long. 
b. The Strategy 
 The coalition’s strategy for the January 25 demonstrations focused on two 
components.  The first component, which received far more attention in international 
media accounts of Egypt’s uprising, involved the heavy use of Internet-based social 
networking services, such as Facebook and Twitter, for “inviting” people to the 
demonstrations, announcing major protest sites, and gathering e-mail addresses to keep 
potential supporters more directly informed.  The primary vehicle for this was the 
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“Khaled Said” Facebook page, whose administrators communicated anonymously with 
the coalition until their identities were revealed during the latter stages of the uprising.851  
Moreover, individual protesters used their personal Facebook pages to inform their 
“friends” of the protests, and in many cases replaced their Facebook profile photos with 
icons that advertised the forthcoming protests.852 
 Yet given their years of experience, the activists knew that Facebook and Twitter 
posts were hardly sufficient to launching mass protests.  For starters, the activists’ social 
networking presence made them vulnerable to State Security, which monitored their 
accounts and often arrested activists as announced demonstrations approached.  But more 
importantly, they knew that any central protest sites that they announced on Facebook 
and Twitter would be preemptively surrounded by CSF and inundated with undercover 
State Security agents, which often included hired thugs who were paid by the regime to 
beat protesters.  The activists tried to hamper the regime’s response by not announcing 
the sites of their protests on social media networks until the evening of January 24, but 
they knew that CSF and State Security would be on high alert, and therefore ready to 
mobilize as soon as the locations were publicized.853 
 The second component of the activists’ strategy thus aimed to overcome the 
pitfalls associated with relying too heavily on social media networks.  Knowing that the 
regime’s police would surround all publicly announced locations, the activists developed 
an intricate ground mobilization plan through which they hoped to gather hundreds of 
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demonstrators before arriving at the known protests sites, so that they could overwhelm 
the police at those points and push forward towards Tahrir Square, converging from 
multiple directions if possible.  April 6th leaders Amr Ezz and Mahmoud Sami began 
working on this plan one month before the January 25 protests, and they dubbed it the 
“snowball” operation, because of the way in which it was designed to ensure that the 
crowds swelled as they reached the protest sites that were announced on the Internet.854 
The “snowball” strategy built on two key lessons that the activists had learned 
during years of failed attempts at assembling mass protests.  First, while the police were 
typically well prepared for quelling protests that took place in major public squares, they 
were rarely prepared for demonstrations emanating from “shaaby” – implying working 
class – neighborhoods. “When Israel attacked Lebanon [in 2006], they stopped us from 
protesting in public places,” said Karama activist Hossam Moones.  “So people went to 
shaaby places.”855  Demonstrations in shaaby areas were not only less expected – they 
were also harder for the police to contain even after they were discovered, because rather 
than converging on central locations, activists would zigzag through narrow streets, 
forcing the police to give chase and therefore making a bigger spectacle.856  
 The second lesson that the activists incorporated into their January 25 strategy 
was the value of emphasizing economic grievances rather than political ones.  They had 
learned this from their experiences in shaaby neighborhoods: the activists attracted more 
interest from onlookers when they marched for lower prices than when they chanted for 
regime change.  Moreover, by emphasizing economic grievances rather political ones, the 
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activists found that they were less likely to be imprisoned, since the regime could not 
accuse them of trying to launch a coup.  In turn, April 6th began spreading leaflets 
advocating minimum wage raises approximately one month before the January 25 
demonstrations, and this work intensified in the week leading up to the protests.857 
 The final plan was thus as follows.  On the morning of January 25, top coalition 
members would begin marching with about fifty of their colleagues from secret locations 
near the outskirts of Cairo.858  To ensure that these starting points were kept secret, only 
three top activists participated in picking the locations, which were finalized on January 
23, and they did not share them with the other coalition leaders until the evening of 
January 24 – and only through face-to-face communication.859  Meanwhile, lower level 
activists weren’t informed of the starting points until the morning of January 25, though 
they had been told in advance to be prepared for receiving marching orders.   
From these initial starting points, the processions would zigzag through nearby 
shaaby neighborhoods, chanting economic slogans and calling ordinary, working class 
Egyptians into the streets.  Their destinations were the various protest sites that had been 
announced online.  As they approached these protest sites, the leading activists would 
text message subordinate members of their respective organizations to meet their 
processions at specific locations along the way, thereby ensuring that the processions 
snowballed as they approached the main protest locations, which they knew would be 
surrounded by police.860  If all went according to plan, the activists hoped to overwhelm 
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the police at these locations and push on towards Tahrir Square, which they hoped to 
occupy.861 
On the evening before the protests, the various members of the activist coalition 
divided up the routes that a smaller committee had cased and finalized during the 
previous few days.862 One route began in Shobra, a neighborhood just north of downtown 
Cairo, and was set to converge with a protest at the central square of Dawaran, which was 
listed on the “Khaled Said” Facebook page; its participants included April 6th, Hamdeen 
Sabahi’s Karama Party, and the Revolutionary Socialists, as well as various Christian 
activists and former MP Rami Lekah.863  A second route began on Nahia Street in Giza, 
the governorate just west of Cairo, and was set to converge with a protest that the 
“Khaled Said” page had announced at Gamaat al-Dowal al-Arabia Square; its participants 
included the DFP, JFYM, and ElBaradei’s NAC, as well as local members from the April 
6th Movement and Muslim Brotherhood Youth.864  A third protest march began in 
Imbaba, a lower income community in northern Giza along the Nile, and included local 
April 6th activists, members of ElBaradei’s NAC, revolutionary socialists, and 
independent activists.865  A fourth protest, which JFYM led, began in northern Cairo’s 
Matariya neighborhood, and a fifth demonstration, led by Ayman Nour’s Ghad Party, 
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emanated from Bab al-Shaariya, a neighborhood just northeast of downtown Cairo.866  
Finally, the “popular parliament,” which was comprised of former opposition 
parliamentarians and well-known anti-Mubarak intellectuals, planned to meet at 1 PM on 
the steps of the Court of Appeals.867  All of these demonstrations had one aim: gaining 
enough strength to overwhelm the police at the points that had been declared on the 
“Khaled Said” Facebook page, and then proceed towards Tahrir Square.868 
 Despite their intensive planning, the coalition of activists kept their expectations 
low.  “Nobody expected [a revolution],” said April 6th leader Ahmed Maher.  “Each year 
[on Police Day] we had 1000 people.  A ‘big’ demonstration would have been 3000 
people – 5000 maximum.”869  The activists thus made only modest plans for occupying 
Tahrir Square.  As JFYM leader Mustafa Shawqi told a counterpart who was trying to 
move tents and blankets to locations around Tahrir Square in anticipation of a prolonged 
sit-in, “Don’t worry about this.  We won’t sit in unless we get 5000 – and we won’t.”870 
II. The Trapped Stay Trapped, The Cornered Stay Cautious 
Despite the activists’ modest expectations, revolutionary chatter intensified on 
Egypt’s social networks and streets alike as the January 25 demonstrations approached.  
Though few predicted that a revolution was afoot, there was the widespread belief that 
the forthcoming demonstrations would be large, and even the younger members of 
Egypt’s trapped opposition parties and the cornered Muslim Brotherhood urged their 
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parent organizations to participate.  These organizations were thus confronted with a 
major dilemma – and their responses provide the firmest evidence that, on the eve of 
Mubarak’s demise, they were still too co-opted or afraid to cross Mubarak’s “red lines.” 
a. Inside the Tagammu Party 
 On January 22, I visited the Tagammu Party headquarters in downtown Cairo to 
interview politburo leader Magdy Sharabiyah.  The mass demonstrations that would 
catalyze Mubarak’s ouster were only three days away, but you would have never known 
it from within the offices of Egypt’s oldest left-wing opposition party.  In fact, the hand-
drawn posters on the walls commemorated the 34th anniversary of a very different 
“revolution” – the January 1977 Bread Riots, in which Tagammu had played a leading 
role.  Indeed, Tagammu’s days as an outspoken regime opponent were a thing of the past.  
“We won’t participate in the [upcoming January 25] demonstrations,” Sharabiyah told 
me, “because this date is when the police stood in 1952 against the British occupation.”871 
 That same day, the Tagammu Party debated its approach towards the January 25 
demonstrations more fully during its regular Central Secretariat meeting.  Youth activists 
invited the party to join the protests, but Tagammu chairman Rifaat al-Said objected, 
telling the party leadership, “It’s silly to participate on this day.”  While the other leaders 
objected to his use of the word “silly,” they agreed that it was too insulting to the regime 
to protest against it on Police Day.872  “It was a long discussion about the fact that Police 
Day is not police day for the police of [Mubarak’s Interior Minister] Habib al-Adly, but 
police day for the police who stood against the British occupation,” recalled Tagammu 
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youth leader Khaled Telema.  “So it was not fair to pick this day.”873  As a result, the 
Central Secretariat voted not to participate, though the party permitted its members to 
participate as individuals – in other words, “not under the party’s name.”874   
In a press statement, chairman al-Said emphasized his view that January 25 was 
an inappropriate day to protest the regime.  He argued that Police Day was meant to 
“honor the police and celebrate the important role of the police forces that spared no 
effort in the defense of the homeland and its citizens, to ensure a secure life for all 
Egyptians.”875  Coming on the heels of mounting popular outrage regarding police 
brutality, as well as the Interior Ministry’s failure to prevent the bombing of the Two 
Saints Church in Alexandria only three weeks prior, al-Said’s compliment to the police 
was remarkable – and a firm indication that he had long ceased behaving as a critic, let 
alone an opponent, of the Mubarak regime. 
b. Inside the Wafd Party 
 Whereas the Tagammu Party’s leaders still viewed themselves as opposition 
activists on account of their involvement in the 1977 Bread Riots, the Wafd’s leaders told 
themselves a very different story.  They viewed themselves as members of an historic 
opposition party whose soft approach toward the regime was a short-term survival 
mechanism that would enable the Wafd to fully reemerge once the Mubarak regime 
liberalized or fell.  The Wafd therefore viewed participating in protests as too risky for a 
party with its long-term aspirations.  “They’re like forest fires,” said Wafdist high 
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committee member Sherif Taher on January 19.   “You don’t know where they start and 
you don’t know where they end.  And politicians can’t get involved in that.”876 
 Still, in the aftermath of the November 2010 parliamentary elections, in which the 
Wafd’s hope for massive gains fell to pieces, there was considerable displeasure within 
the party – particularly among the younger members, who wanted the party to oppose the 
regime more aggressively.877  During the previous decade, Wafdist youths frequently 
bucked the party’s conservative leadership to participate in protests, through which they 
had become acquainted with the opposition activists who were organizing the January 25 
demonstrations, and many Wafdist youths also supported ElBaradei’s NAC.878  Thus, on 
January 21, the Wafd’s youth committee formally called on their party to join the 
forthcoming anti-Mubarak protests, and the youth committee met with the Wafd’s high 
committee two days later to lobby for the party’s approval.879 
 The January 23 meeting was extremely tense.  The Wafd’s older leaders opposed 
endorsing the demonstrations, viewing them as a fool’s errand that had no chance of 
success.880  The youths responded by attacking the high committee, arguing that the party 
of the 1919 revolution had completely lost its way.  “[Opposition] youth [activists] won’t 
come to the Wafd because the Wafd never has any actions against tyranny,” youth 
representative Mohamed Salah el-Sheikh remembers saying.881  But the Wafd leadership 
still refused: honorary chair Mustafa al-Tawil and vice-chairs Mohamed Sarhan, Yasin 
Tag el-Din, and Fouad Badrawy all opposed, with Badrawy insisting that the Wafd 
                                                           
876 Interview with Sherif Taher, 19 Jan. 2011. 
877 Interview with Mona Makram-Ebeid, 17 Mar. 2011. 
878 Interview with Mohamed Fouad, 16 Mar. 2011. 
879 Interview with Essam Shiha, 23 Jan. 2011; interview with Esraa Abdel Fattah, 6 Mar.2011; interview 
with Hossam el-Kholy, 20 Mar. 2011. 
880 Interview with Mohamed Fouad, 16 Mar. 2011. 
881 Interview with Mohamed Salah el-Sheikh, 12 Mar. 2011. 
 234 
“doesn’t have the people who can start a revolution.”  Meanwhile, Wafd chairman al-
Sayyid al-Badawy was nonresponsive: he was receiving constant calls from the regime to 
deter him from supporting the demonstrations, and presumably felt boxed in.882  This 
outraged the youth committee members in attendance, who responded by demanding that 
the high committee be dissolved.883 
 To break through this impasse, Wafdist secretary-general Mounir Fakhry 
Abdelnour proposed a compromise: the youths could participate under the banner of the 
Wafd Youth, but the greater Wafd party would not participate.  Abdelnour further 
insisted that chairman al-Badawy steer clear of the demonstrations entirely.884  Al-
Badawy accepted this idea, permitting the Wafd’s youth members to march under their 
own “Wafd Youth” banner while establishing a committee to help Wafdists who might 
be arrested during the protests.885  In his subsequent statement to the press, al-Badawy 
thus declared that his members were free to participate in the protests but that they did 
not represent the party.886 
 While the Wafd’s position on the January 25 protests was somewhat more 
supportive than Tagammu’s, its top leaders were ultimately no less committed to toeing 
the regime’s “red lines.”  Indeed, were it not for the aggressive lobbying of the Wafd’s 
youth members, who desperately wanted their party to participate in the protests, it is 
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 235 
highly unlikely that any banners bearing the word “Wafd” would have made their way to 
Tahrir Square.  Moreover, the generational nature of the struggle within the Wafd party 
over the January 25 protests affirms the central argument of this dissertation: that 
Mubarak’s manipulation of Egypt’s opposition parties had successfully trapped his earlier 
(and now older) opponents, but that a new generation of opposition activists who saw 
these parties as “decorative” increasingly circumvented the parties and pursued 
alternative avenues for protesting the regime. 
c. Inside Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s Ghad Party 
 Ayman Nour’s faction of the Ghad party participated very actively in the January 
25 protests: Nour called on Mubarak to step down during a January 22 speech that was 
posted to YouTube, and he personally led a demonstration from Bab al-Shaariya on 
January 25, all of which was consistent with his “untrapped” political track record since 
his 2005 presidential run. But by this point Nour’s faction was an extra-legal entity, since 
the PPC had recognized Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s faction as the official Ghad party 
nearly four years before.  And since Moussa’s faction was overwhelmingly comprised of 
people with close ties to the regime, and was mostly inactive in any event, it was hardly 
surprising that Moussa used the January 25 demonstrations as an opportunity to praise the 
Mubarak regime.  “That the regime allows these protesters to demonstrate in front of the 
Interior Ministry is the greatest indication that there is freedom and democracy in Egypt,” 
he said in a public statement on January 22.887 
d. Inside the Muslim Brotherhood 
                                                           
887 Nadia Mohamed, “3 Opposition Parties Refuse to Participate in the Anger Demonstrations on January 
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 While some leading Muslim Brothers learned of the preparations for the January 
25 protests in early January, the Brotherhood didn’t consider participating until 
approximately one week beforehand.888  By that point, Muslim Brotherhood youth 
member Mohamed Abbas was working informally with the coalition of activists that was 
organizing the demonstrations and, on January 22, he formally joined the coalition’s 
leadership along with three other prominent Brotherhood youths.889  These youths’ direct 
involvement in planning the protests happened without the Guidance Office’s approval, 
though the youths maintained regular communication with top Guidance Office leaders, 
particularly Mohamed Morsi, who oversaw the Brotherhood’s political portfolio; 
Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, who oversaw the Brotherhood’s youth portfolio; and Essam el-
Erian, who was one of the Brotherhood’s media mouthpieces.890  But as January 25 
approached and Muslim Brotherhood youths began receiving constant Facebook 
invitations publicizing the protests, leading Brotherhood youths started lobbying the 
Guidance Office to win the Brotherhood’s formal endorsement.891 
 Thus, on January 22, Brotherhood youth activist Mohamed al-Qassas, who was 
working with the broader activist coalition to plan the forthcoming demonstrations, met 
with Guidance Office leader Abu-Zeid to inquire about the Brotherhood’s position on the 
January 25 protests.  Abu-Zeid told al-Qassas that the Brotherhood would never 
participate because the Guidance Office did not know the activists behind the 
forthcoming protests, and added that the Brotherhood was hesitant to participate in an 
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event that it had not directly organized.  Abu-Zeid further expressed his fear that, if 
Muslim Brothers hoisted Brotherhood banners during the demonstrations, the regime’s 
response would be brutal.892 
 Abu-Zeid’s concerns about how the regime might respond to the Brotherhood’s 
involvement in the January 25 protests were well founded.  On January 20, two days 
before Abu-Zeid’s meeting with al-Qassas, State Security chief Hassan Abdel Rahman 
called the Guidance Office and issued a blunt warning: “Don’t participate in the 
[January] 25th demonstrations,” he said.  “It’s a red line.  We’re going to arrest you 
all.”893  In the days that followed, local State Security officials phoned the Brotherhood’s 
secretary-generals and administrative staff in each governorate, warning that participation 
in the protests would invite mass arrests.894 
 Al-Qassas’ meeting with Abu-Zeid ultimately yielded one concession: the 
Guidance Office announced that Muslim Brothers were permitted to protest on January 
25, so long as they didn’t use Brotherhood signage and didn’t curse the regime.895  But 
this essentially mirrored the Wafd and Tagammu parties’ tactical approaches – members 
could participate as individuals only. 
 Yet unlike the Tagammu Party, the Brotherhood did not issue a principled 
rejection of the January 25 protests.  Indeed, whereas Tagammu chairman Rifaat al-Said 
argued that protesting on Police Day was inappropriate and praised the police for 
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safeguarding Egypt, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie’s January 23 media 
statement harshly criticized the regime’s security services.  Badie explicitly noted that the 
regime “called Brotherhood officials in the governorates and threatened them with 
assault, imprisonment, and violent – and possibly bloody – confrontations,” and urged the 
regime to respond to popular demands for ending corruption “rather than referring all 
important files … to security agencies that only deal through threats, intimidation, arrest, 
torture, imprisonment, and even murder.”  Yet rather than embrace a strategy of protest, 
which he knew would invite a massive crackdown, Badie called for “comprehensive 
national dialogue” for addressing the protesters’ grievances.896 
 The fact that security concerns primarily drove the Brotherhood’s position on the 
January 25 protests is further illustrated by how the Guidance Office dealt with some of 
its more outspoken former parliamentarians.  Some of these parliamentarians, most 
notably Mohamed al-Beltagi, joined the “popular parliament” despite the Guidance 
Office’s misgivings one month before, and they were now pressuring the Guidance 
Office to endorse the demonstrations.  Squeezed between the organization’s internal 
divisions and the regime’s external pressure, the Guidance Office ultimately decided to 
allow a limited number of former Brotherhood parliamentarians to participate in the 
“popular parliament” protest that would be held on the steps of the Court of Appeals on 
January 25.  To ensure that the Brotherhood’s participation was minimal, and thereby 
avoid a major regime crackdown, Guidance Office leader Saad al-Katatny personally 
chose fifteen former parliamentarians who were authorized to join the demonstration.  
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“The popular parliament had 100 people, and we had 88 [former parliamentarians],” 
explained al-Katatny in a subsequent interview.  “So if we participated [in full], we 
would have dominated.”897 
 Indeed, on the eve of the anti-Mubarak revolt, the Muslim Brotherhood wasn’t 
trapped like the legal opposition parties.  It maintained a much more active presence 
nationwide than the parties were permitted, and its criticisms of the regime – including its 
security services – were significantly more aggressive.  But the specter of a brutal 
crackdown kept it contained, and the distance it ultimately kept from the January 25 
protests made it barely distinguishable from the thoroughly coopted parties. 
III. The Eve of Upheaval 
 On the evening before the January 25 protests, I met up with Council on Foreign 
Relations scholar Steven Cook, who was in Egypt leading a policy trip.  Over drinks at 
downtown Cairo’s notoriously libertine Horeya Café, Cook and I agreed that a revolution 
was probably not in the offing.  There were, after all, no signs of internal divisions within 
the Mubarak regime, and therefore little chance of protests fomenting an internal power 
struggle that would threaten Mubarak’s reign.  Not that we expected large protests 
anyway: the various activists behind the protests had never mobilized more than a few 
hundred demonstrators, and the likely security crackdown, we believed, would make 
many Egyptians too afraid to even consider participating.  The fact that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was staying out of it, and the fact that Egypt’s co-opted opposition parties 
were still toeing the regime’s “red lines,” added to our belief that the following day’s 
protests would not become the following month’s coup. 
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 We were wrong. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: Uprising of the Untrapped 
 The January 25, 2011 protests were larger than perhaps anyone – the activists 
included – expected.  After many years of failed attempts at mobilizing the masses, a 
small coalition of relatively young activists succeeded in bringing people into the streets 
by the tens of thousands.  The people who converged on Tahrir Square were not, for the 
most part, members of April 6th or the NAC, nor Muslim Brothers who had bucked the 
Guidance Office’s orders.  They were overwhelmingly ordinary Cairenes – people who 
might not have been willing to risk their personal safety to join a hundreds-strong 
demonstration, but were certainly willing to protest the regime once they saw thousands 
of their countrymen in the streets. 
 Indeed, this is precisely what I witnessed.  At around noon on January 25, I was 
standing in front of the Court of Appeals in downtown Cairo, awaiting the start of the 
demonstrations.  Not much was happening: there was a small demonstration on the steps 
of the Journalists Syndicate around the corner, and perhaps a few hundred people 
gathered in the courtyard of the Lawyers Syndicate just down the street.  But both of 
these demonstrations were surrounded by hundreds of Central Security Forces policemen, 
who prevented the activists from spilling onto the streets.  At about 1 PM, the “popular 
parliament” assembled on the stairs of the Court of Appeals and began chanting anti-
regime slogans, but CSF police soon surrounded this demonstration as well. 
 The situation seemed contained for about thirty minutes.  But at approximately 
1:30 PM, the protest that had started in Shobra suddenly poured into the area, and 
activists began calling on pedestrians to join them in the streets, screaming “enzal!” – 
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“come down!”  It worked: ordinary people entered the procession and it grew rapidly, 
quickly overwhelming the CSF police in the area and liberating the three protests that had 
been trapped at the Court of Appeals, Lawyers Syndicate, and Journalists Syndicate.  The 
still-snowballing procession then pushed swiftly one mile southward towards Tahrir 
Square, easily breaking through police cordons as the suddenly understaffed CSF stood 
down.  Perhaps recognizing that Egypt was witnessing a historical moment, a CSF officer 
stationed in the Square whipped out his cell phone and snapped a photo.  Within hours, 
Tahrir Square was packed with people, many of whom were first-time protesters.898 
 This was precisely what the Mubarak regime had long worked to prevent.  The 
legal opposition parties that it co-opted through political patronage were forbidden from 
holding street protests, and the regime had further cut them off from the public by 
confining their activities to their gated headquarters and making them dependent on the 
regime for winning parliamentary seats.  Those opposition parties that rejected this 
bargain were destroyed from within by State Security’s manipulations, as in the case of 
Ayman Nour’s Ghad party.  Those opposition groups that could not be coopted through 
political patronage, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were deterred from popular 
mobilization through heavy-handed crackdowns. 
 This strategy had served the Mubarak regime well for approximately three 
decades, which is why the Mubarak regime was frequently given a starring role in the 
political science literature on “durable authoritarianism.”899  But as the January 25, 2011 
demonstrations revealed, the use of formally democratic institutions to trap some 
                                                           
898 Eric Trager, “Scenes from Egypt’s Would-Be Revolution,” The Atlantic (25 Jan. 2011): 
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opponents, and repression to contain others, could not work forever.  How did studies of 
“durable authoritarianism” fail to foresee the Mubarak regime’s apparent vulnerability? 
 Scholars failed to anticipate Mubarak’s fall in Egypt for two reasons.  First, they 
were looking for the possible sources of regime breakdown in the wrong places.  The 
literature on third-wave political transitions emphasizes intra-regime splits as the cause of 
regime breakdowns,900 and studies of durable authoritarianism thus viewed the 
cohesiveness ruling parties as vital to explaining regimes’ durability.901  Meanwhile, 
other studies emphasized the role of periodic parliamentary elections in distributing 
political patronage, particularly to well-connected elites and lower-level ruling party 
members.902  As Tarek Masoud acknowledged shortly after Egypt’s 2011 uprising with 
respect to these two factors: 
Both of these institutions were supposed to forestall elite conflict – the former by 
providing a forum for dispute resolution among the regime’s core supporters, the latter 
by offering a means for the regime to distribute the fruit of corruption among those 
supporters without having to pick winners and losers itself.903 
 
Oppositionists, however, sparked Egypt’s uprising.  And contrary to third-wave 
transitions studies in which regime “moderates” ultimately join the opposition once a 
regime weakens,904 no NDP leaders or prominent Mubarak regime officials embraced the 
opposition, let alone joined the revolt.  
Yet even those studies of “durable authoritarianism” that examined oppositionists 
failed to anticipate regime breakdown.  While these works cogently explained how 
formally democratic institutions, such as parliamentary elections and opposition parties, 
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could be manipulated to “trap” opponents in the regimes’ autocratic structures and 
thereby enhance regime durability,905 they often overlooked those opposition actors that 
had not been trapped or, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, brutally repressed into 
submission.906  My initial research design for his dissertation contained this same 
oversight: by only interviewing leaders from the Tagammu, Wafd, and Ghad parties, as 
well as the Muslim Brotherhood, I ignored the key drivers of political change in Egypt – 
the revolutionary youth activists – until after Mubarak’s ouster.    
The fact that studies of “durable authoritarianism” looked for catalysts of regime 
breakdown in all the wrong places suggests that these studies examined autocratically 
ruled countries far too narrowly.  By focusing on the regimes’ ability to coopt elites, 
including both those within the regime itself and legalized opposition parties, these 
studies ignored the broader societal factors that have historically given rise to revolts.  
These include the prevalence of economic or political grievances907; the perceived 
illegitimacy of the regime908; and the emergence of revolutionary movements, often as a 
result of the previous two factors.909  By contrast, empirically-focused accounts of Egypt 
in the years preceding Mubarak’s ouster were often more attentive to rising societal 
discontent and the emergence of new protest movements, and acknowledged these as a 
possible catalyst for regime instability.910 
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Second, scholars failed to anticipate Mubarak’s ouster because they ignored the 
fact that electoral authoritarian institutions need credibility in order to keep potential 
oppositionists within them.  While many studies of “durable authoritarianism” correctly 
viewed the formally democratic institutions that persisted under autocratic conditions as 
facades,911 few recognized the extent to which this might deter oppositionists from 
participating in these institutions, especially in the long run.   
Yet that is exactly what happened in Egypt.  By the eve of Mubarak’s ouster, 
Egypt’s parliamentary elections and the severely coopted parties that participated in them 
were widely viewed as frauds, which is why a new generation of oppositionists 
deliberately avoided these institutions and sought new – and ultimately more effective – 
means for confronting the regime.  The electoral authoritarian institutions, in a certain 
sense, contained the seeds of their own destruction: because these institutions are by 
definition unwinnable for the opposition and therefore fraudulent, they are unlikely to 
keep the regimes’ opponents within them indefinitely. 
 That is not to say that all electoral authoritarian regimes are destined for 
Mubarak’s fate.  Much depends on the extent to which these regimes make policy 
concessions to their opposition parties, distribute spoils, and demonstrate their 
willingness to compromise with opponents.912  Regimes can also enhance their durability 
through constant “electoral engineering” that favors the autocratic incumbents.913  But the 
unresolvable tension between regimes’ need to manipulate formally democratic 
institutions to coopt their opponents on one hand, and regimes’ need to make these 
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institutions appear relatively credible so that oppositionists participate in them on the 
other, means that electoral authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to sudden 
breakdown than the academic literature recognizes. 
 Yet despite the vulnerability of electoral authoritarian regimes, the severely 
coopted parties that participate in these regimes’ institutions are, indeed, quite durable.  
After all, the Tagammu and Wafd parties survived Mubarak’s ouster and continue to run 
parliamentary candidates, publish newspapers, and participate in public debates on key 
political developments – despite still not having any realistic chance of achieving power.  
Previous studies of opposition parties under authoritarianism, which view these parties as 
patronage-seeking,914 did not anticipate that these parties would continue to exist and 
compete electorally even when there is no patronage to be gained.  Nor do I find 
convincing notion that these parties continue participating in unwinnable elections 
because they want “to show that they [are] motivated by higher principles, that power [is] 
not their ultimate concern.”915  While looking like a martyr might increase an opposition 
party’s popular appeal under autocratic rule, losing relatively free elections after an 
autocrat’s ouster has the opposite effect: it affirms for many that the party is a loser, 
which will not be the motivation for a party’s continued existence. 
 This dissertation has thus proposed another explanation for why people stay in 
opposition parties under authoritarianism: because these parties are effectively social 
clubs of similar people.  As I have demonstrated, the Tagammu Party’s leadership is 
overwhelmingly comprised of former communist activists from the 1960s and 1970s, 
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who have worked together continuously, albeit unsuccessfully, for nearly four decades to 
promote socialist political ideas in Egypt.  The Wafd Party’s leadership is 
overwhelmingly comprised of descendants from the original, elite Wafd leadership of the 
pre-1952 era, who sometimes even refer to themselves as coming from the Wafd’s major 
“families.”916  This explanation, of course, is not mutually exclusive with those that 
examine these party members’ interest in political patronage or desire to demonstrate 
their commitment to “higher principles” than winning in the context of authoritarian rule.  
But it does explain why these parties might continue to function even after autocratic rule 
ends, when these previous explanations are no longer valid. 
 In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, only those parties that were entirely regime 
creations, such as Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s Ghad party, faded away.  Meanwhile, the 
Muslim Brotherhood emerged as Egypt’s new ruling party – and for reasons that this 
dissertation research anticipated917: despite the Mubarak regime’s brutal repression 
against it, the Muslim Brotherhood remained the only party, other than the NDP, with a 
truly national organization that could effectively mobilize voters to win elections.  The 
NDP’s illegalization following the 2011 uprising, and subsequent changes to the electoral 
system that widened electoral districts and thus diluted the support of former NDP 
parliamentarians, granted the Brotherhood an unprecedented opportunity to seize the 
political momentum.  And it did, winning a 47-percent-seat plurality in the first post-
Mubarak parliamentary elections and, in June 2012, the presidential elections. 
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 Yet despite the Brotherhood’s tremendous political strength, its priority on 
organizational integrity – and the Mubarak regime’s credible threat to arrest its leaders if 
it participated in the January 25, 2011 demonstrations – prevented it from starting the 
very uprising from which it is now benefitting.  That task fell to a new generation of 
opposition activists, who developed new strategies for organizing protests during the final 
decade of Mubarak’s rule.  These activists refused to be trapped in the Mubarak regime’s 
electoral authoritarian institutions, which they viewed as fake.  They were also far more 
willing than the Muslim Brotherhood to accept the risks of organizing revolutionary 
protests because the looseness of their coalitions made them less concerned about 
organizational integrity.  While various economic and political grievances contributed to 
Egypt’s 2011 uprising, these grievances were relatively constant for many years, and 
might have still been simmering were it not for the work of the revolutionary activists in 
sparking the revolt. 
 Much as few predicted the January 2011 uprising, few can predict what will 
happen next in Egypt, where the revolution is still percolating at the time of this writing.  
Impending economic calamity threatens the Brotherhood’s electoral gains, and 
revolutionary activists are now battling Brotherhood cadres in the streets, while non-
Islamist political parties battle the Brotherhood through both the press and ballot boxes.  
Meanwhile, the Egyptian military – which ruled the country for the first sixteen months 
following Mubarak’s ouster – retains an ambiguous position, and further chaos may 
encourage it to reassert itself politically.  Finally, Salafists have emerged as an entirely 
new political player, and the jihadists within their ranks may ignite further instability in a 
state that appears to be deteriorating. 
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For political scientists, the only way to make sense of these events is to follow 
them as granularly as possible.  An approach that looks too narrowly at the new regime, 
or that only examines the sphere of formal politics, is bound to overlook the key factors 
that will drive Egypt’s trajectory moving forward. 
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Appendix 
List of Interviews 
 
N.B. This list, and the affiliations and titles for each interviewee, reflect the time at which 
the interviews were conducted. 
 
Tagammu Party 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Rifaat al-Said Chairman, Member of Shura 
Council (1996-2011) 
2 Aug. 2010,  
27 Feb. 2011 
Anees al-Baya Vice-Chair 7 Aug. 2010 
Amina al-Niqash Vice-Chair 10 Jan. 2011 
Samir Fayyad Vice-Chair 3 Aug. 2010 
Sayyid Abdel Ael Secretary-General 9 Jan. 2011 
Mohamed Said Assistant Secretary-General for 
Public Works 
8 Aug. 2010,  
12 Jan. 2011 
Farida al-Niqash Politburo Member and Editor-
in-Chief of Al-Ahaly 
11 Aug. 2010 
Abdel Rahman Khayr Politburo Member and Member 
of the Shura Council (2004-
2011) 
5 Jan. 2011 
Nabil Zaki Politburo Member, Spokesman 13 Jan. 2011 
Nabil Abdel-Ghani Politburo Member 9 Jan. 2011 
Gouda Abdel Khalek Politburo Member 6 Jan. 2011 
Atef al-Maghrawi Politburo Member 8 Jan. 2011 
Nabil Atrees Politburo Member 3 Aug. 2010,  
6 Aug. 2010,  
28 Feb. 2011 
Mohamed Farag Politburo Member 9 Jan. 2011 
Al-Badri Farghali Politburo Member 9 Jan. 2011 
Ibrahim el-Issawy Politburo Member 6 Jan. 2011 
Ahmed Shaaban Politburo Member 18 Jan. 2011 
Magdy Sharabiyah Politburo Member 22 Jan. 2011 
Abdel Rashid Helal Central Secretariat Member, 
former MP (2010-2011) 
19 Mar. 2011 
Abdullah Abouel-Fotouh Central Secretariat Member 12 Jan. 2011 
Akram Labib Central Secretariat Member 15 Jan. 2011 
Amad Taha Central Secretariat Member 8 Jan. 2011 
Rafit Saif Presidential Committee 
Member, MP (2010-2011) 
10 Jan. 2011 
Hussein Abdel Raziq Presidential Committee 
Member, former al-Ahaly 
editor-in-chief 
24 Mar. 2011 
Farag Farag Member, Cairo University 27 Jan. 2011 
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Professor 
Abu el-Ezz el-Hariri Former Politburo Member 27 Feb. 2011 
Sayyid Shaaban Former Politburo Member 4 Mar. 2011 
Abdel Ghafar Shokr Former member 11 Jan. 2011 
Khaled Telema Youth leader 17 Mar. 2011 
Ahmed Bilal Youth member 24 Mar. 2011 
 
The Wafd Party 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Mahmoud Abaza Former Chair (2006-2010), 
Former MP (2005-2010) 
Jan. 19, 2011, 
Apr. 1, 2011 
Naaman Gomaa Former Chair (2000-2006) Mar. 6, 2011 
Yasin Tag el-Din Vice-Chair Jul. 19, 2010 
Fouad Badrawy Vice Chair (2006-2011), 
Secretary-General (2011-
present) 
Mar. 21, 2011 
Mounir Fakhry Abdelnour Secretary-General (2006-2011), 
former MP (2000-2005), current 
Minister of Tourism 
Aug. 10, 2010 
Ahmed Owda Assistant Secretary-General Jul. 6, 2010 
Iglal Rafit Assistant Secretary-General 
(2006-2010) 
Jul. 7, 2010 
Hussein Mansour Assistant Secretary-General  Jul. 4, 2010 
Ramzi Zaqalama Assistant Chair  Jul. 4, 2010 
Awatif Wali Assistant Chair  Jul. 18, 2010 
Hassan Abdel-Gowad High Committee Member Jul. 24, 2010 
Said Abdel-Khaliq High Committee Member, Editor 
of al-Wafd (1998-approx 2000, 
2009-2010); died in Dec. 2010 
Jul. 17, 2010 
Ahmed Abu-Ismail High Committee Member, 
former MP, former Minister of 
Finance under Sadat 
Jul. 15, 2010 
Mohamed al-Maliki High Committee Member and 
former MP (2010-2011) 
Aug. 9, 2010 
Abdel Aziz al-Nahhas High Committee Member, al-
Wafd journalist 
Jan. 19, 2011 
Salah al-Sabbagh High Committee Member, MP 
(2005-2010) 
Aug. 1, 2010 
Abbas al-Tarabily High Committee Member, Editor 
of al-Wafd (1987-2006) 
Aug. 8, 2010 
Margret Azer High Committee Member (2010-
present); former Secretary-
General of the Democratic Front 
Party 
Jan. 5, 2010 
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Salah Diab High Committee Member, 
billionaire owner of al-Masry al-
Youm 
Mar. 24, 2011 
Hossam el-Kholy High Committee Member, Wafd 
Youth Chair 
Mar. 20, 2011 
Ali ElSalmi High Committee Member, Prime 
Minister of “Shadow 
Government,” current vice-
Prime Minister of Egypt (since 
Jul. 2011) 
Mar. 1, 2011 
Ahmed Ezzelarab High Committee Member Jul. 10, 2010 
Mohamed Kamel High Committee Member, 
former Shura Council Member 
Jan. 23, 2011 
Refat Kamel High Committee Member Mar. 21, 2011 
Mona Korashy High Committee Member Aug. 5, 2010 
Abdel Salam Ragab High Committee Member Jan. 20, 2011 
Tarek Rushdi High Committee Member Jul. 26, 2010 
Mohamed Sherdy High Committee Member, Wafd 
Spokesperson, al-Wafd 
journalist, former MP (2005-
2010) 
Jan. 18, 2011, 
Jan. 24, 2011, 
Mar. 7, 2011 
Essam Shiha High Committee Member Jan. 17, 2011, 
Jan. 23, 2011 
Camilia Shokry High Committee Member and 
director of Wafd think tank 
Aug. 1, 2011 
Sherif Taher High Committee Member, Local 
Councilman (2008-present) 
Aug. 2, 2010, 
Jan. 29, 2011 
Mona Makram-Ebeid Former High Committee 
member, former member of the 
Shura Council, former Secretary-
General of the Ghad party 
Mar. 17, 2011 
Iglal Salam al-Maligi Member, Wafd youth Jul. 9, 2010 
Wahid Fawzi Foreign Minister of the “Shadow 
Government,” former 
Ambassador of Egypt to 
Portugal 
Jan. 22, 2011 
Mohamed Fouad Wafd Youth Committee 
Assistant Chair 
Mar. 16, 2011 
Mohamed Salah el-Sheikh Giza Vice-Chair, Wafd Youth 
member, ElBaradei campaign 
member 
Jun. 27, 2010, 
Mar. 12, 2011 
 
Ayman Nour’s Ghad Party 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
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Ayman Nour Chairman (2004-2005, 2010-
present) 
30 Jun. 2010 
Wael Nawara Secretary-general 6 Jul. 2010,  
12 Jul. 2010,  
29 Mar. 2011 
Mona al-Deeb (since resigned) Deputy chair 2 Aug. 2010 
Mohamed Abu el-Ezm Vice-chair 22 Jul. 2010 
Madhat Khafaga Vice-chair 13 Jul. 2010 
Abd el-Rahim Omar Vice-chair 13 Jul. 2010 
Morsi Sheikh (since resigned) Vice-chair 26 Jul. 2010 
Hussam al-Din Ali Ahmed Vice-secretary 15 Jul. 2010 
Hassan Sharbini Assistant Chair 14 Jul. 2010 
Yasir Mohammed Assistant Chair 22 Jul. 2010 
Ahmed Yesri Said Ahmed Assistant Secretary 18 Jul. 2010 
Walid Aboulkhayr Assistant Secretary 18 Jul. 2010 
Mohammed Farouk Assistant Secretary 22 Jul. 2010 
Samiya Hassan Assistant Treasurer 23 Jul. 2010 
Muhammad Gowda Deputy of the Party 13 Jul. 2010 
Islam Sobhi (died Aug. 2010) Deputy of the Party 15 Jul. 2010 
Faryal Gomaa Deputy of the Party 26 Jul. 2010 
Abdel Rahman al-Ghamrawy High Committee Member 17 Jul. 2010 
Fatiha Abu-Zeid High Committee Member 5 Aug. 2010 
Ruuf Abdel Monem High Committee Member 29 Jul. 2010 
Talaat Khalil High Committee Member 12 Jul. 2010 
Abdel Fattah Ghalib High Committee Member 1 Aug. 2010 
Shadi Taha High Committee Member 6 Jul. 2010 
Shadi Talaat High Committee Member 1 Aug. 2010 
Salah Kitkut High Committee Member 11 Jul. 2010 
Abdel Raziq al-Kilani High Committee Member 16 Jul. 2010 
Ihab el-Kholy Former chairman (2007-2010) 18 Jul. 2010 
Nagi al-Ghatrifi Former chairman (2006-2007); 
member of the Elders’ 
Committee 
28 Jul. 2010 
Gameela Ismail Former secretary-general (2006-
2008); Ayman Nour’s estranged 
wife 
22 Jul. 2010 
Moshira Mohasseb Member of Youth Committee 6 Aug. 2010 
 
Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s “Ghad” Party 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Moussa Mustafa Moussa Chairman 13 Jul. 2008,  
27 Jun. 2010,  
29 Jul. 2010,  
31 Jul. 2010,  
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28 Mar. 2011 
Rageb Helal Hemeda Secretary-general and member of 
parliament 
4 Aug. 2010;  
9 Aug. 2010 
Mohammed Sadiq Okasha Vice-chair for parliamentary 
affairs 
3 Jul. 2010 
Aref el-Desouki Vice-chair for developmental 
affairs 
6 Jul. 2010 
Ibrahim Saleh Vice-chair for policy and deputy 
in Ministry of Economic 
Development 
8 Jul. 2010 
Fawzi James Vice-chair for international 
organizations and civilian affairs 
5 Jul. 2010 
Naguib Gabriel Vice-chair for foreign affairs 3 Jul. 2010,  
29 Mar. 2011 
Ibrahim Nasser el-Din Vice-chair for African affairs 17 Jul. 2010 
Hassan Kemal Vice-chair for economic 
development 
21 Jul. 2010 
Reda Fanoos Vice-chair for industry and 
energy 
12 Jul. 2010 
Hesham Ali Vice-chair for commerce 19 Jul. 2010 
Ismail Ismail Vice-chair for media 21 Jul. 2010 
Walid Riad Assistant chair for public 
relations and information 
7 Jul. 2010 
Moussa Salah al-Din Moussa Party administrator 1 Jul. 2010 
Mahmoud Abdel Monem Moussa Party secretary for Menoufiya and 
Secretary-General 
7 Jul. 2010 
Mustafa al-Shorbagy Assistant secretary-general and 
party secretary for Sharkiya 
5 Jul. 2010 
Fatima Sheib Secretary for women and member 
of the executive committee 
14 Jul. 2010 
Ahmed Fikry Abdel-Ghani Rizk Party secretary for Giza and 
member of the executive 
committee 
5 Jul. 2010 
Abdel Fattah Fakhr el-Din High Committee Member 8 Aug. 2010 
Hamdi Layali High Committee Member 9 Aug. 2010 
Ahmed Ashour High Committee Member 27 Jul. 2010 
Magdy Fakhry Labib High Committee Member 9 Aug. 2010 
Hassan Abu el-Enein High Committee Member 27 Jul. 2010 
Samir al-Atifi High Committee Member 7 Jul. 2010 
Ibrahim el-Tobgui High Committee Member 10 Jul. 2010 
Ayman al-Katib High Committee Member 11 Jul. 2010 
 
* I interviewed one additional member of Moussa Mustafa Moussa’s “Ghad” party, but 
this individual has asked to remain anonymous because he feared retribution from the 
regime for meeting and speaking with an American researcher. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Mehdi Akef Former Supreme Guide 24 Jan. 2011 
Mohamed Habib Former Deputy Supreme Guide 8 Mar. 2011 
Mahmoud Ezzat Deputy Supreme Guide 14 Mar. 2011 
Saad al-Katatny Guidance Office Member, former 
MP and MB parliamentary bloc 
chair (2005-2010) 
29 Mar. 2011 
Saad Esmat al-Husseini Guidance Office Member 2 Mar. 2011 
Essam El-Erian Guidance Office Member 14 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed Morsi Guidance Office Member 3 Aug. 2011 
Ali Abdelfattah Alexandria leader 22 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed al-Beltagi Former MP (2005-2010, 2012) 26 Mar. 2011 
Gamal Hanafi Former MP (2005-2010) 13 Jan. 2011 
Khaled Hamza Editor-in-Chief, IkhwanWeb 10 Jan. 2011 
Mohamed Abdel Qadoos MB Journalists Syndicate leader, 
Kefaya member 
31 Mar. 2011 
Anas al-Qassas MB Youth 9 Mar. 2011 
Amr al-Beltagi MB Youth 9 Mar. 2011 
Magdy Ashour Former MB, Former MP (2005-
2011) 
7 Mar. 2011 
Ahmed Abdel Fattah Former MB blogger 26 Jun. 2010 
Abdel Monem al-Mahmoud Former MB blogger 30 Jun. 2010 
Magdy Amer Former MB 17 Jan. 2011 
Ibrahim Houdaiby Former MB 1 Mar. 2011 
 
Activists 
Name Affiliation Date(s) 
Esraa Abdel Fattah April 6th Youth Movement, 
Egyptian Democratic Academy 
6 Mar. 2011 
Tarek El-Kholy April 6th Youth Movement 13 Mar. 2011 
Amr Ezz April 6th Youth Movement 8 Mar. 2011 
Ahmed Maher April 6th Youth Movement 9 Mar. 2011 
Ahmed Salah April 6th Youth Movement 
(former) 
28 Jun. 2010, 
22 Jan. 2011, 
13 Mar. 2011 
Ahmed Naguib Board of Trustees of the 
Revolution 
20 Mar. 2011 
Nasser Abdel Hamid Democratic Front Party 15 Mar. 2011 
Shadi El-Ghazali Harb Democratic Front Party 8 Mar. 2011 
Abdel Rahman Samir ElBaradei Campaign 26 Feb. 2011 
Bilal Diab Ghad Party 20 Mar. 2011 
Bassem Fathi Ghad Party 10 Mar. 2011 
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Abdel Rahman Faris Independent activist 9 Mar. 2011 
Sally Moore Independent activist 13 Mar. 2011 
Mustafa Abbas Justice and Freedom Youth 27 Feb. 2011 
Ahmed Said Justice and Freedom Youth 27 Feb. 2011 
Haitham Salah Justice and Freedom Youth 3 Mar. 2011 
Khaled Sayed Justice and Freedom Youth 28 Feb. 2011 
Mustafa Shawqi Justice and Freedom Youth 5 Mar. 2011 
Hossam Moones Karama Party 15 Mar. 2011 
Hany Enan Kefaya 1 Mar. 2011 
George Ishak Kefaya 5 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed Abbas Muslim Brotherhood Youth 28 Feb. 2011 
Moaz Abdel Karim Muslim Brotherhood Youth 10 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed al-Qassas Muslim Brotherhood Youth 21 Mar. 2011 
Islam Lotfy  Muslim Brotherhood Youth 2 Mar. 2011 
Mosab Ragab Muslim Brotherhood Youth 7 Mar. 2011 
Hebah Ibrahim Nasserist Party 30 Mar. 2011 
Dalia Moussa Socialist Renewal 3 Mar. 2011 
Abdel Razek Eid Union of Revolutionary Youth 23 Mar. 2011 
Abdullah Helmi Union of Revolutionary Youth 23 Mar. 2011 
 
The Democratic Front Party 
Name Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Osama el-Ghazali Harb Chairman 28 Mar. 2011 
Yehya al-Gamal Former Chairman (2006-2007) 10 Jan. 2011, 
 27 Jan. 2011 
Rizk al-Mala Assistant Secretary-General 13 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed Mansour Hassan Executive Office Member 22 Mar. 2011 
Ibrahim Nawwar Executive Office Member 5 Mar. 2011 
Silwa Suleiman Executive Office Member 30 Mar. 2011 
Sameh Antoun Executive Office Member (former) 14 Mar. 2011 
Khaled Sarour Secretary of Organization and 
Membership 
10 Mar. 2011 
Shehab Wagih Secretary of Youth 12 Mar. 2011 
Salah Fadel High Committee Member 8 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed Nosseir High Committee Member 3 Mar. 2011 
 
Other Party Leaders Interviewed 
Name Party/Title Date(s) 
Interviewed 
Mustafa Abdel-Aziz Conservatives Party 4 Jul. 2010 
Magdy Qorqor Islamic Labor Party, leader 20 Jan. 2011 
Hamdeen Sabahi Karama Party, chairman 14 Mar. 2011 
Wahid Fakry al-Aqsary Misr Socialist Party, chairman 11 Jan. 2011 
Ahmed Hassan Nasserist Party, Secretary-General 19 Jan. 2011, 
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and Member of Shura Council 
(2010-2011) 
26 Jan. 2011 
Mohamed Sayyid Ahmed Nasserist Party, Secretary of 
Political Affairs 
16 Mar. 2011 
Ali Mohamed Nasserist Party, Secretary of 
Youth 
23 Mar. 2011 
Ghareb al-Damati Nasserist Party, Deputy Secretary 
of Youth 
16 Mar. 2011 
Mohamed Anwar Sadat Reform and Development Party, 
Chairman 
27 Mar. 2011 
Abouleila Madi Wasat Party, Chairman 26 Jan. 2011 
 
Experts and Journalists Consulted 
Name Affiliation/Title Date(s)  
Interviewed 
Hala Mustafa Al-Ahram Center 
for Political 
Studies, Al-
Dimuqratiya 
Journal, Editor-in-
Chief 
1 Jul. 2010,  
21 Jul. 2010 
Dina Shehata Al-Ahram Center 
for Political 
Studies, Senior 
Researcher 
2 Aug. 2010 
Mohamed Abdelbaky Al-Ahram Weekly, 
Journalist 
29 Jun. 2010,  
21 Jul. 2010,  
23 Jan. 2011 
Ahmed Samih The Andalus 
Center for 
Tolerance and 
Non-Violence 
Studies 
8 Jul. 2010,  
13 Jul. 2010 
Ziad Aly Alzwad, associate 
of Wael Ghonim 
24 Mar. 2011 
Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid Cairo University, 
Political Scientist 
5 Aug. 2010 
Mahmoud Ibrahem Egypt Campaigns, 
NDP Youth 
31 Jul. 2010,  
17 Jan. 2011,  
20 Mar. 2011 
Amin Taha Morsi Roz al-Yusuf, 
Journalist 
13 Jan. 2011 
Mahmoud Salem “Sandmonkey,” 
blogger 
29 Jun. 2010 
Said Ashamawy State Security 7 Jan. 2011 
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Court, former 
judge 
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